VZCZCXRO5966
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0373/01 1141531
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231531Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7916
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0034
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000373 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG UN
SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES: 04/12/08 - NORTH KIVU "GOMA" SPOILERS 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  For the last few weeks, there has been ferment 
within and among the North Kivu armed groups, particularly among 
those best known for close ties to the FDLR.  This message is based 
on reports of conversations between a MONUC military officer and 
some of these groups, and a talk between USAID Goma liaison officers 
and Clovis Munihire (protect), the North Kivu governor's liaison 
with armed groups and newly-appointed permanent secretary of the 
(as-yet-unformed) Amani Peace and Reconciliation Commission.  The 
questions at hand:  are there Acte d'Engagement spoilers among the 
North Kivu armed groups?  If so, should the Facilitation try to 
engage with them?  If yes, how?  This message raises these 
questions, but does not answer them -- we need to learn more first. 
End summary. 
 
PARECO:  Fragmenting?  Reconfiguring? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) PARECO, or people claiming to speak for it, has been 
threatening to withdraw from the Goma process since the appointment 
of Firmin Mathe, of its Nande branch, to a largely ceremonial post 
as a member of the Technical Harmonization Bureau (BTH) of the Joint 
Technical Commission on Peace and Security.  The noisiest agitator 
on this has been "Museveni," of the Hutu branch, who holds the title 
of PARECO "president" and who is the Hutu branch's focal point in 
Goma. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Museveni was arrested April 4 in connection with an alleged 
plot to induce the defection of Hutu FARDC units, perhaps to form a 
new Hutu militia.  He was released the next morning, evidently in 
order to head off a PARECO withdrawal from the Goma process on the 
eve of the April 6 inauguration of the Peace and Security 
Commission.  Museveni is still agitating, and threatening to take 
PARECO and other Mai-Mai groups (perhaps Kifuafua, Vurondo or 
Kasindien) with him, using the BTH issue as a pretext. 
 
¶4. (SBU) There is no question that filling the BTH slot was poorly 
handled by the Amani leadership.  There is an analogous issue in 
South Kivu -- in both cases, the armed groups' consensus nominees 
were given other Amani jobs and their BTH slots were arbitrarily 
filled by somebody else.  However, this is clearly not the whole 
issue, as shown by Museveni's arrest (along with several Hutu 
officers, who as far as we know are still detained). 
 
¶5. (SBU) PARECO -- especially its Hutu core under Commander Mugabo 
-- is by all accounts an FDLR proxy, created and supported by the 
GDRC/FARDC, or at least by elements therein. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Munihire maintains that:  a) many or most PARECO fighters 
are in fact themselves FDLR; and b) these and other FDLR fighters 
(or at least their cadres) continue, or continued until very 
recently, to receive GDRC financial support.  He is aware of monthly 
salary payments being made to them at least through October 2007. 
The middlemen on these payments are North Kivu National Assembly 
deputies in Kinshasa. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The ferment induced by the Nairobi process within the FDLR 
(withdrawals from many areas, signs of anxiety, or at least of 
changed tactics, as a result of the March 15 date signaled for 
military operations, the UNSC resolution, etc.) seems to be having 
an knock-on effect on PARECO.  They feel exposed, and are probably 
less at ease than ever with the Goma process.  The problems thus go 
far beyond the seemingly-trivial issue of the seat on the BTH, 
though the latter does reflect what PARECO Hutu see as a symptom of 
an unwelcome pro-Nande political tilt in the national government's 
approach to North Kivu affairs.  The appointment of Abbe Apollinaire 
Malumalu (a Nande from the Grand-Nord) as Amani national coordinator 
is a far stronger sign of this, in their eyes. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The issue has created strains between PARECO-Mugabo (Hutu, 
the main force) and PARECO-La Fontaine (Nande, much smaller; Firmin 
Mathe is La Fontaine's brother). 
 
¶9. (SBU) MONUC is planning a trip to Mugabo's headquarters in 
Rutshuru.  Members of the International Facilitation will accompany. 
 The ostensible purpose will be to verify whether Museveni is indeed 
empowered to act for PARECO (or at least PARECO-Hutu) with respect 
to issues such as  withdrawal threats, to express strong disapproval 
of such tactics, and to discuss the issue of the BTH slot. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Facilitation plans to use this opportunity to insist 
on the importance of PARECO's remaining in the Goma process and to 
point out that, with Nairobi pressures increasing in the coming 
months, it will be important for PARECO to rethink its overall 
position with respect to both processes, since UNSC resolutions and 
other sanctions will increasingly put pressures on FDLR:  PARECO has 
 
KINSHASA 00000373  002 OF 002 
 
 
no interest in being associated in any way with FDLR, and any 
association can only bring diminishing returns.  We will report 
septel on this trip, which is scheduled for April 19. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment:  Nairobi-related stresses may be causing a 
strategic rethink within PARECO-Mugabo and more broadly by militias 
that retain close ties with FDLR (which is most of them).  This 
could lead to some kind of fragmentation/ 
realignment involving existing or, potentially, new Hutu militias. 
This would be a bad outcome all around, but particularly for the 
Goma process.  PARECO might remain on paper as a nominal coalition 
(with Hutu, Nande, Hunde and far-smaller and perhaps only notional 
Tembo and Nyanga components) with a seat at the table in the Amani 
Program, but there could be a realignment on the ground and an 
expanding disconnect between any PARECO delegation to the JTCPS and 
any actual armed units.  The Peace and Security Commission could end 
up integrating/DDRing supernumerary PARECO, etc. units just as new 
Hutu militias form -- a very bad outcome indeed.  End comment. 
 
Other Forces 
--------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) It is known that not all armed groups in North Kivu are 
within the Goma process.  Two of these are, according to Munihire, 
of particular concern as potential spoilers: 
 
--  "Axe Nyabyondo:"  A Hunde militia in the highlands and along the 
escarpment northwest of Masisi town.  This group is closely involved 
with FDLR units, who accept the authority of the Hunde traditional 
chiefs and are allowed in return to share in the local mining of 
coltan and gold.  This is an obscure group, but it has particular 
potential as a spoiler because of its control of a key Masisi axis 
and, again, because of its control of significant income streams. 
There is a MONUC mobile operating base (MOB) at Nyabyondo, but it is 
very isolated, and there is little or no contact between this 
militia and MONUC or others. 
 
--  In fact, "Axe Nyabyondo's" main point of contact with the 
outside world is through a North National Assembly deputy and former 
provincial vice governor, Bakungu Mithondeke, in Kinshasa, who was 
present for the Goma conference but refused to sign the Acte 
d'Engagement.  Munihire , himself a Hunde, feels that it is time for 
some kind of contact with Bakungu by  which the increasing perils of 
involvement with FDLR and of continued isolation from and refusal of 
the Goma process can be made clear.  (Comment: We would need 
verification of Munihire's assertions and some further research into 
local issues before any such initiative could be credibly 
undertaken.  End comment.) 
 
--  Grand-Nord hold-outs:  Again per Munihire, there are still 
significant Nande armed units which have no direct link to any of 
the Goma signatories.  They are, again, associated with FDLR -- 
there may be as many as 3,000.  More needs to be learned about them, 
and about their links to the outside world.  For now, they should be 
considered potentially dangerous free radicals. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Comment:  This last point ties directly into concerns 
about the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the public-information 
efforts being conducted by Foreign Minister Mbusa Nyamwisi (also a 
Nande):  to what extent are Nande allies or proxies of the FDLR 
being made aware of the increased emphasis on and momentum behind 
Nairobi, let alone the FDLR themselves?   No one seems to know. 
More on this soon.  End comment. 
 
GARVELINK