VZCZCXRO6329
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0335/01 0991303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081303Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7863
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0015
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL CG
SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES 04/04/08 - SRSG DOSS BRIEFS THE HUMANITARIAN 
COMMUNITY 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  SRSG Doss described the UN Security Stabilization 
Strategy as an effective framework for coordinating North Kivu 
diplomatic, political, military and humanitarian initiatives an 
April 4 briefing in Goma.  He said that MONUC will give timely 
briefings to NGOs on military movements and is preparing dossiers on 
CNDP and FDLR human rights violations.  NGO reps pushed for better 
communication and consultation with government officials and leaders 
of the Amani program, noting that IDPs are mostly unaware of its 
existence.  Eastern Division Commander General Singh promised to 
arrange meetings between MONUC commanders and OCHA to discuss using 
military escorts to facilitate humanitarian operations.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SRSG Alan Doss outlined the UN Security Stabilization 
Strategy to representatives of UN agencies, MONUC, NGOs and the 
Goma-based International Facilitation at OCHA headquarters April 4. 
Doss regards the Strategy as an effective framework for coordinating 
diplomatic, political, military and humanitarian initiatives going 
forward.  He said it was not a master plan but a guide, 
incorporating principles from the Nairobi and Goma/Amani processes 
and covering activities in Kinshasa as well as eastern Congo.  The 
goal of the Strategy is to make these activities -- all of them in 
Congolese hands -- more coherent, to help the partners "sing 
harmoniously from the same hymn sheet." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Doss touched only briefly on military issues during his 
briefing.  Military activity should protect the civilian population 
but not supplant civilian activity, he said, creating humanitarian 
space but not filling it. 
 
Pressure on MONUC 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) In the following Q&A, NGO representatives appealed for help 
from MONUC military in several areas.  Exclusion zones 
notwithstanding, MSF's operations in Kivu are still hampered by 
violence, and population displacement continues.  Food is inadequate 
and people are reduced to eating electrolyte salts.  MSF asked for 
regular, transparent military briefings to be able to prepare for 
disruptions in certain areas, notably villages northwest of Sake, 
where bands of PARECO fighters are disintegrating into smaller 
groups of looters.  MSF's rep noted that in both Goma and Masisi 
there is always the risk that a single stray bullet will scare off 
international humanitarian agencies, leaving the population again 
without help. 
 
¶5. (SBU) WFP complained that the general situation in North Kivu is 
deteriorating.  Bad roads prevent sufficient assistance from 
arriving in affected areas.  Only MONUC has the capacity to operate 
in the province and provide escort for WFP trucks if ordered.  WFP's 
rep predicted the remaining road infrastructure will collapse within 
2-3 weeks, and with it humanitarian assistance to Walikali and 
Masisi territories. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Doss committed to timely briefing by MONUC on military 
movements, excluding certain operational details.  As for road 
improvements, he suggested using engineers from the South Kivu-based 
Pakistani battalion, and promised to consult further with MONUC's 
North Kivu Brigade regarding humanitarian escort.  Eastern Division 
Commander General Bikram Singh agreed to support these approaches. 
Doss urged all partners to help out agencies experiencing troubles 
since MONUC is not equipped to solve all problems. 
 
Human rights 
------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Human rights organizations turned the conversation to 
sexual violence perpetrated by members of armed groups.  Doss 
declared flatly that this will not end until all the groups are 
dismantled.  He said that sexual violence is embedded in some local 
cultures and that much time will be needed before attitudes change. 
In anticipation of action against armed groups, MONUC is preparing 
detailed dossiers on CNDP and FDLR human rights violations.  (Note: 
Some reps complained on the margins of the briefing that the issue 
was not getting higher priority.  Is it right, one representative 
asked, that a Congolese woman should be raped by soldiers of her own 
army and left to wait until cultures change before she gets help? 
End note.) 
 
Calls for outreach 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) NGO reps pushed for better communication and consultation 
with government officials and leaders of the Amani program.  They 
 
KINSHASA 00000335  002 OF 002 
 
 
claimed that IDPs, for example, are mostly unaware of Amani's 
creation and other important changes.  This political-diplomatic 
work needs to move closer to its targets, along with the vision of 
the Congolese participants in the program. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Singh said that MONUC military can help advance the 
process.  He promised to bring commanders from MONUC's Kivu-based 
forces to meet with OCHA on how to use military escorts to 
facilitate humanitarian operations.  Doss added that police are also 
essential to the stabilization process and noted that Interior 
Minister Denis Kalume recently agreed to enhanced police presence in 
Goma.  Doss ended the meeting with an axiom:  Visibility plus 
mobility yields stability and reduced violence. 
 
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