VZCZCXRO1487
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0654/01 1201614
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291614Z APR 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0686
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000654 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AF/C, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, FFP/W, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/EA/FFP, OFDA/ECARO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND BPITTMAN 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR FSHANKS 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI UN SU
SUBJECT: WFP TO REDUCE DARFUR FOOD AID RATIONS IN MAY 
 
KHARTOUM 00000654  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (U) On April 14, the UN World Food Program (WFP) informed key 
donors that in May it would be forced to nearly halve the general 
food aid ration distributed in Darfur, due to ongoing banditry 
against contracted commercial vehicles resulting in decreased 
commodity dispatches.  WFP issued a press release announcing the 
impending reduction on April 17.  A rash of banditry since late 2007 
has pushed WFP's transport capacity to the limit as drivers now 
refuse to travel without a Government of Sudan police escort. 
However, insufficient escort capacity has significantly reduced 
commodity dispatches to Darfur at a time when WFP should be building 
up warehouse stocks in advance of the rainy season.  The decision to 
reduce rations is meant to stretch stocks of food so that WFP can 
resume full rations during the height of the hunger season 
(July-September), when food aid needs are highest. End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
A DANGEROUS ROAD TO TRAVEL 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Though carjackings, lootings and abductions have been a 
persistent and insidious risk for humanitarian groups operating in 
Darfur since 2003, the deliberate targeting of Sudanese commercial 
trucks carrying humanitarian goods is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.  Attacks on commercial transport picked up significantly 
in September 2007 and have continued apace in 2008. 
 
¶3. (U) According to WFP, since January 1 60 WFP-contracted 
commercial trucks have been hijacked in Darfur.  Thirty-nine trucks 
have yet to be recovered and 26 drivers remain unaccounted-for. One 
driver was killed last month while attempting to deliver commodities 
to Nyala. 
 
¶4. (SBU) WFP security has classified incidents in three main 
categories: 
 
- Banditry against one or two vehicles: incidents usually result in 
the theft of food cargo, communications equipment, or money.  Some 
incidents have resulted in abduction and ransom demands for the 
driver.  Most incidents of this kind have taken place along the Ed 
Daein-Nyala road and along the Nyala-Kass-Zalingei road. 
 
- Banditry against large convoys, including convoys of empty trucks: 
WFP security speculates that these incidents are primarily meant to 
replenish rebel groups' logistics (transport assets) and to sell 
stolen trucks on the black market in Chad.  Transporters have 
reported to WFP that they are aware of at least nine of their stolen 
trucks now with Chadian plates operating on the other side of the 
border.  A significant majority of these incidents (24) have 
occurred along the En Nahud (Western Kordofan) to El Fasher road in 
North Darfur. 
 
- Taxation at checkpoints: incidents of taxation or extortion occur 
primarily in rebel-held areas, or areas that are only loosely 
patrolled by GOS military and police.  WFP security speculates that 
armed groups - both rebels and GOS-allied militia - are increasingly 
using the taxation of commercial traffic as another means of funding 
their operations. 
 
------------------- 
WAITING FOR ESCORTS 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) WFP-contracted transporters are now refusing to deliver food 
from logistics hubs outside of Darfur (El Obeid, Khartoum) without a 
GOS police escort.  Further, in South Darfur, the GOS is requiring 
all commercial traffic to have a GOS police escort and threaten to 
fine/detain drivers that don't comply. 
 
¶6. (U) Though WFP notes that GOS police escorts have likely deterred 
some attacks - particularly in South Darfur - banditry even on 
escorted convoys continues.  For large convoys (greater than 100 
trucks) travel over long stretches of road, in particular, 
well-armed bandits are able to quickly attack and steal vehicles 
from the middle of convoys before the lead and follow vehicles have 
time to respond. 
 
¶7. (U) The unfortunate consequence of transporters' demand, as well 
 
KHARTOUM 00000654  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
as GOS requirements, for escorts has been a significant reduction in 
commodity deliveries from logistical hubs to warehouse locations 
within Darfur.  Due to limited capacity and slow GOS response at the 
state and local levels, convoys are often backed up awaiting 
escorts.  The net result has been an overall decrease in trucking 
turnaround times and delivery speed. 
 
¶8. (U) WFP generally aims to keep at least one month's food aid 
requirement - two months during the rainy season - in each Darfur 
state at any given time.  To maintain these stocks, WFP must 
dispatch between 40,000 - 60,000 metric tons to Darfur each month, 
depending on seasonal variations in the beneficiary caseload.   Due 
to the inefficient pace of escorts and decreased turnaround time, 
however, WFP is now only able to deliver approximately 30,000 metric 
tons to Darfur each month.  As a result, WFP's buffer stocks are 
being drawn down at a worrying rate. 
 
 
--------------------- 
BETTER NOW THAN LATER 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) At present, WFP has sufficient food stocks in the pipeline - 
meaning either in Darfur, in logistical hubs elsewhere in Sudan, or 
committed by donors but not yet in Sudan - to provide full rations 
to the planned caseload through September (assuming no hindrances to 
internal deliveries, which is not the case currently).  Further, WFP 
forecasts sufficient stocks in Darfur warehouses to distribute full 
rations in May - over 67,000 metric tons still in stock by end 
April.  Nonetheless, WFP took the decision to reduce the May ration 
in order to ensure that food stocks would be available for full 
rations during the more critical months later in the summer, when 
food insecurity and humanitarian needs are at their peak. 
 
¶10. (U) Specifically, WFP will reduce the cereals, pulses and sugar 
portion of the general ration, planned for 2.8 million people in 
Darfur during the month of May, by 50 percent.  The other 
commodities - oil, corn-soya blend (CSB), and salt - will remain at 
full ration size.  The overall kilo-calorie value of the ration will 
drop from the recommended 2,156 kcals per day to 1,242 kcals per 
day, representing an overall 40 percent reduction in the intended 
ration size. 
 
¶11. (U) WFP has revised their dispatch strategy to prioritize 
non-cereal deliveries in May, given their nutritional importance 
relative to cereals.  Assuming present dispatch rates - 50 percent 
of planned amounts due to the delays with escorts - WFP forecasts 
being able to restore a full pulses ration in June; sugar rations 
will depend on the timely delivery of planned imports.  Also based 
on present dispatch rates, WFP believes it will be able to restore 
full cereal rations in July.  Without the reductions made in May and 
June, and assuming current, diminished delivery rates into Darfur, 
WFP would run out of food by the middle of June, and would not have 
sufficient stock or inflows to continue meeting the needs of an 
expanded caseload in July.  Note:  During the hunger gap months of 
July-September, WFP's total caseload in Darfur increases to a peak 
of approximately 3.1 million beneficiaries, well above the average 
monthly caseload of 2.3-2.4 million beneficiaries during the rest of 
the year. 
 
¶12. (U) Based on current nutritional and food security indicators, 
WFP does not believe that the ration reductions will significantly 
affect the humanitarian situation before full rations can be 
restored.  On the other hand, if the cuts were to take place during 
the hunger season and/or be greater than 50 percent, the risk, in 
humanitarian terms, would be much more significant.  Among all 
humanitarian actors, the biggest worry about the reductions is not a 
deterioration of humanitarian conditions but the risk of unrest in 
IDP camps throughout Darfur.  WFP and its implementing partners are 
reaching out to camp leaders to explain the rationale for the 
impending reduction. 
 
------------------------ 
LIMITED RESPONSE OPTIONS 
------------------------ 
 
¶13. (U) Barring any significant breakthrough on the peace process 
and assuming that UNAMID capacity will continue to be constrained 
for the near future, the international community's options to halt, 
or even marginally disrupt, the rash of banditry occurring in Darfur 
are limited given the lucrative nature of the robberies to rebel 
 
KHARTOUM 00000654  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
groups and to the black market in Chad.  WFP is procuring additional 
banners to provide to commercial transporters so that vehicles can 
be clearly marked as carrying humanitarian aid, and has publicized 
the reasons for the ration reduction in the local press. 
 
¶14. (U) Given the significant quantities involved, WFP does not 
believe that restarting airlifts out of El Obeid and/or Al Kufra 
(Libya) are feasible or desirable options at this time for making up 
the current gap in overland deliveries.  At the height of the air 
operations in 2005, WFP was transporting 11,000 metric tons per 
month by air (5,000 MT/month from El Obeid and 6,000 MT/month from 
Al Kufra)- less than half of the amount needed to make up the 
present transport shortfall.  Nonetheless, WFP is investigating 
options for keeping two IL-76 airplanes on standby in El Obeid, 
which would offer approximately 3,000 MT additional transport 
capacity per month.  If the situation warranted returning to 
airlifts to deliver food into Darfur, WFP would look to use this 
capacity strategically, for transporting high-value commodities 
(non-cereals) and only for areas where humanitarian indicators are 
most severe or life-threatening. 
 
¶15. (U) According to WFP, the only realistic, immediate term option 
for increasing deliveries is to increase the number and frequency of 
GOS escorts for commercial transport - police, military or national 
security.  More frequent and efficient escorts would increase truck 
turnaround time and minimize convoy backup at logistical hubs, not 
to mention attacks on longer convoys.  WFP does not believe that 
more regular patrols - either by GOS forces or UNAMID - would help 
the situation, given the long distances involved. 
 
----------------------- 
GOS APPEARS RESPONSIVE 
----------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) WFP has approached UN leadership in Khartoum to discuss 
the possibility of UNAMID escorts along the most problematic route 
(En Nahud - El Fasher), and discussions are ongoing.  WFP reported 
to USAID/FFP staff that at a meeting between WFP leadership, HAC, 
GOS National Security and the heads of WFP's main transport 
companies April 24, the GOS pledged to provide police escorts every 
48 hours for convoys traveling from logistical hubs to Darfur.  WFP 
stated that this pledge, if actually implemented, will make a 
significant difference in trucking turnaround times and would bring 
primary deliveries to Darfur back up to target levels, assuming the 
security situation does not continue to deteriorate. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶17. (U) The ration reductions planned for May and June are the 
unfortunate but necessary triage that has to occur when faced with 
significantly reduced supply, growing demand and the time 
limitations of the approaching hunger and rainy season.  While a 
severe deterioration of humanitarian conditions due to the ration 
reduction is not expected at this time, USAID will continue to 
closely monitor the situation, particularly any signs of unrest in 
IDP camps once rations begin to be distributed in early May. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The US Mission will continue to impress on rebel leaders 
that banditry against humanitarian and commercial vehicles not only 
hurts their people through reduced service delivery, but makes any 
prospect of recovery and development in Darfur a distant possibility 
if commercial transport cannot be assured safety along even primary 
roads.  One unexplored option would be to somehow seek to dry up the 
lucrative black market trade in stolen property in Chad - a 
difficult prospect. Likewise, the US Mission will continue to press 
the GOS to increase the number and frequency of escorts allocated to 
commercial vehicles carrying humanitarian cargo.  Following the 
US-Sudan bilateral talks in Rome, and the discussion of escorts for 
humanitarian convoys, the GOS made a commitment to provide 
additional security and escorts along WFP's routes.  Although 
limited in their capacity to provide security along the long routes, 
it appears that the GOS is making a concerted effort to appease 
donors and improve the situation. 
 
FERNANDEZ