VZCZCXRO0589
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0650/01 1200958
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290958Z APR 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0673
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0186
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0231
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0310
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000650 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF/C, IO, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC CD ET SU
SUBJECT: TCCS FORCE AGWAI TO CHANGE UNAMID PRIORITIES 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 434 
¶B. KHARTOUM 502 
¶C. KHARTOUM 573 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID) Force Commander (FC) Agwai compromised on his number one 
deployment priority while in Addis Ababa, according to UNAMID's 
Chief of Planning.  As he did with the Egyptians in Um Kadada (ref 
A), Agwai agreed to let the Ethiopian battalion deploy as a whole 
only to one location, Kulbus, instead of splitting it between Kulbus 
and Silea, as had been his intention, given the rampant insecurity 
in that part of the Chad-Sudan border.  Problems on the engineering 
and procurement sides of the house are preventing Agwai's other top 
priority, construction of a camp at Korma, from commencing, and lack 
of staffing in UNAMID's Movement Control (MOVCON) division is 
prolonging delays in getting equipment to forces on the ground. 
This situation is exacerbated by the possible departures within the 
next month of the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Force Commander, 
leading the Planning Chief to ask, "Who is Agwai going to lean on 
then?"  END SUMMARY. 
 
ETHIOPIANS PLAYING SAME GAME AS EGYPTIANS 
----------------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) In an April 27 meeting, UNAMID Chief of Planning debriefed 
FieldOff on his 16-19 April visit with FC Agwai to Addis Ababa 
[NOTE: Agwai proceeded to New York after his Addis stop and is 
expected to return to Sudan within the coming days.  END NOTE].  He 
described the FC's meeting with the Ethiopian Army Chief of Staff, 
Samora Yunis, as a "breath of fresh air after Cairo," where the FC 
had had a contentious meeting with Egyptian MoD officials as he 
attempted to sway them to re-locate their pledged battalion from 
Sector South to Sector North (ref A). 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to the Planning Chief, Yunis was upfront with the 
FC about the GoE's unhappiness at the "lack of notice" about the 
FC's intention to re-locate Ethiopia's pledged battalion from the 
relatively quiet Sector North El Fasher Headquarters to more 
volatile Kulbus and Silea in Sector West (ref A), per the FC's 
designation of these locations as priority spots for UNAMID, given 
the rampant insecurity in this area of the Chad-Sudan border.  Yunis 
expressed concern that this area was controlled by the 
Chadian-supported Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel group, 
whom he had been trying unsuccessfully to contact as a pre-emptive 
measure ahead of the battalion's eventual arrival.  Yunis mentioned 
that there was "an Eritrean brigadier" operating in JEM's ranks in 
this territory, which raised some flags for the GoE [NOTE: Several 
high-ranking JEM leaders and field commanders carry Eritrean, as 
well as Chadian, passports. END NOTE]. 
 
¶4. (SBU) As a compromise, Yunis told the FC that the Ethiopian 
battalion would not occupy both Kulbus and Silea initially but would 
go first as a whole to Kulbus in order to build confidence with the 
Government of Sudan, with JEM and with local populations.  (Comment: 
This seems unnecessary, given the "special" relationship that 
already exists between the GoE and the GoS. End comment.)  Yunis 
said the Ethiopian battalion would patrol to Silea but would not 
occupy that area for at least the first three months of the 
battalion's deployment.  Egypt struck a similar deal when the FC 
asked the Egyptian MoD in March to re-locate its pledged battalion 
from the calmer Sector South Nyala Headquarters to more unsettled Um 
Kadada and Shangil Tobaye in Sector North as part of his 
prioritization plans for deployment.  The Egyptians agreed to go as 
a full unit only to Um Kadada (there are currently 69 Egyptians 
there), which the FC now considers a "wasted deployment." 
 
¶5. (SBU) FieldOff pressed the Planning Chief on the FC's willingness 
to compromise on his deployment priorities for Sector West, 
especially on his failure to dictate terms as Force Commander on a 
battalion whiQQQ1CVQQ 
v would engage with JEM 
himself upon his return to Darfur.  The Planning Chief acknowledged, 
however, that neither the FC nor he had had time in fall 2007 to 
focus on where to deploy the additional Egyptian and Ethiopian 
battalions which UN HQ ordered them to accept, since the FC was 
preoccupied with sorting out MSA payments for rebel commanders and 
since the Planning Chief was the Acting Chief of Staff at the time. 
"That's how we got ourselves into this mess," he admitted, when they 
made the decision at that time to "dump" the additional battalions 
into the El Fasher and Nyala super-camps. 
 
OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS HINDER OTHER FC PRIORITIES 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶6. (SBU) In addition to the Ethiopian refusal to deploy to Silea, 
 
KHARTOUM 00000650  002 OF 002 
 
 
engineering, contracting and procuring problems threaten other FC 
deployment priorities.  In particular, the Planning Chief noted that 
"nothing has happened on Korma," where the FC planned to have 
constructed a new camp for a rotating Rwandan battalion, a second 
priority for 2008 deployment (ref A).  Engineering contracts for 
this construction had not yet been competed, and "you know how long 
it takes the UN to do that," the Chief of Planning warned.  Contrary 
to the Acting Chief of Integrated Support Services' assurances in 
ref c, construction that was to have begun on the new Silea camp in 
mid-April has not yet begun, as land there has not yet been 
procured. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Persistent issues with local contractors continue to plague 
the delivery of equipment to TCCs.  According to the Planning Chief, 
over 70 items for the Chinese engineering party in Nyala still 
remain in Port Sudan due to a local contractor issue that is "out of 
our control."  The Planning Chief noted that much of the Egyptian 
equipment destined for Um Kadada had already been moved but that 
forklifts needed to get this equipment off the trucks were not 
available.  Finally, the UN had yet to negotiate contracts with 
local traQJQQu this department had only a 
recently-arrived Chief to coordinate its operations. 
 
GAPS IN SENIOR LEADERSHIP MAKE EVERYTHING WORSE 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶8. (SBU) It was not only gaps at the working level that were 
plaguing UNAMID deployment progress, but potential vacancies at the 
top as well, starting with the British Chief of Staff (CoS), said 
the Planning Chief.  Despite an alleged order by UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations Chief Guhenno for the FC and the Joint 
Special Representative to engage the GoS personally on extending the 
CoS' contract until the end of May, no such intervention has yet 
been made.  If the GoS insists, as expected, that the CoS leave by 
30 April, then Chief Operations Officer COL Joseph Prah (Ghana) will 
likely be Acting, a decision that even El Fasher DPA signatory rebel 
movements admit will be a "catastrophe" for the mission (Prah is 
currently seized with getting his holiday plans approved rather than 
dealing with operational problems in the mission). 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Planning Chief was also concerned that the Rwandan 
Deputy Force Commander (D/FC) may return to El Fasher on May 4 only 
to pack his bags and leave the mission, due to allegations by a 
Spanish investigation about the murder of a Canadian priest in 
Rwanda in 1997.  The D/FC's Military Assistant has not confirmed the 
Deputy's departure from UNAMID, and most people in the mission are 
holding out hope he will stay.  If he and the CoS go, the Planning 
Chief wondered aloud, "who will Agwai lean on then?" 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶10. (SBU) UNAMID needs to get its priorities straight, and this 
necessity is something UN HQ in New York needs to respect, as do 
TCCs.  It is already bad enough that Secretary-General (SYG) Ban 
Ki-moon struck a unilateral deal with President Bashir in Dakar by 
which he accepted an additional battalion from Egypt and Ethiopia 
for UNAMID without the concurrence of the Force Commander, leaving 
the FC to re-jigger deployment plans to accommodate them.  Now TCCs 
are acting like the GoS in dictating to the FC where they do and do 
not want to deploy, giving everyone else in this mission final say 
over deployment except for the one person who should be informing 
all military decisions.  The loss of senior UNAMID personnel would 
not be felt to such a degree if there were a hard and fast 
deployment plan in place, rather than one that changes at the whim 
of certain TCCs.  Giving TCCs this kind of latitude is perhaps 
unavoidable but remains a dangerous precedent to set, and UN HQ 
should step in to stop it. 
 
¶11. (SBU) With its additional battalion to Um Kadada, Egypt is now 
the third largest troop contributor to UNAMID, and as such will 
likely seek a Sector Commander appointment.  From UNAMID's 
perspective, such an appointment would be a mistake, as it considers 
Egyptian troops ineffective, disliked by Darfuris, and complicit 
with the GoS but deals made elsewhere may preclude a more effective 
use of resources on the ground in Darfur. 
 
¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ