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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM647, GOSS REGIONAL AFFAIRS UNDERSCRETARY ON SPLM POLITITICAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM647 2008-04-28 12:59 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9691
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0647/01 1191259
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281259Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0666
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000647 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, DRL, AND EEB/IFD 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID SOCI KCRM SU
SUBJECT: GOSS REGIONAL AFFAIRS UNDERSCRETARY ON SPLM POLITITICAL 
DYNAMICS, CHINA, AND THE SUDAN CONSORTIUM 
 
REF: STATE 41697 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  In a wide ranging conversation April 25, the 
Undersecretary of the GoSS Ministry of Regional Cooperation said 
that the Council of Minister's vote to delay the census in the South 
reflected South Sudan's internal ethnic anxieties, that it is 
unclear whether President Kiir will run for President of Sudan in 
2009, and that China is interested in strengthening its presence in 
the South, but that his Ministry lacks the resources to engage right 
now.  The GoSS hopes that the U.S. will send a political-level 
representative to next month's Sudan Consortium to signal that Sudan 
remains a high U.S. priority.  End summary. 
 
President Kiir and the Census 
----------------------------- 
2.  (SBU) On April 25, Juba ConOffs met with Ministry of Regional 
Cooperation (the defacto GoSS Foreign Ministry) Undersecretary and 
SPLM insider Cirino Hiteng Ofuho.  Cirino noted that he had just 
returned from his home village in Eastern Equatoria state, where he 
had gone with his family to be counted in the census.  CG Datta 
asked Cirino's view on what was behind the recent vote of the GoSS 
Council of Ministers (later reversed) to significantly delay the 
census in the South.  Was it a revolt against the authority of 
President Kiir, who had endorsed holding the census as scheduled? 
 
3.  (SBU) Cirino thought that the opposition was more a reflection 
of the dynamics of South Sudan's ethnic/tribal anxieties.  He said 
that many of South Sudan's tribes fear that the census will indicate 
that they are less numerous than they would like to believe compared 
to other ethnic groups in the South.  There is a fear, he said, of 
being shown to be a minority by an undercount (or accurate count) 
and thus become vulnerable.  In the Council, the Ministers had cast 
their votes based on the perceived interest of their native tribes. 
The Council's vote on the census was not a reflection on Kiir's 
authority.  Kiir remains strong and secure as leader of the SPLM, he 
said. 
 
Will Kiir Run for President of Sudan? 
------------------------------------- 
4.  (SBU) Asked whether he thinks it likely that Kiir will run for 
President of Sudan in the 2009 elections, Cirino responded that it 
is a difficult issue.  Many in the SPLM think there is no point in 
Kiir running, since Southerners are likely to vote for independence 
from the North in the 2011 referendum anyway.  There is growing 
disenchantment among GoSS/SPLM leadership with CPA implementation. 
The NCP is not making unity very attractive.  Much will depend on 
what happens at the SPLM convention in May. 
 
5.  (SBU) CG Datta noted that the people of the South seem to be 
giving up on the CPA, but observed that it is too early to do so. 
Cirino agreed that the SPLM needs to develop a national policy for 
all of Sudan, not just for the South, for the 2009 elections.  He 
said that South Sudan Legislative Assembly Speaker Wani Igga had 
just returned from a tour of the North impressed with the level of 
potential support there for the SPLM. 
 
Rising Crime in Juba 
-------------------- 
6.  (SBU) CG shared a draft letter from the international community 
in Juba, expressing concern at the recent rise in violent crime. 
NGOs in particular have been targets of robberies, because they must 
hold large amounts of cash on hand due to the lack of banking 
services in South Sudan.  Many are feeling increasingly vulnerable 
and are starting to move out of Juba.  Cirino noted that the Council 
of Ministers is seized with the issue and took up the problem on 
April 21. 
 
China in South Sudan 
----------------------- 
7.  (SBU) CG asked about South Sudan's relations with China 
(reftel), noting President Kiir's summer of 2007 visit to Beijing 
and more recent newspaper reports.  Cirino said that the Chinese 
have expressed an interest in strengthening political and economic 
ties with the South, but there has been little follow-up.  Cirino 
blamed this on a lack of capacity in his own Ministry to adequately 
keep up with multiple issues. Instead, it is focusing its time and 
limited resources on developing relations with a few high-priority 
partners, e.g., immediate neighbors, the U.S. and the EU.  Cirino 
agreed when CG Datta noted that many South Sudanese seem to view 
China with suspicion because of its close ties to the government in 
Khartoum. 
 
Sudan Consortium 
---------------- 
8.  (SBU)  Cirino asked about the level of U.S. participation at the 
May 5-7 Sudan Consortium in Oslo.  The GoSS hopes for 
political-level attendance by the U.S. (the Secretary or Deputy 
 
KHARTOUM 00000647  002 OF 002 
 
 
Secretary), even if for just one day.  Cirino said that this would 
 
SIPDIS 
demonstrate continued U.S. political support for Sudan and would 
greatly bolster GOSS President Kiir.  The NCP, he said, would like 
to keep the Consortium meeting low-key and out of the headlines. 
U.S. political-level participation would send a strong signal that 
Sudan has not been forgotten. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment: The GOSS, which did not exist three years ago, is 
stretched very thin and suffers in many respects from inexperience 
and a lack of capacity.  There is an interest, as Cirino indicated, 
in engaging China, and a realization that doing so might help to 
pull China away from support for the NCP in the North, but by 
Cirino's own admission it is beyond their ability to engage further 
than they already have.  They simply do not have the staff who are 
capable of handling all of the tasks they currently have before 
them.  As for the Consortium meeting in Oslo, this is the second 
time the GoSS has appealed to the US to send a high level political 
delegation.  It is true that Kiir's reputation and status in the 
South will be hurt if the US is thought not to have backed him up by 
helping him to engage the meeting on the issues of Darfur and the 
CPA, which he plans to raise.  We urge high-level participation if 
at all possible; attendance by Special Envoy Williamson would send 
the right signal. 
 
FERNANDEZ