VZCZCXRO1945
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0644 1161141
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251141Z APR 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0662
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000644 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y  -  REMOVED 'TRIPOLI MINIMIZED CONSIDERED' 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, DS/IP/AF, DS/DSS/CC 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU SU ASEC
SUBJECT: JANJAWEED FIGHTING CONTINUES INSIDE EL FASHER 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 557 
 
B) KHARTOUM 538 
 
¶1. (SBU) In yet another example of the clashes between Government of 
Sudan (GoS) military forces and unruly janjaweed elements that have 
been plaguing El Fasher for almost one month, on April 21 at 
approximately 2300 a truck of GoS Special Forces officers was 
stopped at a checkpoint in east El Fasher by Central Reserve Police 
(otherwise known as Border Intelligence Forces or janjaweed).  The 
Special Forces officers were reportedly attempting to re-fuel, to 
which the Central Reserve Police objected given the lateness of the 
hour. 
 
¶2. (SBU) According to UN and outside sources, the Central Reserve 
Police then initiated shooting, which lasted approximately one hour 
and by all accounts was heavy, given the type of weapons used 
(reports say machine gun fire).  By the time the fighting subsided, 
one from each side was killed, including one Special Forces 
intelligence officer, who died on the spot.  A Lieutenant Colonel in 
the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) confirmed the 
death of this officer, as did UNAMID sources.  The identity of the 
other person killed remains unknown. 
 
¶3. (SBU) There were reportedly up to 23 injured, who were taken to 
the El Fasher military hospital.  Some of these injuries were 
considered critical and were referred to the civilian hospital for 
advanced care, reportedly leading to the premature discharge of 
patients already being treated there to free up bed space for the 
wounded soldiers. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Central Reserve Police involved in the incident were 
withdrawn to their camp in east El Fasher, near the Shala Prison, in 
an attempt to defuse tensions between the sides.  This "evacuation" 
did not create the calm envisioned, as during the afternoon of April 
22, GoS National Security attacked the Police in their camp.  UN 
sources consider this action to be in retaliation for the clash the 
night before.  The retaliation continued on April 23 at 0900, when 
shooting resumed between the National Security and Central Reserve 
Police forces near UN warehouse facilities.  National Security 
maintained a heavy presence in that area until approximately 1300, 
resulting in restricted staff movement until its posture relaxed. 
No casualties were reported from that incident. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Comment: There remains a fair amount of speculation among 
El Fasher residents as to the reason behind this continuation of 
GoS-janjaweed element fighting.  The most likely indicates it was 
another manifestation of festering janjaweed frustration due to the 
GoS' non-payment of their salaries.  As this issue remains 
unresolved (and exacerbated by the payment of some forces but notR2JQrces may 
very well be getting somewhere with their tactics, however.  The 
Special Forces whom it engaged had been dispatched from Khartoum to 
serve as protection at the El Fasher branch of the Bank of Khartoum, 
in the event that the disgruntled Police tried to storm the facility 
to take their payment by force.  Since the April 21 incident, the 
Special Forces have withdrawn from their posts; on April 24 FieldOff 
observed no significant armed presence in front of the Bank, where 
one had previously been stationed.  The GoS' tight-lipped response 
to the encounter, which the NISS LTC dismissed as "friendly fire" 
and which another GoS representative claimed was instigated by 
"unknown assailants," indicates that it is trying to save face 
against a threat that it may have considerably underestimated. 
Given GoS liquidity problems, it's not surprising that there are 
some problems paying salaries, but one would think that payment of 
modest salaries to front line foot soldiers in Darfur would be a top 
priority, especially in the absence of adequate "regular" forces. 
We expect that the GoS will move to solve this situation quickly, 
before it loses even more support from fractious and unhappy Arab 
tribal elements in Darfur - the last popular support it retains, 
albeit tenuously - in Darfur. 
 
FERNANDEZ