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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM630, SOUTHERN KORDOFAN - HUMANITARIAN UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM630 2008-04-24 08:05 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6557
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0630/01 1150805
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240805Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0643
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0058
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0179
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0062
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0226
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000630 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, PRM, AF SE WILLIAMSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SP, USAID/W DCHA SUDAN 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND BPITTMAN 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
NEW YORK FOR FSHANKS 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
USMISSION UN ROME FOR RNEWBERG 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI UN SU
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN KORDOFAN - HUMANITARIAN UPDATE 
 
KHARTOUM 00000630  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1. (U) Begin Summary:  From April 5 to 15, a USAID/OFDA program 
officer conducted site visits in Kadugli, Abu Gebeha, Talodi, and 
Kauda areas in Southern Kordofan State.  The USAID/OFDA officer 
monitored USAID/OFDA-funded programs, particularly in the rural 
health sector, and met with humanitarian actors and local officials 
to review the current humanitarian situation in the state. 
According to humanitarian agencies, additional emphasis on 
reintegration and recovery activities is critically needed in the 
coming months.  The flooding that occurred from July to October 2007 
negatively impacted the harvest in the areas visited, impeding 
recent returnees' efforts to recover household assets and improve 
their food security.  During the USAID/OFDA officer's visit to the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)-controlled area of Kauda, 
it was apparent that the presence of two parallel governance systems 
in the state -- one linked to the north and the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) and one linked to the SPLM party in the Nuba 
Mountains -- has resulted in a complex and highly politicized 
environment within which relief organizations are struggling to work 
with the relevant authorities to implement recovery and development 
activities.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
RETURNS IN SOUTHERN KORDOFAN STATE 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) During the war, many communities in the Nuba Mountains were 
forced to flee from prairies, valley floors, and other low-lying 
areas to the rocky hillsides where they terraced the steep slopes to 
cultivate sorghum and other crops.  Since the signing of the Nuba 
Mountains ceasefire in January 2002 and the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, communities have gradually gained 
confidence in the security situation and begun to relocate to the 
lower foothills and valleys where land is more fertile.  This trend 
is visible in Kadugli, Rashad, Heiban, Talodi, Dulami, and Abu 
Gebeha localities where 'new' villages are being established. 
Communities are struggling to re-establish social networks, clear 
and prepare land for cultivation, and access basic services, such as 
health, water, and education. 
 
3. (U) According to the UN Mission in Sudan's Return, Recovery, and 
Reintegration (UNMIS RRR) unit, Southern Kordofan has received the 
second highest number of returnees of any state in Sudan since 2004. 
 Most people have returned spontaneously to areas of origin without 
international assistance.  While accurate estimates of returnee 
numbers by locality/county and administrative unit/payam are 
currently unavailable, the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) reported that the Kauda area is believed to have received the 
largest proportion of returnees in the state.  In addition, IOM 
noted that many spontaneous returnees to the Buram area south of 
Kadugli reportedly have not yet been identified or assisted by 
relief agencies.  The pace of return in the state has outpaced most 
relief organizations' ability to monitor, assess, and assist 
returnees settling in remote areas. 
 
4. (SBU) IOM and UNMIS RRR have also faced challenges in identifying 
an appropriate state government entity with which to coordinate 
return and reintegration activities in Southern Kordofan State.  In 
the South, the UN and IOM coordinate with the Southern Sudan Relief 
and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) and have developed effective 
methods of tracking returnees and planning reintegration services. 
USAID/OFDA contributed USD 4.5 million to IOM's returns program in 
Southern Sudan in FY 2007.  In northern Sudan, the GNU Humanitarian 
Aid Commission (HAC) is tasked with coordinating internal 
displacement and returns with the UN and other agencies.  In the 
Three Areas, where state governments were formed by merging 
Government of Sudan (GOS) and SPLM systems under the CPA, SSRRC and 
HAC were intended to jointly coordinate these activities.  In 
reality, the effectiveness of HAC/SSRRC coordination varies from 
place to place.  For example, in Abyei, USAID was told that the 
original SSRRC/HAC office is now simply called SSRRC.  In Kadugli, 
IOM told USAID that a new government-affiliated organization called 
 
KHARTOUM 00000630  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
the Voluntary Returns and Reintegration Commission (VRRC) had been 
created and would operate independently of SSRRC and HAC in order to 
facilitate return tracking and reintegration in Southern Kordofan. 
In private, IOM noted that HAC staff could not be used for return 
tracking in the state because returnees and communities mistrust the 
HAC's intentions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
ISSUE OF INTEGRATION HINDERS RECOVERY EFFORTS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (U) Two SPLM-controlled areas remain in the Nuba Mountains: the 
Kauda area (locally referred to as the eastern jebels) and the area 
southwest of Dilling (locally referred to as the western jebels).  A 
USAID/OFDA program officer visited the Kauda area from April 11 to 
14 and met the local commissioner, the head of the Secretariat of 
Health, the head of the Secretariat of Agriculture, and the local 
SSRRC representative to discuss humanitarian and recovery issues. 
The representatives from the various secretariats have limited 
coordination with GNU ministry officials in Kadugli or Khartoum. 
 
6. (U) The humanitarian community has significantly improved 
infrastructure and basic services in the Kauda area, including a 
newly opened hospital run by the Diocese of El Obeid, several newly 
renovated schools, well equipped health clinics, and vocational 
training programs since the war ended.  Despite these services and 
the years of emergency relief assistance provided to the Kauda 
community, the transition from relief to recovery is proving to be 
difficult and entangled with political issues surrounding CPA 
implementation and integration.  Kauda is well positioned to 
transition existing agriculture, food security, livelihood, health, 
and water programs established during the relief phase to 
longer-term development programs.  However, the Kauda community is 
resistant to recovery programs that include cost recovery for 
medicine, agriculture inputs, and health services.  NGOs have 
commented that people in Kauda developed a dependency on 
international relief aid and have not yet adapted to 
recovery-oriented programs that encourage self-sufficiency and 
sustainability. 
 
7. (U) Meetings between the USAID/OFDA program officer, implementing 
partners, and local authorities revealed that the local authorities 
have linked the relief-to-recovery transition to progress on CPA 
implementation and state integration.  The Secretariat of Health 
asked USAID not to stop providing relief assistance, such as free 
medicine and free health services, until the CPA has been fully 
implemented because the GNU has not yet taken responsibility for 
providing basic services to the citizens in the Kauda area. 
Effective transition from relief to recovery requires local 
authorities to assume responsibility for basic service provision. 
In Kauda, the local authorities clearly do not have the financial 
resources, the technical capacity, or the political will to begin 
administering services, particularly in the health sector.  This 
dilemma puts USAID and its implementing partners in the difficult 
position of trying to implement recovery and development programs 
without support from local authorities, hindering the recovery 
process. 
 
-------------------------------- 
RECOVERY AND REINTEGRATION NEEDS 
-------------------------------- 
 
8. (U) During the USAID/OFDA program officer's site visits and in 
meetings with community leaders, food security and agricultural 
inputs were repeatedly cited as a pressing need for returnee 
communities because of the bad harvest in 2007.  On April 14, the 
first rains began in Southern Kordofan and many farmers will plant 
seeds in May and June.  Seed and tool distribution needs to occur in 
the coming weeks.  The 2007 rainy season, which resulted in heavy 
flooding, destroyed many crops that returnees planted.  As a result, 
these households have not built up seed supplies or improved 
 
KHARTOUM 00000630  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
household food security as anticipated.  In 2007, general food aid 
distribution was phased out in many areas of Southern Kordofan to 
reduce dependency on food aid and stimulate agricultural production. 
 USAID/OFDA will continue to support agricultural and food security 
interventions that specifically target returnee communities in the 
coming months. 
 
9. (U) USAID/OFDA partners have implemented a wide range of 
livelihood programs in the state, including goat restocking, 
beekeeping, flour mills, and fruit tree nurseries.  These programs 
have had a positive impact and assisted in getting local economies 
restarted.  Small-scale livelihood activities will continue to be a 
need in areas of high return in the coming months. 
 
-------------------- 
DARFUR IDPS IN KAUDA 
-------------------- 
 
10. (U) On April 13, a USAID/OFDA program officer and a Save the 
Children staff member visited the Darfur internally displaced person 
(IDP) camp in Kauda and met with thQdlQ5s|Kauda 
to Abu Gebeha town or refugee camps in Kenya, such as Kakuma.  As of 
April 2008, only 150 households remain in Kauda.  The IDP leaders 
told the USAID/OFDA program officer that most of the group had moved 
to other locations with better employment opportunities and 
services.  Interestingly, they found services in Kauda poorer than 
what they had left in Darfur.  The IDP leaders also reported that 
the current IDP group fled insecurity in El Fasher in North Darfur, 
Mornei in West Darfur, and areas near Foro Baranga in West Darfur. 
In some cases, the IDPs traveled for three months to reach Kauda, 
stopping in various places along the way. 
 
11. (U) The IDP camp in Kauda is located behind a weigh station and 
has three tattered UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) tents that serve as 
schools for the IDPs.  Concern has supported the IDPs with vegetable 
seeds for gardening and has provided kits of relief commodities to 
all households.  The IDPs also receive a UN World Food Program (WFP) 
food ration every two months consisting of sorghum, oil, and sugar. 
The IDP camp currently has two hand pumps, one of which was broken 
at the time of the visit, and 11 latrines.  The Darfur IDP families 
pay approximately USD 1.50 per month to send each child to school in 
the nearby UNICEF tents.  The IDPs have access to free health 
services and medication at the USAID/OFDA-supported Save the 
Children health clinic. 
 
12. (U) The IDP leaders expressed a desire to be allocated land and 
given seeds to farm this season, a request which local authorities 
and aid organizations are currently considering.  Most IDPs generate 
income by selling charcoal, making bricks, or working as day 
laborers in town.  The leaders characterized the security situation 
in Kauda as safe for their families.  Overall, the Darfur IDP camp 
in Kauda has sufficient basic services and relief organizations are 
responding to the IDPs' needs as they arise. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
13. (U) The US Mission will continue to engage with the local 
authorities in Kauda to emphasize that the transition from relief to 
recovery assistance is in the best interests of the community and 
its leadership.  The current local authorities in the Kauda area did 
not serve in the Nuba Mountains during the war and have little 
training in governance and administration.  Their perspective 
articulated to USAID staff that "things have gotten worse in the 
Nuba Mountains since the signing of the CPA" does not reflect the 
reality on the ground, nor does it acknowledge the efforts of the 
international community over the years.  Aid workers who lived and 
 
KHARTOUM 00000630  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
worked in the Nuba Mountains during the war can list many peace 
dividends, particularly in infrastructure, daily life for Nuba 
citizens, and humanitarian conditions, since the end of the war. 
While great needs still exist in Kauda, the emergency situation has 
ended and recovery-oriented programs are best suited to respond to 
the needs in the current context.  If the current mentality persists 
among Kauda authorities, recovery and development will remain 
difficult to implement and parallel governance systems will continue 
to hinder CPA implementation from a development point of view. 
 
FERNANDEZ