VZCZCXRO5690
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0626/01 1141259
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231259Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0634
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0176
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000626 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/C, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UN STAFFER'S PROPOSAL ON DARFUR NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) On April 22, Gerry McHugh, UN Envoy Jan Eliasson's chief 
strategist, told poloffs that the Darfur peace process needs strong 
U.S. leadership, not more large, multi-lateral meetings.   McHugh 
offered a number of uncharacteristic UN ideas including:  1) Any 
deal will be brokered behind the scenes, most likely with US 
intervention, starting with JEM and focusing completely on power 
sharing; other movements and areas of negotiations will follow.  2) 
The U.S. and France should make it clear to Chadian President Idriss 
Deby that continued (and possibly increased) Western support for his 
administration is contingent on his decision to cut ties with JEM. 
3) With the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, there is a limited 
window of opportunity (of at most two or three months) in which the 
peace process has a chance for serious progress, especially given 
the US initiative to engage with the GOS.  4)  The U.S. should put 
more pressure on the rebel movements, and if they continue to be 
uncooperative, the UN Security Council should issue a resolution 
expelling rebel leaders from Western states. 
 
SQUEEZING CHAD AND JEM 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2.  (SBU)  According to McHugh, in its recent consultations with the 
UNAMID's Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST), the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) made it very clear that its main priority is 
to continue to receive support from the Government of Chad and to 
give reciprocal military support back to President Deby while 
seeking to escalate violence in Darfur and beyond (into Kordofan). 
McHugh said that UNAMID and the international community should make 
Chad choose between continued (and perhaps augmented) Western 
support and the GoC's backing of JEM.  According to McHugh, Deby is 
a very logical and tactical thinker.  He realizes that he cannot 
rely on the support of Darfur rebels indefinitely, and may be 
persuaded to cut his ties with JEM.  McHugh added that President 
Deby wants U.S. support, and that the U.S. could use its influence 
on both Chad and France to make Deby more cooperative.  McHugh 
stated that it is untenable to continue the peace process while the 
Governments of Chad and Sudan use militias and rebel groups to do 
their dirty work.  He stated that it may be better to bring JEM into 
the Chadian government and make their relationship official, or cut 
them off completely.  McHugh stated that it is even worth 
brainstorming on some "crazy ideas" such as offering JEM's Khalil 
Ibrahim a position as the Chadian Minister of Defense, if JEM is 
brought officially into the GoC. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  According to McHugh, it may be possible to cut a 
bilateral deal between JEM and the Government of Sudan in the next 
six months.  He stated that JEM claims that they are willing to 
engage politically, but that it is apparent that they take the 
military option more seriously.  The U.S. should pressure JEM, Chad, 
and other countries with influence in Chad (i.e. France) to convince 
JEM to take negotiations more seriously, stated McHugh.  Continuing, 
he said that the majority of JEM's leadership works and resides in 
Europe.  He said that Western countries should use this to their 
advantage.  They should tell JEM and other rebel movements that they 
should cooperate with the international community or the Security 
Council will issue a resolution expelling rebel leadership from 
Europe.  According to McHugh, it would "not cost the U.S. much" to 
convince Britain and even France, and it could be very significant 
in moving the peace process along.  He stated that many JEM and 
SLA-Abdel Wahid leaders have strong ties to Europe's institutions 
and leaders and that this expulsion would deal a significant blow to 
uncooperative rebel actors. 
 
BIGGER THAN THE DPA 
- - - - - - - - - - 
¶4.  (SBU)  McHugh stated that while the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
is the starting place for negotiations, any deal will have to be 
much larger than the DPA.  He said that the focus of negotiations 
should be on a serious power sharing arrangement, and other issues 
such as wealth-sharing will follow.  He said that the weakness of 
the DPA is its power sharing arrangements, saying that the number of 
seats given to DPA signatories at the state legislature and 
presidency is insufficient. 
 
"AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S." 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶5.  (SBU)  McHugh stated that greater U.S. involvement in the peace 
process presents an opportunity to the U.S.  He added that Darfur is 
a significant foreign policy objective that the Bush administration 
might realistically achieve in the next six months.  He said he 
realizes that if the U.S. embarks upon this approach, individuals 
within the U.S. Government must be recognized for their key 
contributions in bringing the rebels to the table. McHugh stated 
that he will continue to present these ideas to the British, French, 
and other capitals.  He said that Jan Eliasson is ready to push some 
of these ideas in the coming months, but only if they are met with 
initial reception by the U.K., U.S., and France.  McHugh noted that 
while Eliasson's term is due to end in June, there may be the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000626  002 OF 002 
 
 
opportunity to renew his term - something that, in McHugh's view, 
looks more likely given the lack of viable replacements and delays 
in the appointment of other leadership positions.  (Note:  McHugh 
also stated that Taye-Brook Zerihoun, the Principal Deputy Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General in Sudan, will soon be 
leaving his position to become the SRSG in Cyprus. End Note.) 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶6.  (SBU) McHugh is the most advanced in his thinking among the UN's 
JMST team and if he can sell these ideas to Eliasson (who he claims 
is open to them) it may be possible for a joint JMST-US-UK-France 
initiative to push the parties forward behind the scenes in the 
coming months.  Without the strategic behind-the-scenes approach 
that McHugh describes, nothing very positive is likely to happen on 
the Darfur peace process for at least another year, leaving UNAMID 
exposed and vulnerable.  Notably, this meeting is the third this 
week where JMST and UNAMID leadership have asked for an injection of 
American leadership into the foundering UNAMID peace process, a 
clear sign of desperation on their part. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The news that Eliasson intends to stay on past June is 
troubling, given his lack of a coherent vision and the limited time 
he spends in Darfur.  The peace process is at a stage that requires 
more sophistication and energy than the current Eliasson-Salim team 
has previously exhibited.  The U.S. has called on the UN Secretariat 
to appoint a chief mediator since June 2007, and we should make 
clear to the UN Secretariat that the delay--whether due to the 
dearth of good candidates, complications with the AU, or UN 
inefficiency--is neither acceptable nor a justification to continue 
Eliasson's weak leadership of the peace process. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) McHugh overestimates the willingness of European countries 
to support punitive measures against Darfur's rebel movements; 
France and other European governments have rebuffed every suggestion 
to expel rebel leaders over the last 18 months.  In this context, a 
discrete, multi-track approach to the peace process--that includes 
separate, sustained, and focused discussions with JEM and SLA-Abdel 
Wahid--led by either a more agile UN/AU team or by the U.S. (but 
with at least the tacit involvement of key European governments, 
such as France) is the best way forward.  If the bilateral process 
with the GOS continues, it is also worth seeing how this may be 
linked to the Darfur peace process.  Of course we need to recognize 
that securing an agreement from both Abdel Wahid and Khalil Ibrahim 
is a long-shot (although the former may prove more flexible than the 
latter), but it's worth a try and this strategic behind-the scenes 
approach is the best plan we have heard from anyone on the JMST team 
in a long time. 
 
FERNANDEZ