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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM623, GOSS GIVES JUBA SECURITY UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM623 2008-04-23 12:47 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5650
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0623/01 1141247
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231247Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0629
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000623 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC CASC SU
SUBJECT: GOSS GIVES JUBA SECURITY UPDATE 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On the afternoon of April 21 the GOSS assembled 
the Diplomatic and NGO community for a briefing on what steps it is 
taking to combat the recent rash of armed robberies targeting 
foreigners and NGOs in Juba.  Actions to be taken include putting 
more police out on the streets, starting night patrols, creation of 
a rapid response force to come to the aid of those being robbed, 
increased investment in communications equipment, the creation of a 
committee to coordinate actions among all security forces, 
identifying critical areas in Juba to watch, the relocation of all 
SPLA forces outside of Juba, and the curtailment of the movement of 
SPLA forces at night except for those on patrol. End Summary 
 
2. (SBU) The Ministers of Regional Cooperation, Internal Affairs and 
Information and Broadcasting met with the international community in 
Juba on Monday afternoon to address concerns related to a recent 
surge in crime directed against foreigners and INGOs.  The Interior 
Minister opened the meeting by explaining that from 2005 to 2006 
Juba had faced a similar crime rate, but that 2007 saw a dramatic 
fall in robberies.  The recent crime wave began in mid-February and 
represented a threat to the CPA.  He hinted darkly that the enemies 
of the Peace Agreement were the active players in this new crime 
wave. 
 
3. (SBU) The Interior Minister laid out the initiatives the GOSS was 
undertaking to combat the problem.  This included putting more 
police on the streets, new night patrols to watch for armed groups, 
a rapid response force ready to rush to the scene of an ongoing 
robbery, the distribution of more and better communications 
equipment to help law enforcement forces to better communicate and 
coordinate, the creation of a committee to coordinate all the 
security forces involved (military intelligence, SPLA, police, 
etc.), the identification of critical areas in Juba for increased 
surveillance, the relocation of all SPLA forces outside of Juba, and 
the curtailment of the movement of SPLA forces at night except when 
on duty. 
 
4. (SBU) The Minister then made a pitch for the INGOS not to panic. 
The GOSS took their security seriously, and the "enemies of peace", 
he said, wanted them to leave.  They should not cave in to that. 
After all, he said, no place was entirely crime free, and in fact 
crime is far more prevalent and dangerous in places like Nairobi and 
in South Africa, where foreigners are often killed.  No foreigners, 
he said, had been killed in Juba. 
 
5. (SBU) The Minister for Regional Cooperation spoke next, assuring 
everyone that the GOSS "Will take responsibility for your safety." 
Again, he hinted that the CPA has its enemies whose intent is to 
wreck the peace, and that the international community was being 
targeted because they help the CPA. The Minister of Information and 
Broadcasting spoke last, echoing much of the same message and again 
hinting that the "enemies of peace and the CPA" were behind the 
attacks.  He promised that these people would be identified and 
brought to justice.  He said that Southern Sudan was a free country 
with freedom of movement, "which gives troublemakers opportunities." 
 He said that the GOSS would not curb or reduce freedoms in order to 
handle the situation, but that they would "crack down." 
 
6. (SBU) In a question and answer period, the Interior Minister said 
that the GOSS was creating nine new police stations around Juba to 
increase law enforcement outreach, and that the pattern of attacks 
looks "calculated."  The attackers are young and generally in 
military clothing.  He said, however, he did not believe they were 
SPLA because they often asked their victims if the SPLA was nearby, 
which they would already know were they really in the army. 
Finally, he added, "Do not complain if we act aggressively against 
these people.  If they take $50,000 and we catch them, we'll shoot 
them." 
 
7. (SBU) After the meeting CG Datta was in a conversation with the 
head of UNMIS when the Interior Minister walked by and interrupted 
them to say privately that they had recently caught some of the 
perpetrators.  "They will lead us to the others," he confidently 
predicted, and again hinted darkly that they were the "enemies of 
peace."  He refused to say more or elaborate. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: The ministers never came out and directly said 
NCP, but they were obviously hinting that these "enemies of peace" 
were agents of the NCP here to drive out INGOs in the hopes of 
damaging the GOSS and the CPA. This is always the default position 
in South Sudan when anything goes badly regardless of the facts.  It 
is also possible that there are elements within the South who would 
wish to destabilize the GOSS.  A crime wave in Juba hardly needs an 
agent provocateur explanation, however.  The INGOs in Juba are soft 
targets with lots of cash on hand because of the poor service 
offered by local banks and the need to conduct nearly all business 
in cash.  Men with guns can make a lot of money fast and there are 
lots of armed men in South Sudan. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000623  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
FERNANDEZ