VZCZCXRO3080
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0614/01 1120813
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210813Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0612
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0174
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000614 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: JMST BRIEFING FOCUSES ON SECURITY AND CONSULTATIONS WITH 
JEM AND ABDUL WAHID 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  In an April 19 briefing to Khartoum's 
Ambassadors, Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliasson (the African Union 
and United Nations Special Envoys for Darfur) stated that their most 
recent visit to Sudan focused on security concerns.  According to 
Salim and Eliasson, consultations with representatives from the 
Government of Sudan (GoS), opposition political parties, the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM), and the Sudan Liberation Army faction 
led by Abdul Wahid Al-Nur (SLA/AW) revealed that almost all parties 
agree that security considerations should take precedence and that 
this focus could serve as a starting place for future negotiations. 
Eliasson and Salim stated that SLA/AW continues to set a "minimal 
level of security" as a condition for talks, while JEM continues to 
entertain grandiose and dangerous dreams of military options and 
believe that "it is the only group in town."  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
SECURITY FIRST 
- - - - - - - 
¶2.  (SBU)  Salim started the briefing saying that the situation in 
Darfur has deteriorated significantly in recent months and that the 
focus of the JMST and peace process should be on security.  He 
stated that violence has taken different forms in the recent months 
including: fighting between the GOS and rebel movements; clashes 
between rebel groups; and banditry and other criminal (including the 
recent Arab militia/janjaweed violence against Government forces.) 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Eliasson said that that he is hopeful that this focus on 
security will eventually lead to a cessation of hostilities and a 
discussion of other issues.  He said that SLA/AW is particularly 
keen on this focus on security, as "they have consistently stated 
that they have wanted this."  According to Salim, SLA/AW commanders 
stated that attaining a minimal level of security is a condition for 
all negotiations. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Eliasson supported Salim's introductory remarks, saying 
that it is essential to bring down the level of hostility and 
violence and create a suitable environment before any future talks. 
He called this period before the raining season "crucial" and stated 
that all international partners present at the briefing must exert 
their influence on all parties involved in the conflict, especially 
those who have special pull with Chad and Sudan.  He emphasized that 
the World Food Program will be forced to reduce rations by 50% in 
May due to banditry and that this will have a "major impact on 
security and become a major problem for all of us." 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Eliasson said that there are three major elements of 
security that merit scrutiny: building a framework for the cessation 
of hostilities; improving humanitarian access and reducing the 
levels of banditry and crime; and supporting the relationship 
between UNAMID and the GoS.  Regarding the lattermost point, 
Eliasson said that there needs to be better cooperation between 
UNAMID and the GoS, and that senior Sudanese officials have 
indicated that they value UNAMID's work in Darfur. UNAMID also needs 
to coordinate better with rebel groups, who "are feeling ignored" by 
UNAMID. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Salim also emphasized that he is concerned about UNAMID's 
overall deployment saying that "we hope that there will be more 
urgent work in the UNSCR to implement that which has been agreed 
upon."  He questioned, "Why can't we get 26 helicopters and more 
troops on the ground now?"  The Dutch Ambassador to Khartoum later 
inquired whether UNAMID was prepared to monitor a cessation of 
hostilities agreement, noting that this had been a problem at 
previous negotiations.  Eliasson stated that "we knew we did not 
have the capacity to monitor the cessation of hostilities at Sirte, 
but we will work to build up this capacity."  He noted that given 
the size of Darfur and delays in deployment, it will be tough to 
develop a reliable monitoring body. 
 
SLA/AW'S and JEM'S CONDITIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶6.  (SBU)  Eliasson said that the two major rebel movements both 
have set conditions for future talks.  He stated that SLA/AW 
continues to insist that before negotiations begin a "minimum level 
of security be met."  He stated that JEM "will be more difficult to 
work with" as it still entertains military options and considers 
itself the only real rebel group in Darfur.  Salim also emphasized 
that discussions with representatives from the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) were "constructive but with some difficulties." 
According to Salim, JEM believes that it is "the only force in town 
and that we should forget about all others."  Salim urged the 
international community to encourage JEM to continue to work with 
UNAMID. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  CDA Fernandez asked whether Salim and Eliasson emphasized 
 
KHARTOUM 00000614  002 OF 002 
 
 
to JEM and the GoS the importance of avoiding a cycle of destructive 
fighting similar to that which occurred in early 2008.  Eliasson 
responded that he raised the issue of the GoS's "excessive use of 
force" two times with senior GoS officials.  He said he also raised 
this point with JEM and added that there are "dangerous signs" 
coming from JEM, especially as it attempts to link the crisis in 
Darfur with neighboring Kordofan.  Salim agreed, stating "JEM is 
trying to bring Kordofan into the mix and that is complicating 
things." 
BRITISH INITIATIVE 
- - - - - - - - - - 
¶8.  (SBU)  Asked about the British initiative, Salim responded that 
he was not consulted prior to Prime Minister Gordon Brown's 
announcement, but that he considers it to be a sign of support for 
the peace process and symbolic of Britain's good will and intention. 
The UK's Ambassador stated that the UK is "ready to host talks if 
that would be useful" and that the Prime Minister's remarks 
demonstrate his "strong personal commitment to this issue." 
POLITICAL PARTIES, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND SUDAN CONSORTIUM 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶9.  (SBU) Salim and Eliasson were also asked about their 
consultations with political parties.  Eliasson stated that they met 
with all the major parties, and that it is obvious that the majority 
of these opposition groups view the Darfur crisis as inseparable 
from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Sudan as a whole. 
Eliasson said that he agrees that there is "mutual dependence" 
between Darfur and the rest of Sudan and that future negotiations 
require a holistic approach, but that UNAMID's mandate is restricted 
to Darfur.  Eliasson stated that although the focus of this trip was 
on security, that UNAMID Civil Affairs continues its important work. 
 He said that there is "rough agreement" regarding the role and 
participation of tribal leaders in future talks, but that there is 
"unease" regarding the selection and representation of IDP leaders. 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  The Norwegian Ambassador reminded attendees that the 
Sudan Consortium will be held in Oslo from May 5-7.  He said that 
there will be a special session on Darfur on May 5 that both the 
GoSS and GNU have accepted this meeting.  He said that this is an 
opportunity to address the Government of Sudan and its senior 
leaders such as Salva Kiir and Ali Osman Taha, and that the 
international community should send appropriate high-level 
representatives to the meeting.  Eliasson said that this was the 
first he had heard of this invitation, and although it is unlikely 
that he will be present, other JMST representatives will try to 
attend. 
 
NO PROGRESS ON CHIEF MEDIATOR 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶11.  (SBU)  Salim stated that there has been no progress on 
selecting an individual for the chief mediator position.  He said 
that there "is no rush to volunteer for the job" and that the 
individual they had identified for the position did not accept it. 
He said they need someone who is sufficiently sensitive, 
sufficiently high profile, and ready to spend a lot of time on the 
ground ("even someone who will eat breakfast with the rebels 
everyday for six months.")   He stated that selecting a chief 
mediator will not be a magical cure for the peace process. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶12.  COMMENT:  Unfortunately, the most significant pieces of 
Eliasson's and Salim's briefing were all negative:  rations to IDPs 
will be cut by half; UNAMID views JEM as uncooperative and inclined 
to aggressive military action, including into Kordofan; and SLA/AW 
continues to set the vaguely-defined condition of minimal security 
as a condition for talks.  Salim and Eliasson appeared content to 
talk in generalities, avoiding defining what "minimal security" 
would mean, or exactly how JEM sees itself leading negotiations. 
Salim, Eliasson, and the JMST also appear to be passively waiting 
for a joint mediator, more UNAMID troops on the ground, and the 
"suitable environment for negotiations."  They appear disconnected 
from international initiatives such as the Sudan Consortium and the 
UK's willingness to host talks.  All these things, along with their 
return to what went wrong at Sirte (e.g. "it was out of our hands"), 
leaves one with little faith for progress in the peace process in 
the coming months with this current, part-time team of dilettantes. 
Additional meetings with the JMST and suggested next steps will be 
reported septel. 
 
FERNANDEZ