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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM613, SOUTH SUDAN OPPOSITION POLITICIAN ON THE CENSUS AND GOSS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM613 2008-04-21 05:37 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2974
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0613/01 1120537
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210537Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0610
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000613 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SOCI KDEM SU
SUBJECT:  SOUTH SUDAN OPPOSITION POLITICIAN ON THE CENSUS AND GOSS 
POLITICS 
 
Refs: A. Khartoum 604 
B. Khartoum 575 
C. Khartoum 566 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  South Sudan parliamentarian and opposition 
leader Dr. Jimmy Wongo believes that the GoSS's last-minute attempt 
to delay the census in the South has only made it look foolish and 
indecisive.  Wongo said that he expects the NCP to manipulate census 
results to undercount the South's population, but that the GoSS 
could have minimized this threat had it focused on the census 
earlier.  He said GoSS President Kiir deserves praise for having 
achieved stability in the South following the death of John Garang, 
but that since then he assessed Kiir as often indecisive, isolated, 
and unable to hold cabinet ministers accountable for incompetence 
and corruption.  End Summary. 
 
Census Indecision 
- - - - - - - - - 
2.  (SBU) On April 18, Juba Conoffs called on Dr. Jimmy Wongo, a 
Member of the South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) from the Union 
of Sudan African Parties (USAP) and Chairman of the SSLA's Public 
Accounts Committee.  Dr. Wongo was very critical of the handling of 
the Sudan census by the leadership of the GoSS and the SPLM.  Within 
the space of a few days, he noted, GoSS President Salva Kiir had 
spoken publicly in support of the census, then the GoSS Council of 
Ministers had voted to postpone it, followed by an agreement with 
Khartoum to delay census-taking by one week, to which the Council of 
Ministers agreed while at the same time issuing a statement that it 
reserves the right to disagree with the results (reftels).  All this 
has made the GoSS appear indecisive and ineffectual, without 
improving the quality of census enumeration.  Wongo said the GoSS 
has put the spotlight on its own actions, rather than on the conduct 
of the census and the NCP. 
 
Worst of All Possible Worlds? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3.  (SBU) Wongo said he personally supports the inclusion of 
questions on ethnicity and religion in the census, but that the GoSS 
had only itself to blame for the absence of the questions on the 
questionnaire.  GoSS Minister of Cabinet Affairs Luka Manoja signed 
off on final content of questionnaires and provided the Presidency 
in Khartoum with the authority to go forward with printing.  Wongo 
charged that the GoSS Council of Ministers failed to take the census 
seriously until too late and now it is paying the price.  It would 
have been better to have stuck with the original April 15 date, or 
else delayed it until the problems could be corrected.  Now the GoSS 
has maneuvered itself into the worst possible situation. 
 
4.  (SBU) GG Datta asked Wongo if he thinks that the GoSS is backing 
away from the census because it fears it would disprove the GoSS 
claim that the South makes up one third of Sudan's total population. 
 Wongo responded that he is confident that the South's population 
actually constitutes more than one third (Note: we find it hard to 
conceive that there are 15 million people in South Sudan. End Note). 
 Rather, he said the GoSS fears that the NCP will manipulate the 
census results to deliberately undercount the South's population. 
Wongo added that he has no doubt that this is just what the NCP 
plans to do.  However, he said that the GoSS would have achieved a 
much better (if not perfect) result, if it had taken the census 
seriously early on, instead of waiting until the last minute. 
 
Kiir a Conciliator, Not a Strong Leader 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU) Wongo said that President Kiir "stood tall" in the 
aftermath of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 
the death of SPLM leader John Garang.  Kiir inherited a tense 
situation in the South, with a variety of antagonistic, armed 
militias ready to resist the SPLM.  Kiir put a priority on stability 
and, through a policy of moderation and conciliation, avoided 
bloodshed and brought these groups under GoSS authority. 
 
6.  (SBU) Wongo said that since then, however, Kiir has failed to 
master the art of governing.  He has not taken a strong hand with 
his cabinet.  Instead of identifying and removing corrupt or 
inefficient cabinet members, they have simply been rotated from seat 
to seat.  Cabinet ministers have concluded they can defy Kiir 
without serious consequence.  This explains the Council of 
Ministers' willingness to vote against Kiir on holding the census on 
schedule and they almost rejected it a second time. 
 
Isolated Kiir 
- - - - - - - 
7.  (SBU) Wongo disagreed with the suggestion that President Kiir's 
cautious approach reflected his style as a consensus builder and the 
need to hold a potentially fractious coalition together.  Rather, 
Wongo asserted that Kiir is surrounded by a small group of trusted 
advisors who have isolated him.  This group includes his office 
 
KHARTOUM 00000613  002 OF 002 
 
 
director Martin Majuk, GoSS Minister of Presidential Affairs Luka 
Biong Deng, GNU Foreign Minister Deng Alor, and GoSS Interior 
Minister Paul Mayong.  Wongo said that he believes Luka and Deng 
Alor, both natives of Abyei, have kept Kiir almost solely focused on 
the Abyei question to the exclusion of other important issues. 
Wongo added that, while it would be appropriate for the SPLM as a 
political party to attempt to mediate the Darfur conflict, he 
disagreed with Kiir's having put the GoSS in that role.  (Note: Our 
understanding is that Darfur Task Force Chair Abdel Aziz Helou is 
filling that role on behalf of the SPLM; Wongo may be intentionally 
misrepresenting the GOSS role in order to be critical - see comment. 
End note). 
 
No Conflict Now, But Wait Until 2011 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
8.  (SBU) Wongo doubts that the South will allow itself to be 
dragged back into conflict, whatever the provocations from the NCP. 
The real question is - what will happen in 2011?  Southerners will 
vote for separation if given the choice, although Wongo said he is 
not certain that separation is the right decision.  Even more 
problematic, Wongo does not believe that the NCP will allow the 2011 
referendum to take place. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
9. (SBU) A member of the opposition in the SSLA, Dr. Wongo is an 
outspoken critic of the leadership of the SPLM, which he considers 
often incompetent and corrupt.  He very much enjoys playing the role 
of opposition critic, and the CG has on more than one occasion seen 
him bait SPLM leaders with intentionally provocative but humorous 
attacks.  While his views on Kiir's isolation from his cabinet and 
his obsession with Abyei are interesting, we frankly take them with 
a grain of salt.  He is certainly correct, however, in his analysis 
that Kiir and the Council of Ministers did themselves no favors in 
the botched manner in which they handled the problems with the 
census. 
 
FERNANDEZ