VZCZCXRO6642
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0568/01 1050609
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 140609Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0547
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0153
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000568 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: WE NEED A CEASEFIRE COMMISSION, SAYS FRUSTRATED DPA 
SIGNATORY GROUP 
 
REF: (A) KHARTOUM 557 
 
(B) KHARTOUM 538 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY:  On April 9, three members of SLM-Free Will (SLM-FW) 
informed emboffs about recent Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) bombings 
in their areas of control in North Darfur, emphasizing that there is 
no mechanism for them to report these incidents, since the Ceasefire 
Commission (CFC) remains dormant.  The SLM-FW leaders, including one 
former AMIS CFC member, appeared confused about how to inform UNAMID 
of ceasefire violations, complaining that UNAMID ignores their 
reports and that they no longer have access to the UNAMID compound 
and its leaders.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On April 9, Abdalla Eisa Abdalla, a rebel commander in the 
Abu Garan sector of North Darfur (SLM-FW's main area of control); 
Jouda Adam Fadul Jouda, a SLM-FW CFC representative; and Abdalla 
Bedairi (aka Bedairi Adam Bedairi), another SLM-FW military 
commander, came to the Embassy field office in El-Fasher.  Abdalla 
opened the meeting stating that "the recent events in North Darfur 
have pushed us to come to speak to you, as things are getting 
worse."  Abdalla stated that he is very worried about the recent 
janjaweed shootings in the El-Fasher market and a number of bombings 
in the north (reftel). 
 
SAF BOMBINGS IN THE NORTH 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶3. (SBU)  The SLM-FW leaders reported that at approximately 16:30 on 
April 8, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) planes bombed SLM-FW areas in 
Mellit, Mado, Sayah, and the Abu Garan Mountains.  They stated that 
there were no casualties resulting from these bombings.  They added 
that the Government of Sudan (GoS) has a special interest in the 
lattermost area, as the mountains provide protection for a large 
number of people there, many of whom the GoS believes are rebels. 
The SLM-FW leaders insisted that only civilians are living in these 
areas and that the GoS bombing of these areas shows its lack of 
regard for signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). 
 
¶4. (SBU) According to the SLM-FW reps, the April 8 bombings follow 
other SAF bombings in these northern areas.  They reported that 
approximately ten to 15 days earlier, SAF airplanes bombed Abu Garan 
and Mado, killing two children and razing one house [NOTE:  Separate 
sources confirmed the Mado bombing.  On April 4, one Italian 
employee of Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI) told emboff that 
during a recent survey trip to North Darfur, he passed through Mado 
"only two hours after it was bombed, when the smoke was still rising 
from the earth."  This INGO worker added that "It makes no sense to 
bomb a village that has absolutely nothing, as the value of all the 
possessions in the village was probably less than the cost of the 
bombs."  END NOTE].  SLM-FW rep Abdalla stated that "the government 
bombs areas irrespective as to whether they are controlled by the 
signatories or non-signatories of the DPA." 
 
NEED FOR CEASEFIRE COMMISSION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶5. (U) The SLM-FW representatives stated that they had not reported 
the bombings in their areas to anyone before the meeting with the 
emboffs.  They said that they previously sent many reports of such 
violations to UNAMID, but "that all the reports all have been 
ignored."  Jouda, SLM-FW's representative to the CFC, specifically 
complained that his access to the UNAMID compound (and to its 
leadership) had been cut off since AMIS's authority was transferred 
to UNAMID on January 1st.  These leaders also said that UNAMID needs 
to travel to remote areas to access civilians in need, and stated 
that neither AMIS nor UNAMID has been effective in areas that are 
not controlled by the GoS. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Emboffs agreed that there is an urgent need to 
re-invigorate the CFC and that all incidents should be reported to 
the Force Commander and his Deputy.  Emboffs agreed to facilitate 
passing on this information to UNAMID leadership and to help provide 
SLM-FW with appropriate contact information at UNAMID.  Emboffs also 
stressed that SLM-FW as a DPA signatory had a responsibility to be 
proactive in reporting these incidents and following up with UNAMID 
on its own. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶7. (SBU) It is notable that these DPA signatories see the small U.S. 
Embassy presence in Darfur as more accessible, receptive, and able 
to act on information about ceasefire violations than the large 
UNAMID contingent.  Although SLM-FW is not a serious force on the 
ground, their criticism of the non-functional CFC follow other 
complaints by larger DPA signatory groups.  Restarting the CFC must 
be a top priority for senior UNAMID leaders.  Until the CFC is 
re-started, it is important to empower the DPA signatories to be 
proactive in reporting directly to UNAMID or they may ultimately 
 
KHARTOUM 00000568  002 OF 002 
 
 
follow the path of the non-signatories. 
 
FERNANDEZ