VZCZCXRO6618
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0567/01 1050515
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140515Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0544
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0327

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000567 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PINS PREL PGOV SOCI EAID SU AU
SUBJECT: URF ANNOUNCES FINAL CONSOLIDATION 
 
REF: A) NDJAMENA 117 
B) TRIPOLI 281 
 
KHARTOUM 00000567  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Four months after the close of SPLM-hosted Darfur movement 
consolidation talks in Juba, the United Resistance Front (URF) has 
announced its final consolidation.  The coalition represents five 
factions that includes Massaleit and Arab representatives but is 
dominated by Zaghawa JEM/Collective Leadership.  The announcement 
brings the total number of major Darfur rebel movements down to 
five: URF, Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), 
Adelwahid Nur's SLM faction, Ahmed Abdelshafie's SLM faction, and 
Abdallah Yahyia's SLA/Unity. The latter group is being actively 
courted by the URF, though to mixed success.  The URF's stated 
demands for any forthcoming peace agreement include a unified Darfur 
region; concrete commitments to development to facilitate IDP 
returns; effective, population-based power distribution; URF 
absorption into the SAF; comprehensive wealth-sharing principles to 
include hawakir (traditional land tenure); and reinstitution of 
Darfur's borders as of 1956.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------- 
URF Structure Finalized 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The United Resistance Front (URF) announced its leadership 
structure during an April 8 press conference in Juba.  The movement 
is a conglomerate of five separate movements: the Arab-dominated 
United Revolutionary Forces Front (URFF), SLA-Field Command, the 
National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD), SLA-Khamis 
Abdullah, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)/Collective 
Leadership.  The URF leadership structure is composed of three 
councils: a "Collective Presidency," a "United Military Command," 
and a general secretariat.  Members of these three organs include, 
respectively, Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda, Khamis Abdullah Abubaker, 
Ibrahim Ahmed Abuzadein, Sharif Adam Mansour, and Adam Ali Shogar in 
the presidency; Adam Bahkeit, the "Vice Commander-in-Chief for 
Supervisory Administration" name unknown, Yacine Yousuf (Logistics), 
Abdelrahman Mousa (Training), and Abdullah Banda (Operations) in the 
military command; and Mansour el Bab and Mansour Ibrahim in the 
general secretariat.  In addition to these three councils, there are 
three oversight organs: a sixty-one person Consultative Monitoring 
Council, a Convention Council, and an Administrative Cell.  El Hadi 
el Jebr Duar is the movement's spokesperson, and Sharif Adam Mosul 
is the Secretary General. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Darfur Taskforce 
Chairman and Deputy Secretary General Abdelaziz Helou opened the 
press conference by noting that while the URF "could have announced 
anywhere, they chose to return to Juba to give credit to the SPLM." 
He called on the URF to consider unification with the remaining 
Darfur movements, and called on SLA/Unity leader Abdullah Yahyia, 
SLA faction leader Abdelwahid Nur, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, and 
Ahmed Abdelshafie to do the same.  "If these five movements agree to 
further pursue the process of unification, there are good prospects 
that a complete unification under one umbrella can be achieved." 
 
--------------------- 
URF Demands for Peace 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) According to URF Collective Presidency Chairman Bahar 
Idriss Abu Gharda, the movements demands the following as part of 
any political settlement: unification of the three Darfur states 
into a single region; a commitment to development in the region to 
facilitate IDP returns; equitable power distribution based on 
Darfur's population; integration of the URF into the SAF; 
comprehensive wealth-sharing principles to include hawakir 
(traditional land rights); and reinstitution of Darfur's 1956 
border.  Abu Gharda noted that the URF is ready for peace talks "if 
Khartoum is ready, but should Khartoum opt for other courses of 
action, the URF is prepared to counter."  The movement characterized 
Khartoum as unable to commit to "reasonable peace talks" given 
ongoing attempts by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to retake 
rebel-held territory in Darfur. 
---------------------------- 
Electoral Alliance with SPLM 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Asked whether the URF would align with the SPLM in an 
electoral coalition, Abu Gharda was evasive in his answer. "All 
marginalized people of Sudan benefit from the efforts of the SPLM, 
but our focus is now on bringing stability to Darfur and its 
people."  (Note: Per Ref. A, Abu Gharda has previously committed to 
"full coordination" with the SPLM on an election strategy, including 
 
KHARTOUM 00000567  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
the possible postponement of elections if the SPLM takes this track. 
 End note.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) SPLM Taskforce Chairman Abdelaziz Helou noted that SPLM 
participation in the coming peace talks was paramount. "SPLM knows 
very well the suffering of the Darfur people and plans to 
participate in the talks as full partners in the GNU." He further 
detailed SPLM actions to contribute to a durable peace in Darfur. 
"While we participated in Abuja, we had no control.  Now the SPLM 
fights in two fields: We push for the unification of the movements 
in order that they have a joint negotiating position, and we 
negotiate with the NCP in order that the GNU adopts a common 
position reflective of NCP and SPLM views before the peace talks 
begin." 
 
---------------------- 
No Census Before Peace 
---------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) When asked about the April 15 national census and whether 
the URF supported it being carried out in Darfur, Abu Gharda noted 
that the URF is not part of the "census-making process," but that 
the security situation is not conducive to a census and that the 
focus now needs to be on consolidation of the movements and 
forthcoming peace talks.  The census and elections should be 
considered only after a peace settlement is achieved. 
 
¶8. (SBU) SPLM Deputy Secretary General Anne Itto attempted to 
redirect Abu Gharda's response, reiterating the socio-economic 
importance of the census for "all Sudanese" and calling on the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) to enact and abide by a ceasefire 
for the duration of the count. "We are aware of the security 
situation in Darfur and recognize that it may not be able to get a 
fair count." Responding to a follow-on question about the 
still-unresolved standoff over lack of questions about ethnicity and 
religion, Itto noted that "recognition of the diversity of Sudan is 
what the SPLM fought for, and what is being fought for now in 
Darfur.  The SPLM will not consider the census to be official should 
questions on religion and ethnicity be excluded."  Note: These 
comments were made before the SPLM announced on April 13 that they 
would postpone the census. End note.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
Prospects for Further Rebel Unity 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) At a private dinner following the press conference, URF 
Secretary General Sharif Adam Mosul told ConGen PolOff that 
 
SIPDIS 
"slightly more than forty-eight hours" before the April 8 URF 
announcement, field commanders representing Abdullah Yahiya's 
SLA/Unity signed an accord with the URF to join the rebel coalition. 
 Mosul maintained the URF had withheld announcing this fact during 
the press conference because they were waiting on direct discussions 
between Yehia and Abu Gharda and for Yahyia's commitment in writing. 
URF de-facto external affairs secretary Tadjedine Niam appeared 
displeased with Mosul's revelation to PolOff and allowed only that 
talks with SLA/Unity are going "quite well, better than most had 
expected."  Mosul continued, noting that "with Yahyia on board, once 
we get Abdelshafie we will represent seventy percent of Darfur." 
(Note: Most independent analysts believe Abdelshafie to be near 
irrelevance in both political and military terms, though he has 
long-standing ties to the SPLM.  End note.) 
 
¶10. (SBU) ConGen PolOff noted that Abdelshafie had shown a 
preference for unification in a different direction -- with URF 
moving into his SLM faction. Interlocutors criticized bitterly the 
threat that "fanatical egos" posed to peace in Darfur. "Khalil 
Ibrahim is pursuing an isolationist position that does nothing for 
Darfur and feeds him right into the palms of the NCP," Niam noted. 
While Niam and others termed Ahmed Abdelshafie "more manageable," 
Niam argued that comprehensive unification was not necessary for a 
successful political settlement. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In marked contrast to public statements at the press 
conference, URF officials spoke openly about the prospects for 
Darfur/SPLM or even URF/SPLM coordination during the upcoming 
elections.  Secretary General Mosul (by far, the most optimistic of 
the dinner guests) noted that should there be a peace agreement in 
Darfur, an electoral coalition would be possible. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) While the presence of the URFF and SLA/Khamis Abdullah 
under the umbrella movement add Arab and Massaleit elements, the URF 
remains dominated by the Zaghawa of JEM/CL previously affiliated 
with Khalil Ibrahim's JEM.  SLA/Unity's position on a coalition with 
 
KHARTOUM 00000567  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
the URF remains unclear, however, with some elements indifferent and 
other key SLA/Unity leaders preferring further consultation with 
field commanders before any formal commitment (Ref. B).  End 
comment. 
 
¶13. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ