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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM557, UPDATE ON NORTH DARFUR SECURITY SITUATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM557 2008-04-10 13:21 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8671
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0557 1011321
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101321Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0525
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000557 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, DS/IP/AF, DS/DSS/CC 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU SU ASEC
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON NORTH DARFUR SECURITY SITUATION 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 538 
 
EL FASHER 
--------- 
1. (SBU) Following the shooting in El Fasher's market April 6 
perpetrated by Arab janjaweed militia (reftel), armed militia 
members re-entered the market later that same day and engaged GoS 
forces there while attempting to loot the Bank of Khartoum.  Shots 
were heard again between 0030-0100 April 7 as Arab militias went 
back to the market.  A UNDSS source reported on April 7 that one 
more person died of injuries from April 6 shooting, which would 
bring the death toll to two.   However, the North Darfur Minister of 
Health told FieldOff on April 9 that he had visited the hospital 
where three wounded had been admitted and confirmed, contrary to 
inflated press numbers and other reports, that only one person had 
died in the violence. 
 
2. (SBU) By April 8, the market area was relatively quiet, with 
limited traffic and with roughly half the shops open for business. 
The GoS security presence remained high in the market area, 
including Military Intelligence near the Bank of Khartoum.  As of 
noon on April 9, regular activity in and through the market area had 
resumed, with a continued armed GoS presence on the scene. 2. (SBU) 
GoS helicopter "gunships" were observed for two days in a row over 
the city following the shooting incidents, and the GoS security 
presence around town remained high, with frequent GoS vehicle 
movement to the military area of the city near the Wali's 
residence. 
 
KABKABIYA, TAWILA AND KUTUM 
---------------------------- 
3. (SBU) In a similar incident, local eyewitnesses reported April 7 
that a group of Arab militia, numbering up to ten, entered the 
Kabkabiya market and picked a fight with GoS soldiers there. 
Exchange of fire ensued, and three people were killed (confirmed by 
the North Darfur Minister of Health on April 9), with three others 
in the hospital being treated for injuries.  GoS soldiers later 
entered the market area to secure it, and as of 1700h on April 7, 
the area was calm.  The Arab militia perpetrators were reported to 
be on the move north of Kabkabiya in two vehicles. 
 
4. (SBU) Similar disturbances were reported at the Tawila market on 
April 8.  UNAMID sources noted that on April 8 a 12-vehicle convoy 
of El Fasher Arab militia members (whom the Deputy Force Commander 
specified should be labeled "janjaweed") passed through Zam Zam 
toward Tawila and Kabkabiya. 
 
5. (SBU) UNAMID sources on April 9 also said that Kutum Arab 
militias are currently mobilizing to join with El Fasher Arab 
militias in a show of solidarity over their shared discontent with 
the GoS failure to pay their salaries and with the GoS conscription 
policies for its Popular Defense Forces.  UNAMID predicted more 
problems with these groups in Kutum, especially given that April 10 
is the main market day there, and the Deputy Force Commander ordered 
all UNAMID sector locations be put on alert. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: Such events demonstrate the volatile and dynamic 
nature of power relationships in Darfur. These are clashes between 
Arab militias armed and paid (sometimes) by the authorities and 
their patrons in the Sudanese regimes. The Arab tribal militias are 
terrifying to civilians but they can be fickle allies for the regime 
when they are not paid. Many believe that they were used by the 
authorities but have not been adequately compensated for their 
losses in "battle."  They are a paradoxical but real part of the 
mosaic of instability and violence in this region. End comment. 
 
7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ