VZCZCXRO8526
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0556/01 1011135
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101135Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0523
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0147
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000556 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF SPG 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SPLM ROLLS OUT BROAD DARFUR PLAN AND REQUESTS DONOR FUNDS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 476 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The SPLM has developed a multi-track plan to effect 
resolution of the Darfur crisis.  Though lacking in operational 
detail, the plan includes having SPLM representatives visit rebel 
groups and civil society in all three Darfur states, working with 
the NCP to develop a GNU approach to the Darfur issue before the 
next round of peace talks, engaging other countries in the region on 
Darfur, and holding a negotiation capacity-building workshop in Juba 
for Darfur rebel movements.  The SPLM has requested donor funding 
for outstanding bills from "Juba I" in the amount of USD 1.32 
million and financing up-front for "Juba II" in the amount of USD 
1.36 million.  While the SPLM--with donor support-- should focus on 
strengthening its ground operations and outreach in Darfur, the USG 
should consider modest funding for a Juba II initiative if the SPLM 
secures the participation of SLM/Abdulwahid and JEM representatives, 
pending UN/AU plans to organize security consultations between Sudan 
and the Darfur rebel movements.  End summary. 
 
-------------------- 
Multi-Track Approach 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Minister for Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng and 
Darfur Taskforce Member Dr. Priscilla Joseph briefed assembled 
diplomats on the SPLM's ongoing Darfur rebel outreach and the 
party's efforts with respect to the crisis in Darfur on April 3. 
The SPLM is moving along a multi-track approach: a visit by the 
Darfur Taskforce to rebel groups and civil society in all three 
Darfur states; development of a GNU approach to the Darfur issue 
before the next round of peace talks, in coordination with the NCP; 
engagement with other countries in the region on the Darfur 
conflict; and a negotiation capacity-building workshop in Juba for 
Darfur rebel movements.  "Juba II," tentatively slated for June or 
July, will focus primarily on capacity building in advance of peace 
talks.  (Note: In the absence of a UN/AU timetable for resumption of 
negotiations, it is unclear how the SPLM settled on this timing. 
End note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Per their strategy document, the SPLM's four-tiered 
approach is as follows: 
 
¶A. Mobilize civil society in Darfur and northern Sudan for peace 
through meetings, rallies and workshops; 
 
¶B. Hold consultations with the NCP to create a GNU "common 
understanding" of the process that will bring peace to Darfur; 
 
¶C. Engage in "diplomatic activity" on the Darfur problem by visiting 
neighboring states (Egypt, Eritrea, Chad, and Libya); and 
 
¶D. "Coordinate and facilitate all of the activities that are related 
to the Darfur conflict and the quest for peace." 
 
¶4. (SBU) In support of the first objective, SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir 
Mayardit will visit Darfur to meet with IDPs, SPLM members, DPA 
signatories, and other political parties to support this process, 
according to the SPLM.  Ten SPLM Darfur Taskforce Members will also 
visit the three states of Darfur over a period of two weeks. The 
Taskforce will later invite approximately 50 Darfur rebels to a 
negotiation capacity-building workshop to be held in Juba over a 
period of two weeks.  The total estimated cost for all of these 
activities is USD 1,362,000.  Joseph, responding to a question from 
UNAMID, noted that the Taskforce will provide the Juba-based 
donor/diplomatic corps with a more detailed proposal the week of 
April 7.  (Note: The SPLM has discussed Kiir's visit to Darfur since 
January of 2007.  Post continues to urge the SPLM leadership to 
organize such a visit, which would be Kiir's first, in order to 
jump-start SPLM efforts to increase its credibility in the region. 
End note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to the Taskforce, the NCP has agreed to the SPLM 
request for Darfur to receive stand-alone treatment as a 
sub-committee within the SPLM/NCP Executive Committee talks.  The 
"Darfur subcommittee" within the ExecComm talks includes six 
individuals, with Deputy Secretary General (and Darfur Taskforce 
Chairman) Abdelaziz Helou representing the SPLM and Presidential 
Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie representing the NCP. The SPLM is pressing 
for the development of a common position with the NCP on the Darfur 
crisis before the next round of peace talks. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Although they are focused primarily on matters impacting 
CPA implementation, the SPLM increasingly regards Darfur as an 
 
KHARTOUM 00000556  002 OF 002 
 
 
impediment to the CPA's consolidation, and deteriorating Chad/Sudan 
relations have become "a new front setting the SPLM back." While the 
SPLM's efforts were viewed warily by the NCP initially, Deng said 
"they now understand that our agenda is peace."  Moreover, Joseph 
noted, including Darfur on the Executive Committee agenda keeps the 
issue at the forefront of talks between the parties. "Anticipation 
and uncertainty surrounding the upcoming census, as well as the SPLM 
and NCP's ongoing discussions on border demarcation have also put 
the issue of Darfur on the backburner at the Presidency," said 
Joseph. 
 
----------------- 
Abdulwahid Shift? 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Minister Deng claimed that the SPLM Deputy Secretaries 
General Yasser Arman and Helou's March visit to Paris to speak with 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Abdulwahid al Nur was a 
breakthrough for two reasons:  Abdulwahid is now open to allowing 
his people to discuss unification with other movements in Juba, and 
there is a shift in his thinking that minimum security, as opposed 
to maximum security, must be in place in Darfur before he will 
participate in peace talks.  Deng said that the SPLM was committed 
to continuing the dialogue with Abdulwahid in order to bring him 
closer to the negotiating table.  (Note: Abdulwahid first revealed 
his position on minimum versus maximum security as a prerequisite to 
negotiations during a meeting with UN Envoy Jan Eliasson in January. 
 Post has no independent confirmation that Abdulwahid has agreed to 
send representatives to Juba, though two of his key field commanders 
have denied this assertion.  End note.) 
 
--------------------- 
Donor Funding Request 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The SPLM representatives discussed the party's outstanding 
bill for "Juba I."  According to Joseph, they anticipated hosting 50 
rebels for two weeks, but 250 rebel representatives ultimately 
joined in the talks and spent over four months in Juba.  At least 
eight Darfur rebels remain in Juba.  Joseph said the outstanding 
costs are due to lengthy hotel stays, movement of rebels from the 
diaspora to Juba, rebels' medical bills, rebels' communication in 
the field through the use of satellite phones, and the 
transportation of rebels to meetings.  Outstanding costs from Juba 
II total USD 1,326,488.  (Note: The mushrooming of rebels in Juba 
during Juba I resulted from inadequate coordination within the SPLM 
on invitations to the Darfur movements.  End note.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) Dutch and Norwegian donors were critical of the SPLM's 
over-expenditures.  The Dutch said that they cannot assist with past 
activities but could contribute to future activities.  The 
Norwegians urged the SPLM to negotiate hotel bills in advance for 
the second round of workshops to be held in Juba.  Poloff asked if 
the SPLM had shared its new strategy document and outstanding and 
future financial requests with the UN/AU.  Joseph responded that the 
SPLM had not spoken with the UN/AU about the strategy document or 
the estimated costs of USD 1,362,000 but would set up a meeting with 
the UN/AU in the next week to discuss.  Minister Deng asked the 
donors to share the strategy and financial requests with their host 
capitals and "see what they could do with it (the financial 
requests)." 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment: The main success of the Juba I discussions was 
the consolidation of several rebel movements under a 
Zaghawa-dominated umbrella group, the United Revolutionary Front 
(URF), announced on April 8.  The other major rebel 
movements--SLA/Unity, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and 
SLA/Abdulwahid-have expressed limited interest in participating in 
"Juba II" discussions hosted by the SPLM.  Given the upcoming 
elections, the SPLM should focus on strengthening its ground 
operation in Darfur to reach out to the people of the region and 
build momentum for its message of transformation in Sudan (Reftel) 
and the bulk of donor funding to the SPLM on Darfur should support 
this effort.  However, if the SPLM is able to convince 
representatives from SLA/Abdulwahid and JEM to attend a meeting in 
Southern Sudan, the USG should consider funding for a limited number 
of key Darfur rebel leaders to convene in Juba, in coordination with 
UN/AU plans to hold consultations with Sudan and the rebel movements 
on security arrangements in late April or early May. 
 
FERNANDEZ