VZCZCXRO6437
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0542/01 0991430
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081430Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0501
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000542 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SPLA DEFENSE WHITE PAPER 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The long-awaited SPLA Defense White Paper provides 
a concise overview of SPLA's mission and objectives, while 
highlighting capacity issues and a framework to tackle them.  The 
challenge will be in its implementation - the document codifies the 
military's weaknesses that require support and repair.  It also 
creates new institutions and policy subsets that will require 
resources and action. The white paper establishes an SPLA Command 
Council, reservist force, and Inspector General, in addition to 
parameters for DDR and civilian conscription. While less 
comprehensive in the areas of personnel and financial management, 
the white paper succeeds somewhat in defining the roles of the 
Minister for SPLA Affairs (strategic policy) and SPLA Chief of Staff 
(operations).  The paper charts out a defensive-oriented SPLA force 
structure with a sizeable peacetime support mandate subordinate to 
civilian agencies.  However the paper is thin on definition of force 
requirements; once it more clearly defines its strategic posture, 
the SPLA will need to focus on rightsizing and DDR because the 
current size of the SPLA is not sustainable. END SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The white paper's own development has been a testament to 
the challenges currently facing the SPLA. Competent, qualified 
drafters were in limited supply, critical operations and policy 
personnel were temporarily felled by serious illness, and tensions 
and proxy-conflict between Khartoum and Juba took many officers 
tasked to the DWP -- to include its Chairman -- away from the 
business at hand.  What began as an historic joint civil-military 
undertaking (a task that shut down the Government of Southern Sudan 
for seven days in September 2007 and saw participation by a majority 
of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly and more than two-thirds 
of the South's governors) subsequently simply broke down in internal 
paralysis and capacity problems.  It took constant pushing by 
USG-funded Security Sector Transformation Training/Advisory Team 
Members and two sets of U.S. military advisors to finally bring the 
DWP to completion, with generally complementary assistance from 
DFID.  The Special Envoy's and ConGen Juba's reiteration of the 
white paper's importance to USG security sector transformation (SST) 
further helped nudge its completion. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Although the DWP will be submitted to the SSLA once it 
opens this spring (its opening date has been thrice postponed), 
Minister for Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng told ConGen PolOff 
on April 1 that the white paper does not require legislative 
approval.  The document sent to the Department (reftel) has been 
approved by President Kiir, the Southern Sudan Defense Council, and 
the GOSS Council of Ministers. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
FINALLY, A JOB DESCRIPTION FOR THE MINISTER 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Critically, through its division of labor between military 
command roles and ministerial-level policy oversight and 
implementation, the Defense White Paper (DWP) fills a void left by 
the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan that has exacerbated 
long-standing personal friction between the SPLA Affairs Minister 
Dominic Dim Deng and SPLA Chief Oyai Deng Ajak.  The Minister now 
holds formal responsibility for all acquisitions, financial 
oversight and general policy formation, whereas the Chief of Staff 
is responsible for determining personnel and equipment requirements, 
and also the design and management of military support units 
(signals, medical, engineering, intelligence, etc.) His duties 
include management oversight of special staff functions, to include 
the Inspectorate General, Military Justice Unit, medical corps, and 
military police.  (COMMENT: USG-funded Training/Advisory Team 
members had been advocating for placing such units under the 
Minister for SPLA Affairs.  Save for one member of the Southern 
Sudan Legislative Assembly, Government of Southern Sudan 
policy-makers were absent from the final drafting session in Addis 
Ababa.  This may have impacted this component of the paper. END 
COMMENT.) 
 
------------------ 
BOXING IN DIM DENG 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) The DWP also establishes two new regulatory agencies: the 
SPLA Command Council and an Inspectorate General (though there is 
little detail on how the IG will function).  The Command Council is 
charged with oversight and "ensuring coordination between the 
Ministry and SPLA military command." It is to be composed of at 
least thirty individuals, to include Commander-in-Chief Kiir, Deputy 
Commander-in-Chief Paulino Matiep, Chief of Staff Oyai Deng Ajak, 
 
KHARTOUM 00000542  002 OF 003 
 
 
Ajak's five deputies, fifteen division commanders and all SPLA 
branch directors.  Ostensibly a coordination mechanism, the white 
paper's description of its duties reflects continuing tensions 
between current Minister Dominic Dim Deng and Chief of Staff Oyai 
Deng Ajak, exacerbated since the Minister's appointment by what SPLA 
officers, rank-and-file, and observers alike describe as Dim Deng's 
"in the weeds, micro-managerial style," and a consistent pattern of 
"over-reach" into the operational depths of the SPLA. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
FORCE STRUCTURE AND A NEW RESERVIST CORPS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The DWP rolls out a new SPLA force structure, one that 
soberly assesses the military's budget constraints.  Minister for 
Regional Cooperation Barnaba Benjamin announced during the Canadian 
Foreign Minister's visit to Juba on March 27 that the SPLA's budget 
will decrease starting in 2009.  The SPLA's decision to maintain a 
light-infantry focus - albeit one supported through civil air 
defense -- reflects "fiscal realities which limit growth of 
mechanized capabilities."  Despite known cash influxes from other 
sources, the white paper's stated force structure mirrors this 
mindset: an active ground-based military force supported 
logistically via air and riverine transportp_AIQlomatic efforts." 
 
--sV!oMQDt and revealing the degree to which a 
skills-transfer program is essential for DDR, the DWP identifies two 
areas of SPLA support to civilian agencies. The SPLA will support 
Organized Forces (police, fire, prison, and wildlife brigades) only 
when directed by President Kiir. The transformation of the SPLA 
engineering corps into road construction battalions and their 
secondment to the Ministry of Roads and Transport is an innovative 
use of occasionally underutilized manpower - one with immediate 
public relations dividends.  Moreover, it offers actionable means by 
which the SPLA can build financial self-reliance in the near-term 
and provide vocational skills training to soldiers. 
 
--------------- 
DWP SHORTFALLS 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The DWP falls short of adequately defining personnel and 
force structure requirements.  The paper does not address any 
"rightsizing" or DDR issues, no doubt because the SPLA is actually 
in a "wait and see" mode regarding whether it should be on a war 
footing or should shift to a more defensive posture.  However, over 
time maintaining a 180,000-strong force is unsustainable.  Moreover, 
the DWP is lacking in clarity on the management and structure of it 
military force. The document addresses the establishment of a 
reservist force, civil service, "Recruitment Command," and civilian 
conscription, which make policy sense but are, in fact, divorced 
from the reality of the South.  This may be an example of the DWP 
"saying the right thing" without fleshing out a serious plan. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Another problem is that the DWP appears to abandon the 
current "in-house" training approach in exchange for targeted 
recruitment or conscription of skilled professionals. However, the 
Ministry of Health states there are only 42 formally trained nurses 
throughout the South.  In addition, the Ministry for Legal Affairs 
and Constitutional Development (MOLA) Minister faces immense 
difficulties attracting qualified (and English-speaking) legal 
personnel - this despite the fact MOLA pays the highest civil 
servant salaries of any GOSS institution.  (NOTE: The MOLA 
Undersecretary makes approximately USD $150,000 per year. END NOTE.) 
The white paper's premise that the SPLA can hire consultants should 
volunteers prove insufficient forces the SPLA to prepare for 
additional expenditures. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The DWP's commitment to provide for its troops is 
surprisingly robust, but out of touch with current resource 
realities.  There is currently no pension scheme in place for either 
the GOSS or SPLA, yet the DWP promises soldiers will be provided 
with pay, pension, housing, water/food, health care, education, 
sports and recreation opportunities and awards. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The SPLA deserves credit for the establishment of an 
Inspector General position with both inspection and audit 
 
KHARTOUM 00000542  003 OF 003 
 
 
capabilities.  However, the white-paper fails to establish 
guidelines for enhanced procurement regulations and commits the SPLA 
to adhere to currently non-existent SSLA anti-corruption 
legislation. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The strengths and weaknesses of the DWP, and the long and 
sometimes tortuous road to its final production, is typical of the 
functioning of the GoSS/SPLA.  Starting off with the best of 
intentions, a lack of capacity to maintain a sustained effort to 
complete the task meant months of delays and breakdowns.  Managerial 
talent in the South is spread thin and is subject to the pushes and 
pulls of conflicting priorities and the demands of constant 
management by crisis.  Although, as noted, some of the DWP's goals 
are clearly beyond the reach of the GoSS at the present time, it has 
set at least the stage for a possible thoughtful, managed 
transformation of the SPLA into a more capable regular military 
force. 
 
FERNANDEZ