VZCZCXRO5349
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0538 0981436
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071436Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0494
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000538 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF/C 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU SU
SUBJECT: GOS BORDER INTELLIGENCE FORCE SPARKS GUNFIRE IN EL FASHER 
MARKET 
 
 
THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
---------------------- 
¶1. (SBU) On April 6 at approximately 1330, United Nations Department 
of Safety and Security (UNDSS) in El Fasher, North Darfur, warned 
that "groups of combatants from the GoS Military Camp intend to 
cause problems in the market area, due to unsatisfactory welfare 
conditions."   A group of Border Intelligence Unit (BIU) forces 
traveled through El Fasher market, firing in the air to express 
their dissatisfaction with their living conditions and GoS 
non-payment of salaries.  At that time UNDSS advised staff to 
exercise caution when driving through the market area. 
 
¶2. (SBU) International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) 
reported shots heard at close range until approximately 1445 [NOTE: 
Many INGOs are headquartered within close proximity to the central 
market area. END NOTE].  Local residents were reported to be running 
from the market area and vehicles in the area evacuated as well. 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) UNDSS told FieldOff at 1530 on April 6 that the BIF had 
moved on to the North Darfur Wali's (Governor's) residence to 
continue its protest there.  UNDSS reported that GoS police were on 
the scene in the market to secure the area and that traffic through 
the area was prohibited.  A weekly 1530 Inter-Agency meeting 
convened by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) was cancelled due to the incident.  National Intelligence and 
Security Services (NISS) officials were also on the scene in the 
market.  Local shop-owners staged a demonstration at the Wali's 
office to make sure the government protects local businesses. 
 
¶4. (SBU) By 1600 on April 6, traffic began to flow again around the 
main market road.  GoS armored vehicles were parked at the entrance 
to the Military Camp area, just north of the Wali's office.  The BIU 
forces announced that they would return to town if the GoS did not 
address their grievances. 
 
¶5. (SBU) As of 0800 on April 7, the security situation in El Fasher 
is reportedly calm.  The Wali addressed the issue on local TV and 
expressed GoS regret over the incident, describing it as an 
"administrative" problem and stressing that the perpetrators will be 
arrested and submitted to a military disciplinary board. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND CASUALTIES 
----------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) At the first report of violence in the market, Embassy 
staff got off the roads and consolidated at the Green House, Blue 
House and USAID Houses.  FieldOff corresponded by mobile and 
satellite phone with the Embassy.  Internet and telephone service 
remained operational during the incident. 
 
¶7. (SBU) As of 2200 on April 6, casualty reports remained 
unconfirmed.  UNDSS initially reported at 1530 that one person had 
been killed but later at 1730 amended that figure to three or four 
killed.  Ahmed Bahr, a member of the North Darfur legislature, told 
emboff at 2230 that there was at least one casualty, specifically 
naming 24-year-old Abdallah Adam Muhammad.  By 0900 on April 7 it 
was reported that there was in fact one person killed and three 
wounded; in his television broadcast, the Wali sent his condolences 
to the families of the dead and the injured.  Initial reports 
indicated the number of wounded had been at least ten.  The GoS 
security presence in El Fasher remains heavy. 
 
¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: While the El Fasher market area is prone to 
security incidents, there has not been an incident similar to that 
of April 6 since December 2006.  While BIU dissatisfaction with the 
GoS for unfulfilled promises with regard to rank and money is also 
nothing new, it has not recently manifested itself in downtown El 
Fasher to such a degree.  The incident shows once again the extent 
to which janjaweed forces that have been integrated into "official" 
forces are essentially guns for hire and are willing to exert very 
public pressure on the GOS to meet their demands.  They obviously 
know that the GOS is vulnerable to their demands, because without 
the janjaweed BIU forces (some of whom are Chadian Arabs especially 
in the West) the GOS would not be able to wage war effectively in 
Darfur. 
 
¶9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ