VZCZCXRO4468
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0518/01 0970849
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060849Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0442
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0142

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000518 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF S/E WILLIAMSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR, AND ALSO PASS USAID 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SU KPKO UNSC
SUBJECT: BALANCING ACT - UNAMID PUBLIC AFFAIRS WALKS TIGHTROPE 
BETWEEN GOS AND INTERNAL BATTLES 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On April 2, Shereen Zorba and Ali Hamati, of 
UNAMID's Public Information Office in El Fasher, told emboffs that 
they feel both external pressure from the Government of Sudan (GoS) 
and a degree of internal marginalization within UNAMID itself.  Most 
notably, Zorba reported that strategic communications were excluded 
from the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) concluded in February 
between the GoS and UNAMID, an omission that is causing significant 
problems for their department.  Externally, Zorba and Ali also 
stated that GoS's censorship, harassment, and bureaucracy slow their 
public affairs and outreach work.  Internally, Zorba and Ali stated 
that they struggle with limited resource allocated from UNAMID (with 
only eight staff, technological limitations, and delays in the 
assignment of a permanent director.) END SUMMARY. 
 
FEELING THE GOS'S HEAT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2.  (SBU) Zorba and Hamati stated that UNAMID public affairs is not 
included in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the 
Government of Sudan (GoS) and the United Nations-African Union 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) signed on February 9, 2008.  Zorba 
explained that at the time of SOFA negotiation, inclusion of public 
information took a back seat to other, more pressing issues (which 
at the time included night flights and access).  They stated that 
because of this exclusion, government harassment and state control 
of the press, they have had to do much of their work below the radar 
of the government. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) They noted that it is particularly difficult to "tell 
UNAMID's story," as the Government tightly controls the main media 
in Sudan.  Zorba stated that it is even more difficult for Sudanese 
journalists to gain access to Darfur than international journalists. 
 Hamati said that during his two years in Sudan, he has learned how 
to "play the government's game" when requesting travel permits for 
journalists, putting for example, "researcher" on many forms (as 
opposed to "reporter"), as this simple substitution speeds the 
process and saves him a significant amount of work and time.  Even 
after gaining access to remote areas of Darfur, Hamati emphasized 
that the government censors remove "almost every story coming out 
about UNAMID in the local press." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Despite the GoS censorship and harassment, neither Hamati 
nor Zorba stated that they feel any sense of competition with the 
GoS-controlled media or the rebel movements.  Zorba stated in fact 
that "the rebels take pressure off of us and do a lot of work for 
us."  Both admitted that non-signatory rebel movements are media 
masters, whose information is often not to be trusted. 
 
UNAMID INTERNAL BATTLES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶5.  (SBU) Zorba stated that UNAMID public affairs currently has two 
international employees and six Sudanese staff.  Hamati is the 
acting director, having served on and off in the position for the 
past several months.  Hamati stated that while he supports his local 
staff, several of them confuse their work in public affairs with 
other areas of the UN mission, including political affairs and 
military intelligence.  Zorba stated that she would like public 
affairs to embark upon a comprehensive research and feedback 
program, but she does not have the staff, time, or money to set up 
focus groups and conduct pre- and post-program surveys. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Zorba stated that most of UNAMID's leadership understands 
the importance of public affairs, even though that department was 
initially excluded from a two-day internal UNAMID brainstorming 
session on Darfur Peace Agreement and Related Issues held on March 
31 and April 1 [NOTE:  Zorba publicly criticized senior UNAMID 
leadership for this oversight during one of the final sessions on 
April 1.  END NOTE]. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Zorba stated that much work needs to be done to avoid 
public affairs "blunders," such as AMIS' handling of the Haskanita 
attack on September 30, 2007, when rebels attacked the Haskanita 
base killing approximately ten AMIS soldiers.  She stated that AMIS 
did not have a mobile media unit, which would have allowed her and 
her team to get directly to the site and report from the field.  She 
said by the time AMIS was able to put together its side of the 
story, the media had already run with it, framing it as an example 
of the incompetence of African Union troops.  Zorba stated that 
other resources, such as radio transmitters, radios for 
distribution, and other equipment are needed to aid the public 
affairs dimension of her work. 
 
POSITIVES 
- - - - - 
¶8.  (SBU)  Despite both the internal and external challenges facing 
UNAMID Public Information, both Zorba and Hamati were optimistic 
about the coming months.  Zorba stated that one recent success was a 
public affairs training for many civilian police (civpol).  She 
 
KHARTOUM 00000518  002 OF 002 
 
 
emphasized that public affairs staff "cannot be everywhere" and that 
civpol have more contact with the local population than any other 
UNAMID office, often prompting Public Information officers to 
accompany civpol on patrols.  "There are opportunities for UNAMID to 
tell its story.  Despite language and cultural barriers, the troops 
are doing good things and we need to highlight that," stated Zorba. 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) On April 15, UNAMID will hold a public event on "UNAMID's 
First 100 Days," highlighting UNAMID successes during this period. 
Public Information would like to hold this event in the Peace 
Secretariat and has expressed interest in taking over the facility 
 
SIPDIS 
from the USG.  [NOTE: The Joint Special Representative's Office, the 
Joint Mediation Support Team and the DDDC have also indicated their 
desire to assume control of the Peace Secretariat; we expect a 
formal request from the JSR's office imminently.  END NOTE].  Hamati 
emphasized that UNAMID continues to work on a radio program for 
UNAMID, while UNMIS's "Radio Miraya" continues its work throughout 
some locations in Darfur.  [NOTE:  Although Radio Miraya has a fully 
functional website with streaming audio, its broadcasts that are 
advertised on the website did not appear to be functional in 
El-Fasher on FM101 during March and April 2008.  END NOTE]. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶10. (SBU) Despite significant challenges, UNAMID Public Information 
Officer Zorba appeared enthusiastic, informed, and undaunted by the 
enormity of UNAMID's public affairs work.  Like other elements of 
the mission, the UN's own bureaucratic dysfunction and difficulties 
integrating the remnants of the AU are two likely reasons for 
UNAMID's shortage in staffing.  Although help may be on the way when 
Albany Associates (a UK-based contractor for communications and 
public diplomacy strategies) provides six more international and 
highly qualified staff to UNAMID, as of April 5, a MoU between 
Albany Associates and UNAMID still has not been signed.  GoS 
harassment and UNAMID's failure to allot sufficient resources, 
freedom, and leverage to public affairs are causes for concern.  The 
fact that UNAMID Public Affairs was not explicitly mentioned in the 
SOFA (although there is a reference to UNAMID radio in the SOFA) 
should not deter UNAMID's Public Information section from going 
about their business. Embassy Khartoum's own experience with the 
Sudanese press is that there is more actual openness and opportunity 
than UNAMID describes - if the USG in Sudan can successfully 
communicate its message, why can't UNAMID? 
 
FERNANDEZ