VZCZCXRO4460
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0517/01 0970757
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060757Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0440
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000517 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNMIS DDR PROGRAM TO REQUEST FUNDING AT SUDAN CONSORTIUM IN 
PARIS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 506 
 
¶1. (SBU) At a meeting of the AEC Security working group April 2 
UNMIS DDR Chief Adrian Verheul described plans for an April 9 
high-level roundtable meeting in Khartoum of UN officials, donors 
and GOS officials to develop comprehensive DDR program.  Verheul 
plans to follow this up with a request for DDR funding at the Sudan 
Consortium in Partis.  He said the program would impact 50,000 
Northern and Southern soldiers over a two year period. Ultimately, 
DDR would disarm and reintegrate an estimated 182,000 soldiers in 
both the North and the South at an estimated cost of $700 million 
over several years. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Verheul assessed that DDR programming to date has had only 
limited success.  He said that disarmament of soldiers can be 
counted in the dozens; there has been limited demobilization of 
soldiers in both the North and the South, and reintegration programs 
have only just begun. However, in November the DDR program achieved 
a major breakthrough when the Presidency adopted a National DDR 
Strategy which provided the legal basis to move forward with a 
program. Furthermore, the Presidency is expected to announce a 
National Reintegration Policy (NRP) and propose a budget for 
submission to the Sudan Consortium in Paris in early May.  Verheul 
said the program is a sign of Sudanese commitment and provides the 
legal and policy framework for future DDR programs. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Verheul, who arrived in February 2008, criticized existing 
DDR programs saying that policy and politics drove current DDR 
program planning and that these programs represent a systematic 
program.  Verheul noted that disarmament programs are often driven 
by political forces, which are prone to abrupt starts and stops, 
while reintegration programs are essentially development programs 
which must be well regulated and managed over a defined period of 
time. Proper planning and timing are essential in developing an 
effective DDR program, Verheul said.  Funds must be available to 
conduct all phases of the program. Verheul cautioned against 
starting a demobilization program without a fully planned and funded 
reintegration program. Any delays in programming would only invite 
former combatants to rearm themselves and turn to petty crime, as 
forces did in Eastern Sudan and other parts of the world. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Verheul explained that initial program success is critical 
to the success of the entire program.  If soldiers can be properly 
disarmed and given skills to replace their weapons, this would give 
confidence to future ex-combatants, to both Northern and Southern 
governments, and to the international community that the DDR program 
can achieve results.  Verheul outlined a plan to transition 50,000 
veterans in the first year of the program by targeting veterans who 
currently play no combat role and have no military significance. 
The choice of veterans who play no combat role is deliberate in 
order to permit both sides to observe the success of the DDR program 
before committing to demobilize their front-line soldiers. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Verheul said that currently-identified funding is 
inadequate. Based on current estimates of 182,000 DDR program 
candidates in both the North and the South, at a programming cost of 
$3,000 per person for two years, the requirement would reach up to 
$600 to $700 million dollars over two years.  Verhel acknowledged 
that donors would be skeptical since none of the currently budgeted 
$49 million has been spent, but explained that a policy framework 
was not in place previously. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Asked if this proposed DDR program could also be used for 
LRA troops, Verheul said yes, but it would be a logistical nightmare 
to set up.  He said that programs would be established in Sudan and 
along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
However, as the families of the combatants are normally part of any 
DDR program, if there is snag in the schedule the LRA families will 
need to be cared for on an extended basis. This will be a drain on 
UNMIS resources. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Verheul noted the many potential obstacles.  He said that 
while a program can be expressed in the simple arithmetic of 
collecting arms, the real challenge is to "disarm the mind of the 
combatants first."  He said there are deep cultural roots of 
resolving disputes through violence in this society, and there are 
real security concerns of being unarmed in a society where guns have 
been a factor for a long time.  "It would be very dangerous to give 
away your weapon if your neighbor still has his." Verheul noted the 
scale of the problem in Sudan: there are an estimated two to three 
million arms in both North and South. He recognized that only 30 
percent of these arms are in the hands of the governments, with the 
remaining arms controlled by unofficial militias. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Verheul said that in preparation for the April 9 meeting in 
 
KHARTOUM 00000517  002 OF 002 
 
 
Sudan, and for the early May Sudan Consortium meeting in Paris, he 
plans to travel to the UN in New York for high-level discussions 
with potential donors to present his DDR proposal.  He will make a 
case for a $20 million reintegration communications campaign program 
to kick-start the first phase of the DDR program. At the April 9 
roundtable hosted by UNMIS, Verheul said that prospective donors and 
Sudanese representatives will discuss DDR programs in light of the 
recent GOS policy framework. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment: Verheul's comprehensive DDR program proposal was 
well received at the informal AEC meeting.  There is broad consensus 
that an effective DDR program is required; the question is how to 
get the program started and funded given political-military 
realities in Sudan.  The program should be especially well received 
in the South, where the SPLA is trying to demobilize veterans. 
Verheul said he will note the endorsement of the AEC when he 
presents his plan in Paris. 
 
FERNANDEZ