VZCZCXRO2637
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0503/01 0941637
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031637Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0390
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0137
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: GOS FLEXES ITS MUSCLE IN DARFUR 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Within the last two weeks, there are indications 
that the Government of Sudan (GoS) is flexing its muscle in Darfur. 
Signs of this include: three firefights between Arab 
militias/janjaweed and SLM-Minnawi members in the center of 
El-Fasher; several Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) parades through IDP 
camps; increased janjaweed activity and presence; and apparent 
indications of impending fighting between the GoS and the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM). End SUMMARY. 
 
SHOOTINGS AND FIREFIGHTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2.  (SBU)  For three consecutive days starting on March 30, 2008, 
shooting between Arab militiamen/janjaweed and members of the Sudan 
Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi (SLM-Minnawi) occurred in 
El-Fasher proper.  The first incident appears to have been 
spontaneous violence (resulting in one wounded SLM-Minnawi member 
still in critical condition), while later incidents appear to have 
been coordinated between the police and Arab militias. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  On March 30, one SLA-Minnawi member exchanged fire with a 
GoS soldier in El Fasher. As of April 3, the SLA-Minnawi member 
remains in a critical condition in an El-Fasher hospital.  One day 
later, three vehicles of SLA-Minnawi members came to the central 
El-Fasher police station and demanded the arrest of the Arab militia 
members who attacked their colleague on March 30.  Five vehicles 
with a number of Arab militia immediately came to the police station 
and the two parties exchanged fire.  Also, on March 31, a separate 
firefight between three SLA-Minnawi and two Arab militia men 
reportedly took place in El-Fasher, resulting in the death of one 
SLA-Minnawi member. On April 1, UNDSS also reported more gunshots in 
El-Fasher's market, though the parties involved have not yet been 
confirmed. (Note: The information in this paragraph is based on 
UNDSS situation reports.  End Note.) 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  On April 2, two members of SLM-Minnawi told emboffs that 
the Arab militia/janjaweed violence is part of the GoS's intentional 
targeting, marginalization, and harassment of DPA signatory groups. 
Eisa Musa, Head of Security and Police, and Adam Ali War, a 
Ceasefire Commission representative of SLM-Minni, described the 
attacks as the government's effort to fragment Minnawi's force. 
They acknowledged that SLM-Minnawi has lost supporters to rival 
movements such as the National Redemption Front, as their members 
feel isolated, targeted, and not rewarded by the DPA.  Musa stated 
that it is "very clear" that the government is pushing its 
recruitment efforts for the SAF, and placing janjaweed into 
positions in the Border Patrol, police, and army.  Both Musa and War 
doubted that the perpetrators of the shootings would be brought to 
justice, as law enforcement and the courts are extensions of the NCP 
and "the judicial system and police are political institutions." 
War criticized the "total neglect" of the DPA's security protocols, 
especially by the government, which uses the janjaweed and militia 
as tools to "buy control of Darfur." 
 
¶5. (SBU) On April 2, locally employed staff observed unusual 
movements of heavily armed SLM-Minnawi roaming throughout El-Fasher, 
brandishing weapons.  Local staff commented that although it is 
common for SLM-Minnawi to have arms in the city, the group's current 
amount of firepower, high level of awareness, and overall 
preparedness were "out of the ordinary."  Representatives from other 
Darfur rebel groups, including former El Fasher-based JEM reps, 
agreed that these displays and gunfights were unusual. 
 
DISPLAY OF FORCE 
- - - - - - - - - 
¶6.  (SBU) In response to anti-census protests in IDP camps in El 
Fasher and Nyala, the SAF and related security groups paraded 
through towns in North and South Darfur in full force twice during 
the week of March 30.  Senior UNAMID personnel remarked at daily 
briefings on April 1 and 2 that such shows of force were intended to 
"maintain law and order" in the areas.  The presence of even more 
heavily armed SAF members is also noticeable in El Fasher.  The 
UNAMID Force Commander on April 2 said he anticipates similar 
displays in West Darfur, where anti-census protests are expected 
next. 
 
JANJAWEED 
- - - - - 
¶7.  (SBU)  In addition to the three clashes between SLM-Minnawi and 
Arab militias during the week of March 30, there have been other 
reports of an increased presence of janjaweed in Darfur and their 
reintegration into the GoS's multi-layered security apparatus.  On 
March 27, Abu Bashir Al-Ahmed, Umdah of Abu Shouk camp, high school 
teacher, and community activist, told emboff that in the past 
several months, janjaweed have been strategically positioned outside 
of many IDP camps.  Ahmed reported that the janjaweed often display 
reckless behavior, drinking alcohol and shooting their weapons at 
night.  "It terrifies us in the camps," stated Ahmed. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000503  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) UNAMID force protection, civilian police, and military 
observers at multiple camps all over Darfur have also noted the 
revitalization of janjaweed into Sudanese security structures.  On 
March 23, Kabkabiya Sector Headquarters the Deputy Camp Commander 
recounted for FieldOff an incident in March wherein an estranged 
janjaweed fighter turned himself over to UNAMID authorities.  This 
individual had two official IDs as well, one showing him as a Major 
in the janjaweed militia and one showing him as a Corporal in the 
SAF. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Also in a March 23 visit to Nertiti Base Camp Deputy Camp 
Commander pointed out to FieldOff dozens of men in the near vicinity 
of the camp that he labeled as janjaweed.  Pointing to a man on 
horseback less than 100 meters from where the UNAMID group was 
standing outside the camp, the Deputy Commander explained that 
janjaweed often rode by the camp, hiding their rifles under their 
clothes to evade the eye of armed UNMAID guards.  Despite the 
janjaweed's obvious presence, as well as that of other armed Arab 
groups, the Camp Commander MAJ Antoine Kayiranga said UNAMID's night 
patrols and outreach to janjaweed and Arab leaders in Gorne and 
Guldo had been effective in reducing the incidents of banditry and 
in creating better communication with other armed groups. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  In a March 25 meeting the Secretary General of the 
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, Ishaq Ahmed Abdul Rahman, 
told emboffs that janjaweed inside El-Fasher are totally integrated 
into the local police, the Popular Defense Forces, the border 
intelligence, and the central reserve police.  He claimed that the 
National Intelligence and Security Service is responsible for the 
coordination between Arab militias, janjaweed, and the security 
apparatus.  He added this noticeable presence of the janjaweed has 
created a general concern among the local population about the 
legitimacy of law enforcement. 
 
IMPENDING FIGHT BETWEEN GoS AND JEM? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶11.  (SBU)  In the April 1 UNAMID Morning Brief, the Chief of 
UNAMID's military intelligence unit reported on March 31 
conversations between UNAMID and GoS security operatives.  One of 
these conversations focused on JEM activities in West Darfur.  The 
GoS operatives reportedly told UNAMID about JEM plans for an attack 
against GoS positions.  FieldOff spoke with JEM Field Commander GEN 
Mohamed Beshier following this briefing, and Beshier adamantly 
denied any such JEM plans, noting that JEM areas, particularly Jebel 
Moun, were relatively calm in recent days.  [NOTE: Over the past 
four months Beshier has been forthcoming regarding JEM military 
plans, often reporting when and where JEM was planning attacks in 
West Darfur before they took place.  While rebel leaders are not 
always the most trustworthy of sources, Beshier has been reliable 
with his information to date.  END NOTE].  Beshier assessed that the 
GoS made the statement as a pretext for unilateral GoS military 
action against JEM in West Darfur.  In a subsequent conversation 
with Joint Mediation Support Team member Muin Shreim, Muin told 
FieldOff he had had a similar exchange with a GoS interlocutor when 
discussing a possible visit in mid-April by the Special Envoys to 
Jebel Moun to meet JEM representatives.  The GoS contact advised 
Muin "not to go anytime soon," lending further credence to the 
likelihood of impending military action in the region. 
 
¶12. (SBU) FieldOff reported this information to the UNAMID Chief of 
Staff and Chief of Planning, the latter of whom is planning a trip 
to the Kulbus/Silea area on April 4 to investigate [NOTE: UNAMID 
Chief of Staff remarked to emboffs the week of March 16 that GoS 
troop movements in West Darfur indicate that it is "planning to try 
to wipe out JEM once and for all." END NOTE].  UNAMID on April 2 
reported sightings of GoS attack helicopters over El Geneina, where, 
according to JEM sources in Abeche, at least 100 injured Chadian 
rebels retreated after having been beaten back by the Government of 
Chad (GoC) in fighting over the past 24 hours [NOTE: One JEM source 
reported that the GoC was "celebrating" in Abeche on April 2.  END 
NOTE].  JEM sources added that 50 Chadian rebel vehicles had been 
destroyed in the "severe" fighting that took place in Ade Beida, and 
UNAMID confirmed that NGOs had been evacuated from that area to El 
Geneina. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶13.  (SBU) It is possible that the GoS may be racing to "complete 
the job" in Darfur before UNAMID troops deploy in greater numbers. 
This certainly appears to be the case with JEM, which the GOS views 
as its only real adversary.  However government forces in Darfur 
appear to be taking a more muscular approach at the moment toward 
SLM/Minawi as well.  The increased aggression on the part of 
janjaweed forces in and around El Fasher is troubling, and seems to 
be an attempt at intimidating and marginalizing the insurgents.  The 
display of force at an IDP camp in El Fasher makes less sense, 
 
KHARTOUM 00000503  003 OF 003 
 
 
however, especially as its outcome may have led to IDP protests 
against the census in the first place. 
 
FERNANDEZ