VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKM #0565/01 1150558
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240558Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0249
INFO RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0983
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 2390
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1015

UNCLAS KAMPALA 000565 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR PRM/AFR, GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREF EAID PINS UG
SUBJECT:  Uganda refugee official on Kenyan, Sudanese 
and Congolese refugees 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  On April 18, 2008, RefCoord met 
with Carlos Twesigomwe, Commissioner for Disaster 
Management and Refugee Affairs, Office of the Prime 
Minister, Uganda.  The Commissioner reaffirmed his 
government's commitment to Kenyan and Congolese 
refugees in its borders and praised UNHCR efforts to 
repatriate Sudanese.  He said Uganda was ready to 
participate in preliminary discussions on Congolese 
repatriation, but cautioned that barriers lay in the 
path to a final Uganda-DRCongo-UNHCR agreement on 
Congolese repatriation.  Commissioner Twesigomwe 
appeared to be exceptionally well informed on the 
status of refugees in Uganda. 
 
Kenyans:  Move to a settlement in Uganda's interest 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Twesigomwe explained that he lobbied his 
Minster Musa Ecweru, Minister of State for Disaster 
Management and Refugees, for the March 2008 
relocation of Kenyan refugees from their transit site 
to a permanent settlement.  He said that refugees 
expressed to him their desire to begin their lives in 
Uganda, as they waited for peace to return to their 
communities in Kenya.  The Commissioner opined that 
national political settlements meant less to the 
refugees than did regional compensation for losses, 
and assurances of security in their villages and 
towns. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The delay in moving the refugees to a 
settlement had been the result of a political 
decision, not a humanitarian one, according to 
Twesigomwe.  The government acceded to a request from 
the Government of Kenya, to postpone the move to 
April, to allow the refugees more time to deliberate 
before moving them away from the border.  The 
Commissioner said he had objected to the decision 
because the transit site was unsuitable for refugees 
in the long term, and the refugee presence would 
eventually become a burden or health threat for the 
local community, creating enmity between the 
populations. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Initially, the political concerns took 
precedence over humanitarian considerations, and the 
Ministry delayed the refugee relocation.  However, 
Twesigomwe committed himself to "convince" the 
Minister to hold to the end of April deadline for the 
move. 
 
Sudanese:  Returns cost Uganda resources/services 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Twesigomwe was encouraged by the pace of 
the voluntarily repatriations of Southern Sudanese 
from Uganda.  He said the refugees were initially 
suspicious that UNHCR and Uganda were delaying their 
return home for political reasons, in collusion with 
the Khartoum government.  Southern Sudanese diplomats 
had fed that suspicion in their contacts with refugee 
leaders.  However, there never had been a Government 
plot against refugee returns.  Now that UNHCR was 
moving 3,600 refugees per week, the refugees had 
stopped their protests. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) According to Twesigomwe, the Government of 
Uganda expected to have good relations with Southern 
Sudan, and the people-to-people contact in the 
refugee hosting areas would be the basis for future 
economic and social ties.  Although he hoped for 
close economic ties with Southern Sudan, the 
Commissioner was concerned that repatriating Sudanese 
were buying Uganda's food and charcoal, and exporting 
those commodities with them as they returned home, 
while Uganda experienced the early stages of a food 
shortage.  Twesigomwe planned to raise this trade 
with the ministers responsible for agriculture, 
commerce, and customs. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Commissioner said the successful 
repatriation had another negative aspect for Uganda. 
As part of the operation, UNHCR reduced resources 
dedicated to the Sudanese refugees, and handed over 
responsibility for key services to the Government of 
Uganda.  The Commissioner was unhappy over what he 
 
described as UNHCR's "rush" to hand over to the 
Government health and education services in refugee 
camps.  Twesigomwe complained that UNHCR and its 
partners designed and executed the handover without 
informing the Government.  He and his office 
developed their own plan for post-refugee services in 
affected areas.  However, UNHCR had never inquired if 
the Government had its own ideas about what should 
happen once the refugees repatriated. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) With unusual candor, the Commissioner said, 
"We want money," in response to how UNHCR could 
better manage the hand over.  According to 
Twesigomwe, the local government did not have the 
resources to provide health and education services to 
refugees and the local population as well.  If UNHCR 
could no longer provide these services, they should 
transfer resources to the GoU so that local 
government could use UNHCR funding to support 
refugees. 
 
Congo:  Talking about repatriation talks 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The Commissioner had learned from his 
Minister of State that the Tripartite-plus process 
encouraged talks between DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda on 
the repatriation of Congolese refugees.  Twesigomwe 
supported the idea of preliminary talks.  However, he 
pointed out that two barriers stood in the path of a 
UNHCR-Congo-Uganda tripartite agreement.  First,  in 
a recent survey, Congolese refugees had 
overwhelmingly rejected the idea of return to DRC. 
He opined that the Congolese reticence made good 
sense given the uncertain political situation in the 
Kivus. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The second barrier to a repatriation 
agreement was the continued arrival of Congolese 
refugees in both Rwanda and Uganda.  "How can we 
conclude an agreement on repatriation when refugees 
are still coming," he asked.  Twesigomwe said that 
the violence in DRC continued, and had even crossed 
the border briefly into Uganda when armed fighters 
raided Uganda border villages for food. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Returning to the theme of resources, 
Twesigomwe expressed the concern that once nations 
begin speaking of repatriation, UNHCR and donors 
might begin to reallocate resources away from Rwanda 
and Uganda and toward DRC.  Such a move would be 
disastrous for the nations that had hosted refugees, 
Twesigomwe said.  He explained that UNHCR and donors 
should consider all the effects of a refugee crisis 
on the host country, as well as the eventual care of 
the residual refugee population left behind after a 
repatriation exercise.  The Government of Uganda 
would want assurances that agreeing to a tripartite 
agreement would not mean a lessening of the 
international commitment to Uganda. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Comment:  The Commissioner's position on a 
tripartite agreement with DRC seemed mildly negative. 
The questions he raised are valid.  UNHCR confirmed 
that an intention survey conducted among Congolese 
showed a marked unwillingness to go home.  The survey 
also showed that events in Kinshasa were not relevant 
to refugees' decisions to return home.  UNHCR plans 
another survey in preparation for the preliminary 
tripartite discussions.  No matter what the result, 
swaying the refugees would be a matter of 
reassurances from their specific areas of return, 
rather than demonstrated goodwill on the part of 
Kinshasa. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Comment continued:  Commissioner 
Twesigomwe's comments on UNHCR handover plans in 
Uganda were disingenuous.  In 2007, RefCoord and 
UNHCR spoke at length with his office, local 
government, members of Parliament, and the offices of 
the responsible Ministers about the methodology of 
the handover of health services.  At that time, the 
government was keen on the idea, hoping that UNHCR 
would close out its partner, IRC, and funnel all 
assistance through the GoU.  Instead, UNHCR followed 
a transparent plan, using local government--the 
 
actual service provider, to take over aspects of the 
health and education operations in the settlements 
previously managed by partners. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Government performance in the health sector 
has shown weaknesses in health administration. 
However, the GoU had over one year to prepare to 
accept those functions from UNHCR.  End comment. 
Browning