VZCZCXRO7050
RR RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #0521/01 1051350
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141350Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0212
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 0004

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000521 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU CG
SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: KONY DANCES AWAY AGAIN FROM PEACE 
AGREEMENT 
 
KAMPALA 00000521  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  For the Government of Uganda, Kony's 
rejection of peace was disappointing, but not unexpected. 
President Museveni will meet with his Southern Sudanese 
counterpart Salva Kiir on April 14 to determine the way 
forward.  International criticism of Kony's movements, 
kidnappings, and forced military training of abductees from 
Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), was muted during the negotiations.  Kony's 
rejection of the peace process could deepen disaffection 
within the LRA, create splits, and increase his reliance on 
external allies.  The international community should begin 
exploring other ways to increase corral Kony.  End Summary. 
 
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SITUATION UPDATE 
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¶2.  (SBU) Kony did not sign the peace agreement nor did he 
meet with northern elders, traditional, and religious leaders 
at Rikwangba between April 10 and 13.  On April 9, LRA 
fighters reported to us that Kony told them he would not sign 
the peace agreement because he reportedly feared becoming 
another Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh, or Jonas Savimbi.  Kony 
also sacked his negotiating team, including its leader David 
Matsanga, on April 9.  Matsanga announced that he resigned on 
April 10.  After his departure, Matsanga admitted to 
journalists and diplomats that he had had not met Kony in the 
past as he had claimed.  Matsanga said he had little contact 
with Kony even via telephone and had last spoken to him in 
March.  Government of Southern Sudan mediator Riek Machar 
waited for Kony at Rikwangba until April 13.  He claimed that 
Kony was coming back toward Rikwangba to meet him.  U.N. 
Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Joachim Chissano 
traveled to Rikwangba on April 13.  The GOU's chief 
negotiators, Ruhakana Rugunda and Henry Okello Oryem, told 
P/E Chief on April 12 and 13 that they supported any last 
ditch efforts by Chissano and Machar to establish direct 
contact with Kony, but were not hopeful as they believed Kony 
was moving westward. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) For the GOU, the formal negotiating phase of the 
peace process has likely ended.  The Ugandan Government 
negotiating team returned from southern Sudan on April 11 and 
announced that it would not renew the Cessation of 
Hostilities Agreement (CHA).  Upon return, the team met with 
various government elements on April 12 to debate next steps. 
 President Museveni maintained his travel plans to go to Juba 
on April 14.  Instead of signing the peace deal, Museveni 
will hold a regular bilateral meeting with Government of 
Southern Sudan President Salva Kiir.  Oryem told P/E Chief 
that Museveni and Kiir would discuss the future of the peace 
process. 
 
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IMPLICATIONS 
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¶4.  (U) Kony's refusal to sign the agreement takes the 
process of resolving the LRA conflict into a new phase. 
 
- - - - 
FOR GOU 
- - - - 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The apparent demise of the negotiations means that 
the GOU's hands are no longer tied and it can openly pursue 
other options to resolve the conflict.  Formally, the end of 
the negotiation should be called by the GOSS, and Museveni 
may be discussing this with Kiir on April 14.  Government 
patience throughout the peace process yielded significant 
domestic benefits, including a changed dynamic in northern 
Uganda.  The peace process unified Ugandans, highlighted the 
extent of northern marginalization to the Government, and 
demonstrated the need for national reconciliation, according 
to Oryem. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Plans for a military option (Plan B) need revision 
given that the LRA leader has re-located and spread his 
forces between DRC and CAR.  The GOU's chief negotiator, 
Minister of Internal Affairs Ruhakana Rugunda, has said that 
it might not be worth the GOU's effort to go after Kony 
militarily if he continued to move in CAR and toward Chad. 
Rugunda stated that it "was always Khartoum's plan to use 
Kony's rebels as a mercenary force" and that the GOU would 
act to prevent any destabilization of southern Sudan.  If 
Kony proceeded to Darfur, it might not be worth Ugandan 
resources to chase him.  If he was in DRC, he could be 
accessed.  UN Special Envoy Chissano also has misgivings 
about a unilateral Ugandan military operation to capture 
 
KAMPALA 00000521  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Kony.  According to Chissano, not all the governments in the 
region accept a military option because a failed operation 
could unleash unintended consequences.  The region had 
experienced two years without war and the prospect that the 
LRA conflict could be re-ignited was worrisome.  If Museveni 
went after Kony without knowing where he was and the 
operation failed, Uganda would be held responsible for 
startign a cycle of retaliatory violence.  The LRA's 
confidence would be boosted and civilians in the region would 
be terrified.  Chissano argued that a coordinated 
international action sanctioned by the UNSC would ameliorate 
the negative conseqences of a failed Ugandan operation.  He 
believes an international force executing the ICC warrants 
would have credibility and more of a chance for success. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The GOU will encourage defections from the LRA and 
formed a task force to devise plans to assist LRA wishing to 
leave LRA encampments.  Exposure of LRA movements, 
abductions, and crimes and increased GOU diplomatic contacts 
with DRC and CAR to deny safe haven for Kony could increase 
pressure on the LRA.  Domestically, the GOU will continue 
encouraging internally-displaced persons (IDPs) to return 
home and may commit additional resources, to accelerate the 
Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP).  A recently 
signed USD 750,000 agreement between USAID and the 
International Office for Migration (IOM) will provide 
Uganda,s Amnesty Commission the resources necessary to 
provide re-insertion packages for returnees and facilitate 
their return to their home communities. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
FOR NORTHERN UGANDANS 
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¶8.  (SBU) Kony's refusal to sign the agreement dashed the 
hopes of many IDPs, but may solify public opinion in the 
LRA-affected areas of the north that the LRA was not serious 
about negotiations.  At the beginning of the peace process in 
July 2006, the Government was viewed negatively in the north 
and often cited as causing and perpetuating the war.  The 
composition of the diaspora-based LRA delegation, its extreme 
demands, and its foot-dragging for more allowances alienated 
northern Ugandan leaders.  The LRA negotiators' antics and 
Kony's aloofness from the process damaged the credibility of 
the LRA in the eyes of the northerners.  The primary 
beneficiary of the change in public mood was the Government, 
which was praised in the media for having demonstrated that 
it was committed to peace even if the LRA was not.  Gulu 
District officials and parliamentarians said that in the 
aftermath of the failed process, it would be critical for the 
Government to encourage northerners to return home and to 
protect them from the LRA. 
 
- - - - - - 
FOR THE LRA 
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¶9.  (SBU) Kony's rejection of the peace process, his 
execution of Vincent Otti in October 2007, and recent 
abductions most likely will fuel additional internal turmoil 
in the LRA.  Kony's failure to sign means that there is no 
way out of the bush for disaffected LRA members except 
through defection.  The peace process had been viewed as an 
honorable way out for many, according to former LRA 
negotiator Martin Ojul.  Kony's movements indicate that he 
understands the real possibility of military attack now that 
he has repudiated peace. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) LRA abductions in CAR and DRC and movement to CAR 
are indications that Kony was using the peace process to buy 
time and shield his activities.   According to two recent 
escapees, at least 300 newly abducted children are being 
forced into military training.  Oryem described as 
"heartbreaking" the plight of the child soldiers who had been 
sent to protect the newly donated food for the LRA at 
Rikwangba.  Oryem said the children had expected to go home 
with the GOU team and began crying when they were left 
behind.  Kony had told them they were International Criminal 
Court (ICC) indictees.  Col. Walter Ochora said the child 
soldiers had cried when the previous delegations left 
Rikwangba.  Kony's isolation could make him more dependent on 
external patrons in Khartoum and within the diaspora. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
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¶11.  (SBU)  Many in the donor and non-governmental community 
took Kony seriously as a negotiating party, and some will be 
 
KAMPALA 00000521  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
reluctant to see the Juba process end.  However, donor 
monetary support for the peace process will almost certainly 
end.  There could be increased scrutiny of the donor fund for 
the peace process as former delegation leaders Matsanga and 
Ojul explain their role and how donor funds were used. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  A number of local diplomatic missions agree with 
us that now is the time to accelerate aid to the North, but 
as basket-funders, their disbursements are tied to the PRDP 
and the GOU's speed.  Well-publicized U.S. expenditures could 
help shame the EU and others into faster action. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The international community may become more vocal 
about the LRA's continued holding of women and children and 
violations of human rights.  Many governments may come under 
pressure from non-governmental and human rights groups to 
take a tougher public stand against the LRA.  There could be 
calls, particularly from the Ugandan Government, to rein in 
negative diaspora elements.  Chissano suggested that in the 
event Kony failed to sign the agreement, some members of the 
international community might be called upon to lend 
assistance in apprehending Kony and the other commanders 
indicted by the ICC.  Additional warrants against the LRA for 
its recent abductions and enslavement of children in CAR and 
DRC could be another form of pressure on the LRA. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
FOR THE UNITED STATES 
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¶14.  (SBU)  Our role in the Juba Peace Process helped focus 
and accelerate the negotiating phase of the peace process to 
a final conclusion.  The process had dragged on without a 
demonstrable commitment by Kony for 20 months.  We should 
continue to take our lead from the Ugandan Government in our 
public stance, and be ready to condemn ongoing LRA atrocities 
on the ground in DRC and CAR.  We should be prepared to share 
information as needed, if requested, to assist the Ugandans 
and others in operations against the LRA.  Finally, our 
continued diplomatic, development, and defense assistance is 
vital to the recovery, reconciliation, and recovery in 
northern Uganda. 
BROWNING