VZCZCXRO8745
PP RUEHBW RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1030/01 1171112
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261112Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3701
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001030 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO A/DAS CAMP, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM, 
INL/CIVPOL 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MARR AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN POLICE:  FDD UPDATE FROM ZABUL PROVINCE 
 
REF: A. 07 KABUL 3848 
     ¶B. 07 KABUL 3054 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Focused District Development (FDD) program to 
reform Afghan police at the local level has yielded positive 
results in the southern province of Zabul.  Elite, national 
units provided an effective backstop as local units were 
rotated out for training.  The highway was cleared of over 20 
excess checkpoints, considerably easing travel along that 
segment of the Ring Road.  Local police returned from the 
training centers with renewed commitment to serve their 
communities, and many corrupt elements have been weeded out. 
End summary. 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Focused District Development (FDD) program, 
initiated by the Combined Security Transition Command - 
Afghanistan (CSTC-A), aims to reform police across 
Afghanistan at the district level (reftels).  Beginning in 
late December 2007, FDD targeted seven districts across the 
country, rotating Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) out for eight 
weeks of retraining and backstopping them with Afghan 
National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) units.  Three of the 
seven districts in this first cycle were in the southern 
province of Zabul.  During a recent visit to the province, 
Emboffs spoke with police officials, Police Mentoring Team 
(PMT) personnel and mentors, and observed interactions 
between a police commander and local villagers, in order to 
assess the impact of FDD in the area. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Zabul Province is located in Afghanistan,s volatile 
southern regional command (RC-S) and shares a 40-mile border 
with Pakistan.  The Ring Road, the country,s most critical 
roadway, runs through all three targeted districts, 
connecting the provinces of Kandahar and Ghazni.  The 
provincial population of 370,000 is ethnically Pashtun, 
estimated to be 85 percent illiterate, and extremely poor, 
with 58 percent of residents under age 18.  Residents are 
predominantly subsistence farmers who tend sheep and grow 
almonds, apricots, pomegranates, grapes and wheat.  Poppy 
production is minimal, and both the provincial and district 
governors are supportive of eradication efforts.  While 
Zabul,s security is relatively better than Kandahar or 
Helmand, Taliban insurgents and criminal elements continue to 
operate.  On April 8, Taliban attacked a road survey team and 
their Afghan security guards in Dab Pass, about 30 miles east 
of the provincial capital of Qalat and in the area of the 
border between Qalat District and Shinkay District, killing 
18 guards and wounding seven; that attack did not occur in an 
FDD-targeted district. 
 
Initial Results:  Positive 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) FDD training of police from target districts in 
Zabul was broadly successful.  GIRoA officials held shuras 
(councils) with local elders to explain program goals and 
build support for FDD.  About 150 Afghan National Civil Order 
Police (ANCOP) troops assumed responsibility for local 
security as AUP units from two of the districts (Tarnak wa 
Jaldak and Qalat) went to the INL-run Regional Training 
Center (RTC) at Kandahar, and police from a third district 
(Shah Joy, the province's most populous and prosperous 
district) went to RTC Jalalabad.  On arrival, AUP turned in 
their weapons for replacement, repair or return at the end of 
the eight-week course.  CSTC-A also provided units with new 
vehicles suitable to the local terrain, and a contract to 
provide repairs as necessary is in place.  MOI-certified 
Afghan trainers instructed the AUP.  Police pay has also gone 
smoothly since FDD came to Zabul.  Many police are now paid 
 
KABUL 00001030  002 OF 004 
 
 
through personal bank accounts, and the PMT confirmed that 
police were paid in full and on time last month. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Initial reports from Zabul and other FDD-targeted 
areas found local residents impressed with ANCOP units and 
unhappy at having to give them up.  ANCOP units are 
nationally recruited, more extensively trained and more 
committed to their jobs than most locally-recruited AUP, 
giving the returning trainees a hard act to follow.  Yet 
according to the PMT commander in Qalat, the returned AUP, 
newly equipped and decked out in new uniforms, cut an 
impressive figure next to the departing ANCOP during the 
transfer-of-authority ceremony in late February.  Since then, 
AUP have had a stronger voice at weekly provincial security 
council meetings; local Afghan National Army (ANA) units, 
accustomed to viewing police as a band of yahoos, have begun 
to view them almost as rivals.  Subsequent reports have also 
found elders pleased to have their Pashto-speaking AUP units 
back, as many of the Dari-speaking ANCOP units had difficulty 
communicating with the locals.  The PMT commander described 
local National Directorate of Security personnel as still 
loath to share intelligence in a timely way, although he 
hopes to change that dynamic, now that newly-trained police 
are in place.  Also according to the PMT commander, the 
provincial Chief of Police has supported gains achieved, 
invoking his chain of command when the governor has sought 
allegedly to exceed his authorities in directing police 
operations. 
 
¶6. (SBU) One area of particular success in Zabul Province was 
collaboration between the CSTC-A Police Mentoring Team and 
ANCOP to eliminate over 20 "checkpoints" that pre-FDD police 
and criminal elements had used to extract illegal taxes and 
otherwise shake down Ring Road travelers.  Some 300 so-called 
Afghan Highway Police were evicted from one checkpoint, now 
repaired and soon to be returned to AUP control.  As a result 
of the shutdown of excess checkpoints, travel from one end of 
the province to the other, which used to take eight hours, 
now takes two. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The AUP commander at one of the remaining Ring Road 
checkpoints is First Lieutenant Abdullah Razaq.  Razaq had 
recently come to Zabul Province from Bagrami, a rural 
district in Kabul Province.  He told Emboffs that he had 
received FDD training at one of the RTCs, as had the 41 
troops he was responsible for; however, only 24 of that 
number remained on duty.  He described those who had left as 
insubordinate and unwilling to trade AFG 30,000-40,000/month 
(USD 600-800) in shakedown income for the AFG 5,000/month 
(USD 100) that is a patrolman,s standard pay.  &When they 
were not allowed to rob the people,8 he continued, &they 
just quit.8  He said that as an officer from Kabul, the 
principal challenges he faced were language (Razaq speaks 
Dari but not Pashto) and local tribal allegiances.  Since a 
large recent battle with Taliban elements, according to 
Razaq, there were two or three attacks a day on patrol teams 
(rather than on the checkpoint itself, located between the 
city of Qalat and the Zabul-Kandahar border).  According to 
DynCorp mentors who have traveled more extensively through 
Zabul Province, the checkpoints have also been the target of 
many attacks by the Taliban. 
 
Signs of Popular Support 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) In the village of Sadu, local elders greeted the 
visiting AUP zone commander Abdul Raziq Salangi respectfully. 
 Captain Salangi told the villagers about police retraining 
and of his desire to ensure their security.  He pledged that 
the police would serve the common good and called upon the 
people of Sadu to resist Taliban overtures and to report them 
to him personally, distributing cards with his name and 
telephone number.  The villagers acknowledged a change in the 
attitude of police, saying they were more polite toward 
village residents since returning from the RTC and more 
 
KABUL 00001030  003 OF 004 
 
 
respectful of the sanctity of village homes.  Above all, they 
wanted to be left in peace to finish building a reservoir and 
expand a network of irrigation ditches.  They also told of 
previous violations of their homes and of unfounded 
detentions by police.  From the village lane flanked by high 
mud walls, the elders invited the commander and Emboffs to 
continue the meeting inside their home in a gesture of 
hospitality.  The residents of a second village, Bakorzai, 
were more guarded in their welcome.   There, the captain 
delivered his standard talk, also cautioning that the 
insurgents who arrived from Pakistan were ¬ the friends 
of Afghanistan8 and did not deserve the support of the 
people.  The principal elder maintained a skeptical tone, 
however, complaining of past police behavior, including the 
arrests of ten village men and searches that violated 
women,s quarters. 
 
Still to Come, and Lessons Learned 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Initial results in these three districts have been 
impressive and bode well for future cycles of FDD.  Still, 
there is much work to be done.  Afghan and Coalition forces 
in Zabul are now focusing on how to prevent World Food 
Program drops from being misappropriated.  The UN needs to 
take advantage of FDD gains and establish a permanent 
presence in Qalat, the provincial capital.  The poor 
condition of roads linking outlying districts and the 
provincial center continues to hamper aid delivery.  On the 
positive side, USAID has helped the national bank (Da 
Afghanistan Bank) to establish a branch in Qalat, and has 
also established a provincial radio station to enable better 
communication between local government and largely illiterate 
local residents.  Several Emboff interlocutors complained 
about police arrests going nowhere, as cases were never 
brought to trial; INL's Justice Sector Support Program is 
currently conducting a pilot training program for prosecutors 
from FDD-targeted districts and in the coming months will 
extend such training to other districts including Zabul.  A 
USAID program to improve court administration has already 
targeted justice officials from the province.  A local 
version of 911 (&1198) now in the works should make it 
easier for local residents to call on police for help. 
 
¶10. (SBU) As successive cycles have begun, the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI) has proven increasingly supportive of FDD; 
however, its capacity to direct even isolated segments of 
overall operations remains weak.  A key challenge that is 
currently being addressed is a 16,000 shortfall of 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs); there are currently under 
9,000 NCOs, and a new class of 1,716 NCO graduates is 
expected in June.  In Cycle 1, the MOI managed to send NCOs 
for Zabul to the RTCs only in the seventh week of the 
eight-week program.  Many of these collected their personal 
equipment and deserted.  In the long run, the MOI will also 
need to consider how to secure FDD gains by regular oversight 
and support to the district level after the PMTs complete 
their mission and depart. 
 
¶11. (SBU) On the training side, rank-conscious Afghan 
officers who have not received basic training have resisted 
any suggestion that they join the rank and file in the 
classroom; instead, INL is considering offering an 
alternative version of the basic course for those officers 
who lack it, and continuing to foster unit cohesion through 
other opportunities.  The tempo of FDD and limits on RTC 
capacity make it difficult to integrate training in functions 
such as logistics, advanced first aid and driver education in 
the schedule of instruction, and for now these subjects are 
offered to targeted groups of trainees on an &opportunity8 
basis after hours.  Mentors at RTC Kandahar have concluded 
that putting whole units through training together resonates 
extremely well with troops from tribal areas; even when they 
belong to various tribes, the shared training experience 
effectively encourages unit cohesion. 
 
KABUL 00001030  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) Also important to the overall success of FDD will 
be maintaining a complementary fit between civilian and 
military roles.  While civilian mentors emphasize the 
police,s law-enforcement functions, in Afghanistan,s 
security environment military personnel provide police with 
valuable survival training.  Among FDD-targeted districts in 
Cycles 1 through 3, the same security conditions also limit 
the ability of civilian mentors to sustain their presence 
among retrained police without a military escort, with the 
possible exception of Chahar Dara in Konduz Province.  Yet it 
is vital to maintain the civilian character of the overall 
police mentoring program in order to maintain the distinction 
between police and the army.  Toward that end, U.S. civilian 
and military colleagues are working together to ensure 
appropriate civilian participation in future mentoring 
efforts under FDD.  One major problem is that as FDD expands 
to more target districts, PMT resources will be stretched 
ever more thinly. 
WOOD