VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDBU #0526/01 1070454
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160454Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0411
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000526 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
AIDAC 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND SCA/EX 
DEPT PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: AMGT EAID SNAR MASS PREL TI
SUBJECT:  THE IMPACT OF NOT RIGHTSIZING EMBASSY DUSHANBE'S 
MANAGEMENT PLATFORM 
 
Ref:  (a) April 10 MSP Senior Review for Embassy Dushanbe; 
(b) April 11 Spratlen-Jacobson e-mail; (c) Dushanbe 522 
 
¶1.  Summary:  Embassy Dushanbe's thoroughly inadequate management 
staffing means we have had to turn down important positions 
requested by the Drug Enforcement Agency, Office of Defense 
Cooperation, and USAID.  We understand the need for "triage" in the 
current budgetary environment, but urge the Department to consider 
this mission's unique history and current position as a front line 
state in the battle against terrorism and drugs, and provide 
additional FTE for the management section.   End Summary. 
 
 
How We Got Here 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  As we noted in successive Mission Strategic Plans, front channel 
communications, and the recent inspection report (ISP-I-08-17A), 
Embassy Dushanbe's American staffing has tripled over the last few 
years, without a concomitant increase in management staffing. 
Essentially, we have a similar level of resources now, as a 
mid-sized mission with a robust foreign policy agenda located full 
time in Tajikistan, as when Embassy Dushanbe was co-located with 
Embassy Almaty, and staffed by 17 unaccompanied Americans.  Four 
years ago, the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative awarded positions to 
other posts in the region to right-size their management sections. 
Embassy Dushanbe didn't benefit because at the time, it was 
considered part of Embassy Almaty. 
 
¶3.  Adequate American management staffing is critical given the 
enormous challenges related to Tajikistan's high level of 
corruption, crumbling infrastructure, bureaucratic inefficiencies, 
and remote location at the end of a long supply chain.   Given these 
challenges, we are unable to support the existing mission community 
adequately with the staffing we now have, and thus have established 
a moratorium on new positions.   This means that we have turned down 
NSDD-38 requests for additional positions from DEA, Office of 
Defense Cooperation, and USAID.  The inspectors acknowledged the 
imbalance between management and program staff and recognized the 
necessity of the moratorium saying, "The Ambassador has been 
courageous in dealing with this imbalance.  She has declared a 
moratorium on further NSDD-38 decisions unless and until the 
embassy's management capacities including staffing and space will 
support further growth.  Her position should be sustained."   The 
inspection report called for additional management staffing. 
 
The Impact:  Drug Enforcement Administration 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4.  In 2006, the Drug Enforcement Agency decided to move its 
regional hub from Tashkent to Dushanbe, based both on a worsening 
relationship with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan's status as the majority 
transshipment point for Afghan poppy bound for Russian and European 
markets.  We initially approved positions for three agents and one 
administrative specialist, but because the office must build 
relationships with all five countries in Central Asia, DEA requested 
two additional agents.  The workload, including the investment of 
time necessary to build relationships to the point where trust is 
sufficient to allow real exchange of information and joint 
activities, demands additional resources.  Unfortunately, we have 
had to turn them down.   We are missing a real opportunity to 
develop the capacity of the Central Asian transit countries to bring 
down criminal networks and stem the flow of narcotics and 
Qdown criminal networks and stem the flow of narcotics and 
narco-profits, which fuel corruption and provide funding to 
terrorists. 
 
The Impact: Office of Defense Cooperation 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶5.  Tajikistan is Central Command's third most important country for 
counter-narcotics work, after Afghanistan and Pakistan.  CENTCOM is 
funding important capacity building work here, including the 
renovation of border posts, training facilities, and equipment.  The 
office is woefully understaffed to handle the amount of CENTCOM 
assistance - $15 million of ongoing projects -- and would like to 
establish a position (contract or long term TDY) to help manage its 
contracting and monitoring.  We have had to turn down this request, 
with the end result that we are not able to support CENTCOM's 
mandate to play a greater role in fighting narcotics trafficking 
(and related terrorist financing) in a country bordering an active 
war zone. 
 
The Impact: USAID 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  USAID has asked to move its regional education advisor from 
Almaty (where it doesn't have an education program) to Tajikistan, 
where it does.  Tajikistan is the most vulnerable country (and worst 
performer) in Europe and Eurasia in relation to a number of 
education indicators including education spending, secondary and 
tertiary enrollment, vocational education and pre-school education. 
For this reason, USAID's implementing partner has established its 
regional headquarters here in Dushanbe.  Moving the USAID regional 
education advisor to Dushanbe would allow USAID to provide better 
oversight of the regional program and to better design and manage an 
expanded education assistance portfolio in Tajikistan.  Education, 
in turn, is a powerful weapon against the poverty and despair which 
make people vulnerable to recruitment by drug mafias or extremists. 
However, we have had to turn this position down. 
 
The Impact - Language Training 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  We have also had to turn down requests for two long term TDYs 
for members of the Defense community who had proposed to come to 
Dushanbe for Persian language training.  Tajikistan is one of only 
three Persian-speaking countries.  In-country training for U.S. 
Government personnel is not possible in Iran and not practical in 
Afghanistan given the security concerns there.  Tajikistan would 
make a prime training ground for such immersion training and it is 
no surprise that we are beginning to receive such requests. 
However, absent an increase in management staffing, the embassy 
cannot handle the additional administrative burden imposed by 
long-term language trainees. 
 
Next Steps 
------------- 
 
¶8.  We had useful discussions with Dirk Richards from M's 
rightsizing office during his visit April 7; he supported our 
request for additional assistance on the management front.  The OIG 
has also supported the need.  In his memo to the OIG, Assistant 
Secretary Boucher listed Embassy Dushanbe's need for an increase in 
 
SIPDIS 
management staffing as the Bureau's top human resources priority. 
Ideally, post requires a second management officer (who would serve 
as Deputy while simultaneously supervising the financial management 
and human resources units), a Supervisory GSO, and another 
Information Management position.  We would need to see progress in 
filling these management positions before we could consider lifting 
our staffing moratorium to do the work we need to do in fighting 
narcotics and terrorism and promoting education.  We look forward to 
continuing to work with Washington to address this critical need. 
 
HUSHEK