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Viewing cable 08BRASILIA516, BRAZIL: DEFENSE PLAN PREVIEW GETS THUMBS UP IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA516 2008-04-17 10:58 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO0563
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0516/01 1081058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171058Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1448
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6716
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4525
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5437
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4047
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 6112
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7316
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0359
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0371
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0264
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7918
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6028
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1899
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000516 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, T, WHA, AND PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018 
TAGS: PARM MARR MCAP PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: DEFENSE PLAN PREVIEW GETS THUMBS UP IN 
CONGRESS 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Phil Chicola. Reasons 1.4 B and 
 
1. (U) Summary: Previewing their Strategic Plan on National 
Defense (scheduled to be unveiled on September 7, 2008) in 
Congress for the first time on April 9, Minister of Defense 
Nelson Jobim and Long-Term Planning Minister Mangabeira Unger 
were met with an overwhelmingly positive response from 
members of the Chamber of Deputies' External Relations and 
National Defense Committee (CREDN) during a public hearing. 
The plan, an ambitious soup-to-nuts transformation of 
Brazil's national defense structure, charts a new strategic 
direction by re-defining the key threats Brazil faces, 
reorganizing and reequipping its forces around those threats, 
and redeveloping an autonomous defense industry that can be 
an engine for the development of advanced technology. 
Although both ministers called for a national conversation on 
long-ignored defense and national security issues, the 
preview generated little in-depth discussion of the threats 
or premises-- even those with a subtle but not entirely 
veiled anti-American bent to them-- underlying the reforms. 
Judging by the uncritical reception they received, Jobim and 
Unger's national defense plan may meet little resistance in 
Congress when it is unveiled later this year. End summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
First, Define the Threats... 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) On April 9, CREDN convened a hearing to preview the 
work of the recently convened intra-governmental committee 
created to craft a Strategic Plan for National Defense and to 
discuss Jobim and Unger's recent travels to France and Russia 
earlier this year.  The government committee, chaired by 
Jobim, coordinated by Unger, with participation of the three 
force commanders, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Planning, and the Ministry of Science and Technology, seeks, 
according to Jobim and Unger, to resurrect the issue national 
defense from the "authoritarian debris" left behind with the 
end of the military regime and place it firmly in the 
national consciousness.  Unger noted that their intent is not 
to come with a plan to merely re-arm the Brazilian armed 
forces and update old technology but a plan to achieve 
nothing less than a comprehensive reform of all the 
constituent parts of Brazil's national defense 
infrastructure.  (Comment: It is no accident that the 
Ministry of External Relations (MRE) is not represented on 
the committee.  Jobim and Unger purposefully made sure MRE 
was not represented, a move that apparently angered MRE 
officials and is likely the reason MRE is trying to keep 
Jobim on a short leash as he consults with other countries. 
End comment.) 
 
3. (U) According to Jobim, the committee's first task is to 
define the threats that need to be defended against.  Only 
after defining the threats could they begin to study how to 
restructure the forces, redeploy them if necessary, 
eformulate doctrine to conform to the newly define threats, 
retrain them in accordance with new dotrines, and reequip 
them to fulfill the missions  Because Brazil lacks 
territorial ambitions or utstanding border disputes, Jobim 
and Unger identfied the missions as: monitoring and 
protection f land, sea, and air boundaries in peacetime; 
prtection from regional warfare outside Brazil's borers; 
defense against invasion by a conventional orce; and 
asymmetrical warfare in the Amazon by ether an 
unconventional force or by a conventiona force with backing 
from a more powerful outsidepower. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
...Then Reorganize and Rearm Around te Threats 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
4. (U) After outlining the hypothetcal threats being 
 
BRASILIA 00000516  002 OF 004 
 
 
considered, Jobim proceeded to outline how the posited 
threats would impact decisions on reform. For example, noting 
that only about 27,000 of about 300,000 active members of all 
three branches of the Brazilian armed forces serve in the 
Amazon region, Jobim questioned whether it was prudent to 
maintain the bulk of the forces deployed in the west and 
south of the country if a principal mission would be to 
protect the Amazon and the western borders.  He also 
questioned whether it made sense to keep Brazil's rapid 
reaction forces headquartered in the south instead of the 
center-west, where they can more quickly deploy to any part 
of the country. 
 
5. (U) For his part, Unger noted their plan sought answers to 
fundamental issues each of the services face: 
 
- For the Air Force, is it best to invest in joint-production 
of 4th generation jet fighters, invest in modernizing the 
existing jet fighter fleet, or invest in a 5th generation 
fighter? 
 
- For the Navy: Its geographical positioning needs to be 
resolved.  The bulk of the fleet cannot continue to be based 
out of Rio de Janeiro.  Increasing the number of submarines 
may mean reducing the number of surface ships, therefore, 
Unger noted, trade-offs will have to be made. 
 
- For the Army: Brazil's rapid reaction capability amounts to 
ten percent of the total force.  Should this capacity move to 
a larger percentage of the force based on the hypothetical 
threats Brazil is facing? 
 
- Space: What should Brazil's capabilities be? At a minimum, 
according to Unger, Brazil needs to have a presence in order 
to monitor its borders. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
A New Defense Industry: Seeking Strategic Partners 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
6. (U) Both Jobim and Unger focused a part of their 
presentation to highlighting the need for Brazil to 
reestablish an autonomous defense industry.  In pursuit of 
that goal, Jobim and Unger recently traveled together to 
Russia and France, and Unger to India.  (Note: Jobim also 
mentioned that he had recently visited the United States, 
although he did dwell on it.  End note.)  Both noted that 
they were not seeking to purchase products off the shelf as 
in a supermarket, but instead they are looking to build 
Brazil's own industrial capacity.  Unger further stressed 
that an autonomous defense industry will require legislation 
establishing a preferential regulatory framework and granting 
tax incentives to private defense companies in exchange for 
strategic direction.  State companies, on the other hand, 
will focus on basic and advanced research that the private 
companies cannot undertake because it cannot be quickly 
commercialized.  In furtherance of this goal, Jobim and Unger 
will be hosting delegations from France and Russia in the 
next week (Note: According to an article in the 16 April 
daily newspaper Correio Braziliense, a Russian delegation was 
in Brasilia this week to discuss the joint development of jet 
fighters. End note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Flexing Regional Leadership Muscles Defense Council: 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
7. (U) During the hearing, Jobim also focused on the 
Brazilian proposal to create a South American Defense Council 
(SADC) that he stated, would help place Brazil in a 
leadership role within the region after having its back 
turned to Latin American since imperial days.  Jobim 
indicated he would be flying to Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, 
 
BRASILIA 00000516  003 OF 004 
 
 
Paraguay, and Chile soon to seek support for the SADC, a 
concept for which Brazil had made no definitive designs but 
which did not follow the classic model of a military alliance 
such as NATO.  (Note: Press reports out of Jobim's April 14 
meeting with Venezuelan President Chavez in Caracas 
highlighted this aspect of Jobim's concept and reported that 
Chavez had agreed.  End note.)  Some of the goals of the 
SADC, he noted, would be to stimulate the creation of a 
common South American defense identity; establish 
confidence-building measures; develop programs for the 
exchange and common training of personnel; train for joint 
peacekeeping operations; possibly develop coordinated actions 
against transnational crime; and integrate the regional 
defense industrial base.  Principally, he noted, it will 
serve to develop and reinforce the need for South America to 
speak with one voice in international fora, and for the 
region to come up with its own solutions, rather than having 
them imposed from outsiders. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Enthusiastic, Uncritical Congressional Reaction: 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
8. (U) Jobim's and Unger's presentations elicited mostly 
unanimous praise and uncritical observations from the Federal 
Deputies who attended the hearing.  Chairman Marcondes 
Gadelha (Brazilian Socialist Party, PSB, governing coalition; 
of Pernambuco) called the hearing a historic occasion and 
referred to the strategic plan as the new foundation of 
national defense in Brazil, expressions which were echoed by 
several other members, who had few questions.  The one 
exception came from Federal Deputy Raul Jungmann (PPS, 
Socialist People's Party, opposition; of Pernambuco). 
Jungmann questioned the motivation behind a partnership with 
France to jointly produce military technologies such as a 
nuclear submarine, noting that France is responsible for only 
a tiny fraction of the global nuclear submarine fleet built 
over the past decade.  In response, Unger argued that France 
was not only interested in sharing its technology, but was 
interested in a strategic partnership that goes beyond 
technological development.  Jungmann also questioned whether 
there was contemplation of terrorism as a threat.  "Terrorism 
is not an internal problem," Jobim responded, adding that of 
greater concern was the possible asymmetrical threat from 
non-terrorist groups such as the FARC. 
 
---------- 
Comment: 
---------- 
 
9. (C) The hearing represented the first attempt to preview 
the national defense plan before Congress and, considering it 
exposed no fissures between the GoB's and Congress'  views on 
the country's national defense needs, has to be considered a 
success for Jobim and Unger.  The hearing made clear that, 
for Jobim and Unger, the calculus driving decisions on 
weapons purchases will not be whether to equip the forces 
with the best or most advanced technology, but what makes the 
most sense for Brazil economically and politically.  That 
seeking deals with France and Russia went mostly unquestioned 
probably reflects Congress's lack of engagement at this 
point.  But it also shows that partnering with the United 
States is not a natural direction here, and that it will not 
take much for Congress to accept the premise, argued by some 
here, that the U.S. is not a viable partner because of what 
they view as overly restrictive technology sharing rules.  At 
the same time, Congress's newfound interest in the issue 
suggests they might be interested and open to persuasion 
regarding the potential benefits of cooperation with the 
United States.  Furthermore, the paranoia about a foreign 
invasion of the Amazon by a more powerful actor--a clear 
reference to the long-held fear that the US military has 
designs on the Amazon--remains alive and well.  By making 
 
BRASILIA 00000516  004 OF 004 
 
 
this one of the central threats Brazil will be preparing for, 
Jobim and Unger will, unfortunately, perpetuate this fear 
into the foreseeable future.  End comment. 
SOBEL