VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #1205/01 0922053
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 012053Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2188

UNCLAS BOGOTA 001205 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
PASS TO USTR FOR MCARILLO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD PREL ECON EFIN PGOV EAID CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR APRIL 4-6 VISIT OF USTR SCHWAB AND 
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO COLOMBIA 
 
¶1.  (U) Fostered by targeted U.S. assistance, Colombia finds 
itself safer, economically stronger, better governed, and 
more democratic than it has been in decades.  Rates of 
murder, kidnapping, and violence nationwide, particularly 
against union members, have fallen dramatically.  Increased 
security has led to an economic boom that has reduced poverty 
by 20 percent since 2002, lowered unemployment by 25 percent, 
and attracted record levels of investment.  More than 40,000 
combatants, mostly paramilitaries, have laid down their arms 
and are participating in GOC reintegration programs.  The 
captures or kills of several leaders of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and rising desertions have 
weakened Colombia's largest guerrilla group. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Nevertheless, Colombia remains a work in progress. 
Consolidating recent gains and making further advances on 
human rights, security, and poverty reduction--while also 
managing tense relations with Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa--represent the 
greatest challenges for the remaining 2.5 years of the Uribe 
Administration.  Our continued commitment to 
Colombia--through approval of the U.S.-Colombia Trade 
Promotion Act (CTPA) and support for Plan Colombia--will help 
lock in Colombia's democratic security gains, promote 
regional stability, and contribute to a Colombia that 
provides security and opportunity to all its citizens.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
CTPA Solidifies Advances: 
Investment, Poverty, and Security 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) President Uribe's democratic security policy and free 
market economic reforms have spurred the economy.  GDP growth 
exceeded 7.5 percent in 2007 after averaging more than five 
percent annually since 2003.  Colombia's trade volume grew 
more than 65 percent in the same period.  The United States 
remains Colombia's largest trade partner (approximately 34 
percent of exports and 26 percent of imports), though 
Colombia could shift to greater 
agricultural imports from Canada and the European Union when 
free trade negotiations with them conclude in 2008.  Nearly 
93 percent of Colombia's exports already receive duty-free 
access to the U.S. under the Andean Trade Preferences Act 
(ATPA), which expires December 31, 2008, while U.S. exports 
to Colombia face an average tariff of 12 percent.  Investors 
from around the world have boosted investment in Colombia in 
anticipation of the CTPA.  In 2007, Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) exceeded $7.5 billion, 350 percent greater than FDI in 
¶2002. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Colombian Congress ratified the CTPA in 2007 by 
a substantial margin, and it remains the Colombian 
government's highest economic priority.  Delays in U.S. 
approval or rejection of the accord would deal a severe 
political and economic blow to Uribe and his policy of 
strengthened ties with the United States -- especially given 
recent tensions with Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez. 
Colombia's second largest trading partner, Venezuela resorted 
to temporary commercial and diplomatic retaliation over the 
March 1 killing of FARC Secretariat Member Raul Reyes in 
Ecuador as well as Uribe's earlier decision to end Chavez' 
formal facilitator role in a humanitarian exchange with the 
FARC.  Venezuela restricted automobile imports from Colombia 
in January and then temporarily halted all trade in March 
after sending tanks to its border with Colombia in response 
to the Reyes incident.  Chavez later reestablished relations 
with Colombia and withdrew his forces from the border after a 
rapprochement at the Rio Group summit.  However, economic 
strains continue. 
 
¶5.  (U) Analysts estimate the agreement with the United 
States would add between one and two percent annual GDP 
growth to the local Colombian economy.  This growth would add 
the new jobs in the formal sector that President Uribe needs 
to meet his goal of cutting the poverty rate from 45 percent 
to 35 percent by 2010.  Trade-based formal sector growth will 
also provide the GOC with additional fiscal resources to 
shoulder a larger portion of its security costs as USG Plan 
Colombia support falls. 
 
------------------- 
Democratic Security 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) The establishment of greater Colombian government 
territorial control and the paramilitary demobilization have 
created the space for civil society and political parties to 
 
operate more openly than ever before.  The GOC maintains a 
police presence in all 1099 municipalities for the first time 
in history.  Increased security of roads and highways have 
allowed for greater freedom of movement for people and 
commerce.  Murders fell from over 29,000 in 2002 to less than 
17,000 in 2007, and kidnappings fell from over 2,800 a year 
to less than 600 during the same period.  Local elections in 
October 2007 reflected the improved security with over 86,000 
candidates participating.  The leftist Polo Democratico Party 
(PDA) won 1.2 million more votes than in 2003, and its 
candidate won the key Bogota mayoral race. 
 
-------------- 
Labor Violence 
-------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) Labor violence and impunity remain major concerns, 
with the government making dramatic progress.  Since 2002, 
labor union data demonstrates that murders of unionists for 
political reasons or common crime have fallen more than 75 
percent.  A resident International Labor Organization (ILO) 
representative arrived in Colombia in January 2007 to help 
implement the tripartite agreement committing the GOC to 
provide $4 million to finance the ILO Special Technical 
Cooperation program and to provide $1.5 million a year to the 
Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia).  The Fiscalia 
operates as an independent agency responsible for prosecuting 
cases of violence against trade unionists.  The additional 
funding enabled the Fiscalia to create a special sub-unit 
with nearly 100 prosecutors and investigators to investigate 
187 priority cases.  Since 2001, the Fiscalia has resolved 56 
cases of labor violence, leading to 118 convictions.  For 
2008, the Fiscalia has received an additional $40 million in 
GOC funds that has allowed it to add 1,072 new positions, 
including 175 prosecutors and 200 investigators. 
 
¶8.  (U) In addition to gains stemming from its democratic 
security policy, the GOC has taken specific steps to protect 
labor leaders and other vulnerable individuals.  In 2007, the 
Ministry of Interior and Justice's $34 million Protection 
Program helped protect more than 6,900 human rights 
activists, journalists, politicians, and other threatened 
 
individuals, including 1,720 trade unionists.  The murder 
rate for unionists is now lower than that for the general 
population. 
 
-------------------- 
Human Rights Record 
-------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress 
on human rights cases involving military abuse or 
collaboration with paramilitaries.  All members of the 
military and police receive mandatory human rights training. 
In October 2006, Defense Minister Santos named the first 
civilian -- and the first woman -- as director of the 
Military Criminal Justice System.  Santos has strongly backed 
initiatives to deter extrajudicial killings, changing 
promotion criteria to favor demobilization or capture of 
illegal fighters, and ordering military personnel to 
facilitate civilian investigations of all combat deaths. 
Human rights groups allege that security forces committed 955 
extrajudicial killings over the last five years. 
 
¶10.  (U) The Fiscalia has made advances in prosecuting 
military personnel alleged to have committed human rights 
abuses.  In August 2007, a court convicted three military 
personnel for the murder of three unionists in Arauca in 
¶2004.  In November 2007, the Fiscalia ordered the detention 
of Army Captain Guillermo Gordillo for his participation in 
the massacre of eight civilians near San Jose de Apartado in 
February 2005.  On March 28, 2008, the Fiscalia arrested an 
additional 13 members of the military for the 2005 massacre. 
The Fiscalia has set up a special prosecutorial team to 
investigate cases of alleged extrajudicial killings. 
 
--------------- 
U.S. Assistance 
--------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In January 2007 the GOC presented a Plan Colombia 
"consolidation strategy" pledging a Colombian investment of 
$78 billion through 2013.  The proposal emphasizes the 
importance of building social cohesion, assigning substantial 
resources to help strengthen local governance, protect human 
rights, and help displaced people, Afro-Colombians, and 
indigenous communities.  It also aims to reintegrate more 
than 45,000 demobilized ex-fighters and deserters and to 
promote Colombia's licit exports.  The GOC seeks funding from 
 
the United States and European countries to complement its 
own resources. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more 
than $5 billion in assistance, including $800 million in 
economic and social assistance.  USG security assistance 
combats drug trafficking and terrorism through training, 
equipment, and technical assistance.  It supports Colombian 
military aviation, essential for all programs - civilian or 
military - outside Colombia's major cities.  U.S. social and 
economic aid focuses on alternative development, displaced 
and other vulnerable communities, human rights and democratic 
institutions, and reintegration of demobilized fighters. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Drug Eradication and Interdiction 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Eradication of coca and poppy crops and 
interdiction of cocaine and heroin reached near-record levels 
in 2007.  President Uribe supports greater manual 
eradication, but understands that manual eradication cannot 
replace aerial eradication without a sharp increase in 
spending.  He seeks a complementary approach using both 
methods.  In 2007, the National Police and military forces 
seized almost 150 metric tons of cocaine and coca base, and 
destroyed 200 cocaine laboratories.  We continue to work with 
the Colombian government to refine our eradication strategy 
and determine how best to transfer key tasks from the USG to 
the GOC. 
 
----------- 
Extradition 
----------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Since taking office, President Uribe has approved 
over 631 extraditions to the United States, including a 
record number of 164 in 2007.  Among those extradited in 2007 
were 11 members of the FARC and three members of the United 
Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).  the Colombian 
Government has already extradited over 50 criminals to the 
United States in 2008. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Demobilization and Peace Process 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Over 32,000 former paramilitaries have demobilized 
since 2002, and a further 14,000 have deserted from other 
illegal armed groups (about one-half from the FARC).  The 
Organization of American States (OAS) estimates there are 30 
emerging criminal groups with a combined membership of over 
3000 persons.  Reintegration programs and targeted law 
enforcement are working to counter these groups.  Under the 
Justice and Peace Law (JPL) process, over 50 former 
paramilitary leaders have been jailed, and many have 
confessed their participation in violent crimes.  To date, 
the JPL process has revealed the location of the graves of 
almost 1,200 paramilitary victims and provided information on 
3,600 crimes.  Almost 100,000 victims have registered under 
the JPL, with the GOC working on measures to accelerate the 
payment of reparations. The Supreme Court and the 
Fiscalia--with GOC support--continue to investigate 
politicians with alleged paramilitary ties.  Fifty-two 
Congressmen, 19 mayors, and 11 governors have been implicated 
in the scandal. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) The National Liberation Army (ELN) has negotiated 
with the Colombian government for over two years on a 
cease-fire agreement, but ELN infighting and FARC pressure 
have prevented a deal.  The ELN kidnap civilians to fund its 
operations, but its military capability is declining.  The 
FARC has rebuffed GOC initiatives to engage in any meaningful 
peace talks, and killed eleven state legislators held hostage 
in July 2007.  The GOC authorized Venezuelan President Chavez 
to facilitate peace talks between the Colombian government 
and the FARC and ELN in late August 2007, but subsequently 
suspended his role after Chavez intervened in Colombia's 
internal politics.  The GOC issued a communique in January 
2008 urging Chavez to "stop his aggression towards Colombia" 
after Chavez proposed that the international community grant 
the FARC "belligerent status" and remove the group from 
worldwide terrorism lists.  Chavez subsequently announced the 
militarization of Venezuela's 2200 kilometer border with 
Colombia.  Following the March 1 GOC killing of FARC 
Secretariat Member Raul Reyes across the border in Ecuador, 
 
SIPDIS 
Venezuela deployed additional military forces to its border 
before calling off the buildup after reaching agreement with 
Colombia March 7 to reduce tensions and reestablish 
 
commercial and diplomatic ties. 
 
------------- 
U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in 
February 2003 are the longest held U.S. hostages in the 
world.  A November 2007 video seized by the GOC from a FARC 
urban cell showed proof-of-life of the three Americans. Their 
safe release remains a top priority.  A February 26 FARC 
communique referred to the three Americans as "spies" and 
threatened to hold them for 60 years in retaliation for the 
U.S. conviction and sentencing of FARC Commander Simon 
Trinidad.  President Uribe has assured us that any 
humanitarian exchange will include the U.S. hostages.  In 
January, the Colombian Government authorized the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) -- working 
with Venezuela -- to recover two FARC-held hostages.  The 
FARC released four additional Colombian hostages on February 
27, again working with the ICRC and Venezuelan government. 
BROWNFIELD