VZCZCXRO8343
OO RUEHBW RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHYG
DE RUEHRL #0540/01 1161639
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251639Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1051
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000540 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR EUR/RPM - RICHARD PROSEN 
USOSCE FOR DIANA BROWN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL OSCE AF GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY: OPEN TO CUSTOMS TRAINING ROLE FOR OSCE IN 
AFGHANISTAN, BUT REMAIN TO BE CONVINCED 
 
REF: STATE 39820 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Pol-mil/external chief delivered reftel 
points to MFA Afghanistan desk officer Clemens Hach and OSCE 
desk officer Eric Tosatti April 24, emphasizing that the U.S. 
felt it was important to go forward as soon as possible in 
implementing the December 2007 decision on providing OSCE 
technical assistance to Afghanistan and that this assistance 
should include OSCE projects within Afghanistan itself. 
Drawing on reftel, pol-mil/external chief also explained in 
detail the U.S. proposal for a three-phased OSCE customs 
training program for Afghanistan.  While not willing to 
commit themselves, both Hach and Tosatti agreed that the U.S. 
proposal was intriguing and deserved further consideration. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
Looking for Added Value 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Hach noted that one of Germany's main concerns had 
been that the OSCE provide real added value and not duplicate 
assistance already being provided by another international 
organization.  He was relieved to hear that the U.S. was not 
proposing that the OSCE get involved in police training, 
which Germany felt was already being adequately covered by 
the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan 
(CSTC-A) and the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL).  He 
noted that Ambassador Salber's assessment report had been 
"full" of ideas about OSCE support for police training, which 
Germany thought would be redundant with current assistance. 
Clemens agreed that customs training sounded like a fruitful 
area for the OSCE to provide added value.  Pol-mil/external 
chief pointed out that since the OSCE was already providing 
this kind of training/assistance to customs officials from 
Afghanistan's northern neighbors, it only made sense to 
provide the same kind of training/assistance to their Afghan 
counterparts. 
 
Concern about an OSCE "Permanent Presence" in Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) On the issue of carrying out OSCE training within 
Afghanistan itself, Tosatti noted that the OSCE has never had 
a permanent presence in any non-OSCE member country and that 
Germany supported a continuation of this policy.  He argued 
that establishing a permanent OSCE presence in Afghanistan 
would constitute "a huge change in the gravitational center" 
of the OSCE and could have serious budgetary consequences. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Pol-mil/external chief pointed out that the U.S. was 
proposing that the program be funded through extra-budgetary 
means and that several countries had already expressed an 
interest in donating the necessary funds.  This program would 
not divert funds from other worthwhile OSCE programs.  Hach 
agreed that the relatively small of money contemplated for 
the four-year customs training program (less than 30 million 
Euros) should not be considered a major impediment to going 
forward with this program. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Pol-mil/external chief also noted that by 
definition, the OSCE presence would not be "permanent," since 
the proposal was for a four-year program and was based on a 
train-the-trainer concept.  The idea was that the Afghans 
would eventually assume responsibility for running the 
customs training themselves.  In addition, the idea was for 
the training and mentoring to be conducted near border points 
along Afghanistan's northern border.  If necessary to meet 
concerns about security and not having a "permanent" OSCE 
presence in Afghanistan, OSCE trainers and mentors involved 
in the program could perhaps reside in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, but travel daily to their duty stations in 
Afghanistan. 
 
Worthy of Further Consideration 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Both Hach and Tosatti indicated that while they were 
still not ready to "jump in" and support the U.S. proposal, 
they found it intriguing and worth further consideration 
during the upcoming stock-taking exercise (phase I of the 
U.S. proposal).  To ensure good coordination with other 
international actors providing similar training (to the 
border police, for example), Hach floated the idea of having 
an OSCE liaison officer based at the International Police 
Coordination Board (IPCB) in Kabul. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
BERLIN 00000540  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Germans are basically judging the U.S. proposal 
by two criteria: 1) Is the identified area for assistance a 
real gap that no other organization is currently filling? and 
2) Is the OSCE the right organization to fill that gap, i.e., 
does it bring real expertise and value added to the table? 
If we can make a convincing case on these two key points, 
then the issue of conducting this training in Afghanistan 
itself, near the northern border, should be easier to manage. 
 The Germans acknowledge that trying to run an effective 
Afghan customs training program outside the country would not 
make much sense.  END COMMENT. 
TIMKEN JR