VZCZCXRO0927
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0322/01 0930845
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020845Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0124
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0187

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000322 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MW PGOV PHUM PREL KV SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA: UN OFFICE BELGRADE SEEKING NEGOTIATIONS WITH 
GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 
 
BELGRADE 00000322  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Summary 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶1. (SBU)  The United Nations Office in Belgrade is assessing the 
Government of Serbia's willingness to negotiate with the UN on 
breaking the impasse on Kosovo.  UNOB Head Richard Wilcox told 
the Ambassador that if the GOS is willing, UNHQ would try to 
negotiate a solution by the end of April, but insisted any 
agreement would require buy in from both the EU and Kosovar 
Albanians.  Wilcox confirmed that there had been little movement 
by UNMIK on either preparing for Serbia's elections in Kosovo or 
investigating the March 17 violence.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
UNOB Leading Exploratory Talks 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In a meeting with the Ambassador on April 1, UNOB 
Director Richard Wilcox said the UN wanted to start a political 
dialogue with Belgrade on the situation in Kosovo.  Wilcox said 
the UN Secretary General had given him the "lead in exploratory 
talks with the Government of Serbia."  According to Wilcox, he 
is to soon recommend back to UNHQ whether more formal talks with 
Serbia are merited.  If so, the goal, he said, was to reach a 
"substantial agreement" by Orthodox Easter (April 27).  Having 
just concluded a meeting with Minister for Kosovo Slobodan 
Samardzic and MFA Political Director Boris Stefanovic earlier in 
the day, Wilcox said he thought the GOS was willing to have 
further talks. 
 
 
 
UN's Justification for Talks 
 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) The UN believed reaching an agreement with Belgrade was 
the only way to move forward, given the current impasse on the 
EULEX mission.  Wilcox said currently, it would require "a nod 
from Russia" for the UNSG to agree to the full deployment of the 
EULEX mission.  He described EULEX Commander General Yves De 
Kermabon as "shell shocked" when DPKO recently told him that the 
EU should not yet deploy through all of Kosovo.  Wilcox said 
there may ultimately be a "UN policy change, but that the EU 
should not count on this being a smooth process."  Ultimately, 
he said, UNSG was hoping for a solution that Russia would 
"tacitly tolerate but one which it would not go to the UNSC to 
protest."   According to Wilcox, these UN talks with Belgrade 
could lead to that solution.  In addition, he said, Russia had 
received "indications" that the United States was open to talks 
with Serbia.   He asked if Kosovo was on the agenda for the 
Bush-Putin meeting on April 6, suggesting that its discussion, 
or lack thereof, would send a strong signal to Serbia. 
 
 
 
Buy In from Other Interested Parties a Must 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Wilcox told the Ambassador that he had stressed with 
Samardzic that Serbia must recognize the changing situation in 
Kosovo.  Wilcox told Samardzic, that Kosovo's new constitution 
(expected in mid June) will "change the political reality on the 
ground."  Serbia, he said, will need to take this into account, 
since it will have a real impact on UNMIK, particularly how 
Kosovar Albanians view UNMIK post-constitution. Samardzic 
responded that Kosovo's new constitution would have no legal 
consequence for Serbia, according to Wilcox.  Samardzic, he 
said, called for a slower pace, in which the GOS and UN would 
first reach an agreement, followed by a new UNSC resolution, and 
finally GOS talks with other stakeholders (EU, Kosovar 
Albanians).  Wilcox claimed he stressed with Samardzic that any 
agreement with the UN would have "limited value" if it did not 
have "buy in" from both the EU and Kosovar Albanians.  Wilcox 
stressed that ultimately he thought Kosovo needed to be a 
 
BELGRADE 00000322  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
European problem, with a European solution. 
 
 
 
Issues for Discussions 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Wilcox believed it was in the interest of Serbian 
government authorities to reach an agreement with the UN on 
practical arrangements for Kosovar Serbs in six different areas: 
Police, Judicial, Administrative Boundary, Customs, 
Transportation, and Religious Sites.  Wilcox noted that these 
were the same six issues Samardzic outlined to SRSG Ruecker in 
his March 16 plan, but stressed that any discussion with the GOS 
would not be on the Samardzic plan, but rather only on these 
points.  He insisted the Samardzic plan would not be a starting 
off point for negotiations.   The UN was not interested in 
creating new UN structures for Northern Kosovo.  That, he said, 
would be a "complete non-starter."  Instead Wilcox wanted to 
find out how the GOS could accept an EU structure in Serb areas. 
 
 
 
 
No Idea if EU is On Board 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Wilcox said he did not know if the EU was open to the 
idea of the UN holding talks with Serbia.  He said after he 
assessed Belgrade's receptiveness, the UN could approach the EU. 
If the EU says there can be no accommodation and that the EULEX 
mission must deploy specifically as outlined in the Ahtisaari 
Plan, the UN would have to admit that an agreement with Belgrade 
cannot be achieved.  In that situation, "we just couldn't do 
it," Wilcox told the Ambassador. 
 
 
 
 
 
UNMIK Has Not Made Decision on Elections 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) UNMIK had made no decision regarding the GOS's 
intentions to hold May 11 elections in Kosovo.  UNMIK was 
currently working on a policy paper which would then be shared 
with UNHQ, Wilcox said.  He did not know if Serbia would 
ultimately carry through on its intent to hold elections, and 
said he did not raise it with Samardzic.  He pointed out, 
however that Samardzic had told him several months ago that if 
elections were not held in Kosovo, the GOS had the option of 
appointing new local leaders for those municipalities. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
-------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Wilcox says, and apparently believes, he has been 
empowered by the UN Secretary General to determine if any 
accommodation with the Government of Serbia in the short term is 
attainable.  If this is the case, the UN seems determined to 
negotiate with Belgrade in order to find a solution that is 
tolerable to Russia, but that will not be rejected by the EU or 
the Kosovar Albanians.  Wilcox readily admits that tricky task 
would require a willingness to detour from the Ahtisaari plan, 
at least to an extent.  If Wilcox is overestimating the mandate 
given to him by the UNSG he may be offering his services in good 
faith, but on shaky ground.  This ground could easily crumble if 
Belgrade later realizes that Wilcox was not the empowered broker 
they thought, and the international community will have even 
less time to find solutions to these pending issues prior to 
Serbia's May 11 elections and the rollout of Kosovo's new 
constitution.  End Comment. 
MUNTER