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Viewing cable 08BEIJING1280, COUNTRY CLEARANCE APPROVAL FOR A/S HILL TO BEIJING APRIL 9

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BEIJING1280 2008-04-07 08:11 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBJ #1280/01 0980811
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 070811Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6287
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0631
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1897
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8983
UNCLAS BEIJING 001280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OTRA AMGT KNNP PREL MNUC KN CH JA
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE APPROVAL FOR A/S HILL TO BEIJING APRIL 9 
 
REF: STATE 35440 
 
1. (SBU) Embassy Beijing welcomes and grants country clearance for 
EAP Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill and his delegation to 
Beijing on April 9 for consultations related to the Six-Party 
Talks. 
 
2. (SBU) Control Officer: 
Nancy Leou, Political Officer 
Tel: (86-10)6532-3831 x6040 
Cell: (86)139-1023-4347 
Fax: (86-10)6532-6423 
Unclass E-mail: LeouNW@state.gov 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Control officer will meet travelers at the airport and take them to 
their hotel. 
 
3. (SBU) Hotel reservations have been made at the Grand Hyatt 
Hotel. 
 
Grand Hyatt Hotel 
Beijing Oriental Plaza 
1 Dong Changan Jie, Beijing 100738 
Ph: (86-10)8518-1234 
Fax: (86-10)8518-0000 
 
------------------------------ 
Security and Threat Assessment 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (U) The threat level for all China posts is considered low for 
crime and medium for terrorism. 
 
5. (U) The Regional Security Office is not aware of any specific 
threat directed against any U.S. person or traveling delegation. 
Should such information be developed, the Chinese security services 
are committed to advise the Embassy of pertinent information and to 
provide necessary security coverage. 
 
6. (U) China experiences a moderate rate of crime, including recent 
incidents ranging from petty theft to murder.  Pickpockets are 
particularly active in crowded markets and foreigners are often 
sought out as primary targets.  Petty theft from hotel rooms is 
uncommon, but visitors are advised not to leave valuables lying 
loose or unattended in their rooms.  It is the policy of this 
Mission that employees, their family members and official visitors 
to China must not knowingly purchase counterfeit or pirated products 
during their stay in China.  Also, foreigners may be approached in 
tourist areas by individuals seeking to exchange U.S. dollars or to 
sell pirated or fake products, such as compact discs, in violation 
of intellectual property rights laws.  These transactions are 
illegal, violate post policy, and must be avoided. 
 
7. (U) All U.S. citizen personnel serving under Chief of Mission 
authority in a temporary duty status of 30 days or more must 
complete appropriate overseas personal security training prior to 
travel (04 State 66580).  Employees who have completed the Security 
Overseas Seminar Course at State's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) 
after June 1, 2000 meet this requirement.  All other TDYers must 
either 1) complete the approved four-day seminar at FSI entitled 
"Serving Abroad for Families and Employees (SAFE) or 2) have their 
agency certify to the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security 
that the employee has undergone equivalent security training.  The 
contact for this certification is Assistant Director of Training, 
DS/T, at telephone (703) 205-2617.  Country clearance will not be 
granted for any traveler with planned TDY in excess of 30 days if 
this information is not stated/certified.  POC for additional 
information is DS_RSO, Beijing at: ds_rso_Beijing@state.gov(Note: 
Travelers from DHS/CBP, DIA, FBI, DOD, and the Peace Corp have been 
pre-certified by their agencies with DS.) 
 
8. (U) All/all official visitors are required to obtain a 
pre-departure, country specific counterintelligence briefing from 
their parent agency before departing for China.  Visitors should 
contact the security office of their parent agency.  If the parent 
agency is unable to give the briefing or needs assistance/guidance, 
the visitor should contact the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's 
Division of Counterintelligence (DS/ICI/CI) at 571-345-7641, 3966, 
or 3968 to schedule a briefing.  HQ DS/CI is located at SA-20, 1801 
Lynn St., Rosslyn, Virginia 20522-2008.  Department of State 
personnel should contact the DS/ICI/CI directly to schedule a 
briefing. Official visitors may also be required to attend a post 
specific security briefing upon their arrival in country.  The type 
of briefing is contingent on the length of the planned visit.  Upon 
arrival in Beijing, all TDY personnel should contact the Regional 
Security Office at 6532-3831, ext. 6036 to determine level of 
briefing required. 
 
9. (U) Visitors are reminded to take necessary precautions in 
safeguarding sensitive material and information.  All non-USG 
facilities must be considered technically compromised and may not be 
used to discuss, process, or store classified information. 
Telephone calls, e-mail, and Internet usage are routinely monitored 
and hotel rooms searched. 
 
10. (U) All TDY U.S. citizen employees of the U.S. Government, 
civilian or military, who are under the authority of the Chief of 
Mission are subject to the reporting requirement stated in 12 FAM 
262 regarding contact reports, i.e. any initial (non-business 
related) contact with a national from a country with a Critical 
threat (counterintelligence) post, as listed on the Department's 
Security Environment Threat List (SETL), must be reported.  In 
general, employee reporting should occur within one business day 
after such contact has occurred.  If unable to report within this 
time frame, or unsure about the need to report at all, employees 
should contact the RSO or PSO as soon as practicable.  If the 
RSO/PSO is unavailable, notify the Management Officer or the Deputy 
Chief of Mission. 
 
11. (U) Per 12 FAM 262, this reporting requirement generally applies 
whenever: 
 
(1) Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or 
otherwise sensitive information. 
 
(2) The employee is concerned that he or she may the target of 
actual or attempted exploitation by a foreign entity. 
 
(3) That national attempts to establish recurring contact or seems 
to be actively seeking a close personal association, beyond 
professional or personal courtesies. 
 
12. (U) Travelers should be aware tat previous visitors have 
reported that their unattended computers have been subjected to 
tampering.  The efforts may be directed toward obtaining information 
on the computers, but problems ranging from viruses left on their 
systems to hard drives, which are no longer functional, have been 
reported.  Hotels and private Chinese Internet providers have in 
some cases given hotel guests "free" thumb drives for use with their 
computers.  The source and quality of these devices are unknown. 
Such devices could contain malicious codes and viruses and should 
not be used on government computers.  Official visitors are reminded 
that non-inspectable electrical/electronic equipment, i.e., cellular 
telephones, laptop computers, personal digital assistants (PDAs), 
etc., may not be brought into the controlled access areas of the 
Chancery.  If a visitor intends to travel with USG-owned computers 
and equipment for use within the chancery, please contact the 
Regional Security Officer at 86-10-6532-3831 ext. 6058, or 
GormanB2@state.gov or MooreBM@state.gov, for information and 
guidelines. 
 
13. (U) Additionally, all classified and sensitive materials must be 
secured at the Embassy upon arrival in country.  All classified 
material must be brought into China via diplomatic pouch. 
 
14. (U) Travelers must contact the Embassy or nearest Consulate 
General upon arrival in China and provide telephone and address 
information while in country. 
 
15. (U) Passports and visas are required.  Americans 
arriving/transiting without valid passports and Chinese visas are 
not permitted to enter China and may also be subject to fines. 
Visas are required to transit China on the way to and from Mongolia 
or North Korea. Those visitors traveling to China on a single entry 
visa should be reminded that trips to Hong Kong or Macau Special 
Administrative Regions are treated as a visit outside Mainland 
China.  If the traveler is planning to return to Mainland China 
after a visit to one of these two destinations on the same single 
entry visa, they will be denied entry.  Visitors facing this dilemma 
will be required to apply for a new visa at the Chinese consulate in 
Hong Kong to gain re-entry into Mainland China. 
 
RANDT