VZCZCXRO1635
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1334/01 1210804
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300804Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7097
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001334 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SBU 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: ANBAR MODERATE CLERICS SHARE THEIR VIEWS ON 
ENGAGING THE US 
 
¶1. (U) This is a PRT Anbar reporting cable. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary:  While largely misunderstood by outsiders, 
the role of the mosque was crucial in winning the battle 
against Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in Anbar Province.  Local 
contacts are firm in their belief that the re-taking of the 
mosques from radicals was a critical factor in the winning of 
hearts and minds.  April 23 Anbar PRT met with two Sunni 
Endowment leaders who fought in both the ideological and 
physical struggle against Al-Qaeda in Iraq.  They talked 
about their experiences during the insurgency and affirm that 
while moderates are in charge of the mosques today, radicals 
may still make inroads among the youth.  They favor a deeper 
"cultural dialogue" with the U.S..  End Summary. 
 
---------------- 
Moderate Clerics 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The battle for Anbar Province tipped in GOI favor in 
¶2007.  A key factor in that development was the shift in 
public opinion, in which AQI was re-defined as the enemy, and 
Coalition Forces (CF) gradually came to be seen as an ally. 
The role of the mosque in influencing that change in the 
public mood is still poorly understood by outsiders, but 
virtually all PRT contacts )- both government officials and 
tribal leaders )- cite the importance of moderate clerics 
assuming leadership of the mosques that had fallen under 
radical influence.  If the mosques fomented insurrection in 
2004-05, it is clear that they helped to stabilize the 
situation in 2006-07. 
 
¶4. (SBU) PRT met with two Ramadi-based clerics to get a 
better understanding of the ideological struggle against 
radical Islam.  (Note:  Both clerics are widely viewed here 
as moderates and bear the physical scars from combat with 
AQI.  End Note) At an April 23 meeting Abdullah Jallal 
al-Faraj told PRT:  "If you find a mosque that is preaching 
radicalism, tell us and we will visit it, and change the 
messages to moderation and tolerance.8  Abdullah is a portly 
forty-something, who once competed in national soccer.  He 
now heads up Anbar,s office of the Sunni Endowment, and uses 
that position to ensure that the mosque preachers 
(Al-Khutiba') stay on a message of moderation.  Today, he 
says some "500,000 citizens hear our message of peace and 
tolerance every Friday." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Dr. Thamir Al-Assafi, a Ramadi native and the 
Endowment's senior theologian, joined Abdullah at the April 
23 meeting and explained that his interest in theology came 
after his service as a commando in the Iran-Iraq war.  In his 
presentation, he was strongly anti)Iranian, but came down 
equally hard on Sunni extremism.  "We will beat down the 
'takfiri' using the power of true Islam," he said.  (Note: 
"Takfiri" is an Arabic word denoting those who denounce other 
Muslims for the sin of apostasy.  It is commonly used 
describe to followers of militant Sunni ideologies. End Note) 
He cites the Endowment,s responsibility to propagate correct 
religious teaching.  "We will even get rid of the term 
'moderate' because it truly is redundant,8 he said. 
 
--------------------- 
The Battle for Ramadi 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The role of Abdullah and Thamir in the fight against 
AQI goes back to September 2006, when the late Sheikh Sattar 
Abu Risha and a group of like-minded tribal leaders in Ramadi 
formed the Anbar Awakening Council.  That group encouraged 
local youths to join the police force, and with the aid of 
CF, ultimately expelled AQI from the city.  Soon after the 
Awakening was founded, Sattar sought the Endowment to issue a 
"fatwa," or official religious decree, to legitimize the 
Awakening's aims.  Abdullah and Thamir obliged.  Although the 
two were ideologically in tune with Sattar, they moved 
carefully.  Such a decree was controversial because it called 
on the public to reassess its sympathies to AQI, which it had 
previously viewed as the defender of Sunni interests. 
Another issue was Sattar himself.  The clerics wished to 
avoid being seen as giving moral support to a man who had a 
penchant for alcohol and whose source of personal wealth 
(black-marketeering) was suspect.  In the end, the fatwa gave 
the public the permission to oppose AQI.  It also declared 
that its brand of Islam was false and that it engaged in 
un-Islamic practices. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Moreover, the clerics made it permissible for the 
people to cooperate with the CF, a notion that ran against 
the prevailing sentiment among Iraq,s Sunni religious 
establishment, which viewed the CF as occupiers.  In November 
2006, for example, Sattar traded media insults with Hareth 
 
BAGHDAD 00001334  002 OF 002 
 
 
Al-Dhari, the leader of the anti-government Association of 
Muslim Scholars, with Sattar openly referring to the CF as 
"friendly forces" and displaying the American flag at his 
Ramadi compound.  Al-Dhari called him an "agent" of the "US 
occupation."  Summing up that period of the insurgency, 
Abdullah says that it was the combination of Sattar's vision 
plus the Endowment's moral authority that tipped the scales 
on the battlefield. 
 
---------------------- 
Reclaiming the Mosques 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Nonetheless, AQI still exercised influence over key 
mosques.  Abdullah was under a death threat.  In early 2007, 
he asked the CF to arrange a security detail for him, 
comprised of local members of the "emergency police 
battalions," the forerunner to the Sons of Iraq, so that he 
could visit mosques.  "I will kick the bad guys out of the 
mosques," Abdullah recalls his telling CF officers in those 
days.  By a series of personal engagements, Abdullah fired 
some mosque speakers (al-khutiba') and persuaded others to 
moderate their sermons.  Gradually the radical hold loosened. 
 Today radicalism in the mosques has fallen to "nearly zero," 
in Abdullah's estimation. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Abdullah says that the mosques are currently 
controlled by the moderates; he is still concerned that "the 
poor and uneducated" are susceptible to AQI recruitment. 
Curiously, he sees an increased American civilian presence in 
Anbar as the antidote.  "The more American cultural presence 
we have in Anbar, the more we can support and reach out to 
these vulnerable people." 
 
----------------- 
Cultural Dialogue 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Thamir added that "if America wants to weaken the 
appeal of Al-Qaeda" it should engage in a "cultural 
dialogue."  On that theme, both he and Abdullah made the 
following points during the discussion: 
 
-- The US should establish a "consulate" in Anbar, as well as 
a cultural center, and an English language center. 
 
-- They want Arabic translations of American literature in 
the schools. 
 
-- They support the presence of American NGOs, and see their 
role in helping to provide basic services.  "Where are the 
American NGOs?  We want private NGOs in every town," Thamir 
said. 
 
-- Both clerics favor inter-faith dialogue with the "People 
of the Book", and both had critical words about Western 
Muslims with pro-AQI sympathies.  They claim to have met such 
persons on the hajj and believe they are mis-guided about 
AQI.  "They don't know what we know," Thamir said.  "We must 
talk to them about the reality of Al-Qaeda, because it is not 
Islam.  Our society has seen the damage of radical 
ideologies." 
 
-- The clerics support elections and want women to vote. 
Thamir added that he will go together with his wife to 
register to vote as an example to others. 
 
---------------------------- 
A Center to Combat Extremism 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Both sought financial support for the unfunded 
Center to Combat Foreign Ideologies (Al-Markez Al-Wiqaii 
li-Muajihad Al-Afkhar Al-Dakheela), a body that Abdullah 
recently established.  The center has already published short 
essays on religious themes and has plans for larger 
book-length studies.  Planned topics include:  the damage 
caused by extremist ideology; civil rights and 
responsibilities; public freedom in Islam; the moderate 
criteria for fatwas; respecting people's rights; and the 
Muslim role in reform. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Comment:  Abdullah and Thamir have obviously left 
the door open for further dialogue.  Several PRT initiatives 
suggest themselves, including nominating Anbari clerics for 
an International Visitor's program on inter-faith dialogue, 
and support for Abdullah's research center.  We will be 
calling on them again.  End comment. 
CROCKER