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Viewing cable 08BAGHDAD1074, IESC MEETING APRIL 4

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BAGHDAD1074 2008-04-07 14:46 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO5238
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1074/01 0981446
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071446Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6712
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001074 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SBU 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PINS IZ
SUBJECT: IESC MEETING APRIL 4 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki chaired the 
Iraq Executive Steering Committee (IESC) in support of 
Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ) April 4.  Discussion focused 
on the provision of essential services and humanitarian aid 
to areas affected by the recent violence and featured a 
lengthy interchange between Ministry of Health officials and 
Baghdad Operations Commander General Abud on the need for 
better coordination to permit the secure but timely travel of 
ambulances through checkpoints manned by Iraqi Security 
Forces and Coalition units.  Several of the assembled GOI 
officials expressed concern about the way the recent crisis 
was being portrayed in the media, and suggested that the GOI 
must put more effort into its public relations campaign.  The 
Prime Minister said that many news outlets are highlighting 
the humanitarian suffering in areas where ISF forces are 
fighting, without paying due attention to the root cause of 
that violence -- the actions of outlaw militia groups.  The 
enemies of the GOI are warping the public's perception of the 
conflict and creating sympathy for the wrong parties, he 
said.  Recently released from five days of captivity at the 
hands of militia kidnappers, Fardh al-Qanoon Spokesman 
Tahseen Sheikhly pledged to redouble his efforts to get the 
Government's message out to the people.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Maintaining services requires coordination with ISF 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2. (SBU) Prime Minister Maliki welcomed the packed house of 
attendees and declared that the meeting would address the 
critical services and humanitarian needs of Baghdad's 
neighborhoods.  National Security Adviser (NSA) Rubaie 
outlined the meeting's major agenda topics of health, 
electricity and food supply. 
 
3. (SBU) The Ministry of Health was represented by a 
contingent of officials that included the Health Minister and 
the Directors General (DGs) for the western and eastern 
(Karkh and Rusafa) halves of Baghdad.  The Minister stated 
that despite the overall unpreparedness of his ministry to 
cope with such an emergency, he felt proud to be an Iraqi as 
he witnessed the hard work performed by his doctors, nurses 
and other workers and as Baghdad received support and 
supplies from neighboring provinces.  He specifically cited 
Salah ad Din and Ninewa as provinces providing aid to 
hospitals coping with patients injured during the fighting in 
Baghdad and Basra. 
 
4. (SBU) Each DG provided an overview of the health-related 
concerns in his sector,  describing numbers of patients 
admitted, operations performed, and deaths recorded.  Each DG 
highlighted examples of problems faced when ambulances, 
health supply trucks, and even when they themselves 
personally tried to get through checkpoints manned by ISF or 
Coalition units.  A lengthy discussion on this topic between 
these DGs, General Abud and the other GOI participants 
ensued.  PM Maliki stressed that effective coordination 
between the ministries and the BOC be maintained so that 
ministry vehicles were not prevented from restoring services 
or delivering supplies. 
 
5. (SBU) Mayor of Baghdad City Saber al-Essawi chimed in that 
he expected all Amanat vehicles to be inspected vigorously at 
ISF checkpoints, and asked for no special favors for 
municipal workers.  He stated that the Amanat has been 
'infiltrated' and militia groups have access to many 
municipal vehicles that could be used to transport arms, 
munitions, supplies and personnel for nefarious purposes.  He 
launched into a spirited criticism of the outlaw militia 
groups currently wreaking havoc in Baghdad and urged the 
Prime Minister to maintain the toughest possible line on 
these criminals.  Iraq is at a crossroads, he said, and these 
militias must be eliminated or the government will surely 
fall.  The Minister of Health, possibly inferring from the 
Mayor's comments the suggestion that Sadrist-affiliated 
ministry officials within his organization were just looking 
for an easy way to bypass checkpoints, took a moment to 
announce his certainty that his ministry had not/not been 
'infiltrated' in such a manner. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Food and electricity supply affected, but not critically 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
 
5. (SBU) The Minister of Electricity reported that work to 
maintain the flow of power across Baghdad continues apace; 
the recent crisis has made that work more difficult, but the 
overall electricity supply to Baghdad has not been 
dramatically affected.  Sniper attacks against his workers in 
Sadr City and other hot neighborhoods are preventing repairs. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00001074  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) The Deputy Minister of Trade reported that the 
distribution of food supplies to citizens in needy areas is 
hindered by security problems in Basra, where ships at the Um 
Qasr port still need to be unloaded, and in Sadr City, where 
trucks have been prevented from picking up supplies at 
several warehouses.  Humanitarian assistance provided by 
other international organizations, such as the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent, was noted. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Issues for future meetings identified 
------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Former Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi reported 
on the activities of his Services Committee, stating that he 
and several other GOI officials paid visits to services 
facilities in Sadr City and elsewhere in Baghdad over the 
past week.  He emphasized the importance of such visits and 
urged his fellow GOI officials to do more to engage the local 
citizens of Baghdad during this time of crisis. 
 
8. (SBU) Chalabi raised the issue of Baghdad's potable water 
supply, stating that the GOI must determine how they were 
going to ensure an adequate supply throughout the summer. 
The topic has been addressed by his Services Committee a 
number of times, but needs to be raised in the IESC forum, he 
said.  Mayor Saber agreed that the issue was serious and said 
that approximately 55% of Baghdad's potable water supply is 
lost due to illegal siphoning. 
 
9.  (SBU) Provincial Council Chairman Mueen al-Khademy 
stressed employment as a critical issue for the IESC to look 
into.  He said that one of the root causes of the current 
conflict was unemployment, as young men often turn to militia 
groups when they do not have a steady job to keep them 
occupied. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Losing the public relations war? 
--------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Prime Minister Maliki expressed displeasure at 
media outlets, referring to several satellite channels, which 
seem to be serving as mouthpieces for the criminals at war 
with the government.  Stories airing the grievances of these 
gangs and showing the hardships imposed on Iraq's citizens by 
the recent fighting seem to be laying the blame on the GOI 
and not where it rightly should rest -- upon the outlaws who 
are sabotaging national infrastructure and causing the 
shortages in food, electricity and other services.  PM Maliki 
likened the current media situation to the way Saddam was 
able to convince the Iraqi people to blame the UN and the 
Western nations for the hardships of the Oil-For-Food program 
when, in fact, he was the one truly responsible. 
 
11. (SBU) Fardh al-Qanoon Spokesman Tahseen Sheikhly 
commented that a great deal of media attention has been paid 
to the plight of citizens in Sadr City, but he wanted to 
offer the following anecdote about his recent kidnapping: 
During his nearly 5 days of being held by militia gunmen at 
locations in and around in Sadr City, he noted that the 
electricity remained on for all but two hours and he observed 
his captors drinking a regular supply of tap water with no 
ill effects or complaints. 
BUTENIS