VZCZCXRO0315
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1008/01 0921648
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011648Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6597
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0004
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/I 
AID/W/ANE/IRO/FOR PRYOR AND STAAL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID AMGT PGOV ECON PREL SOCI PINR IZ
SUBJECT:  MINISTERIAL CAPACITY SURGE ASSESSMENT - INTERIM REPORT 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  As of March 30, 97 percent of the 75 "surge" 
advisors on Ministerial Capacity have arrived in Baghdad.  Their 
arrivals were staggered; in mid-January, 53 percent were present and 
working in country.  Surge personnel focus on providing targeted 
skills to several key non-security ministries; eighteen provide 
targeted assistance on energy issues. Overall, ministerial 
engagement team leaders agree that surge personnel enable them to 
focus on critical initiatives that would otherwise have been 
difficult to tackle.  Surge personnel have been most effective when 
their skills match specific needs in Iraqi ministries.  But because 
those needs are evolving, flexibility is also essential.  While it 
is early to point to specific accomplishments, surge personnel are 
addressing ministerial priorities that advance both Government of 
Iraq (GOI) and U.S. interests.  As they do so, they face one major 
obstacle - security restrictions that can severely limit access to 
the Ministries.  The success of this surge will depend on whether 
personnel are able to work around these physical limitations. 
 
¶2. (SBU) As events of the past week have shown, that is not always 
easy.  Ministries are often wary of a too-visible U.S. presence, 
day-to-day, in the Ministry.  In addition, security details will not 
permit predictable daily trips to and from the same location.  For 
that reason, with the exception of two "mini-surges," currently in 
the planning stages, we recommend holding to existing numbers of 
advisors for the present.  We will assess effectiveness again in our 
next quarterly assessment; in addition, two broader assessment 
efforts are underway; the results will inform our planning.  Some 
surge personnel are considering whether locally engaged staff, 
appropriately trained, might continue implementation of programs 
once surge personnel depart, an approach already used by USAID 
programs. END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
GETTING (THE RIGHT) BOOTS ON THE GROUND 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Surge personnel focus primarily on work with ministries at 
the national, not provincial, level.  They are most effective when 
their specific technical expertise matches the needs of the 
ministries.  But those needs have evolved since positions were 
originally identified.  U.S. priorities have also shifted, placing 
greater emphasis on helping ministries spend their budgets on both 
reconstruction and technical assistance.  These shifting needs, 
coupled with delays in identifying/hiring surge personnel, has 
required flexibility from the Mission, the ministries, and surge 
personnel. 
 
------------------------ 
SECURITY A MAJOR CONCERN 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Surge personnel are not "embedded" in ministries, and they 
face a common obstacle:  security.  Most ministries are located 
outside the International Zone (IZ), although individual Ministers 
may live or maintain offices in the IZ.  Travel to any ministry is 
subject to Mission security restrictions, cancellation or 
curtailment. Once on site, the visitor is extremely visible.  Iraqi 
officials - who have been the targets of kidnappings and 
assassinations -- are sensitive to the optics of U.S. ministerial 
assistance; some are more willing than others to meet with us in the 
IZ.  The Ministry of Health, for example, is currently off-limits; 
surge personnel meet with the Minister - frequently - at his IZ 
home.  While some ministerial advisors (such as Electricity) see 
Ministry personnel frequently, others visit ministries on average 
one-two times per week.  VTC capability is now available in the key 
government offices and ministries, and could provide an alternative 
to visits.  However, it is a clear second best to meeting in person, 
and highly dependent on a well-established relationship between the 
participants.  No question:  personal, face-to-face contact is 
better for this work.  USAID's National Capacity Development 
project, Tatweer, maintains two compounds outside the IZ with living 
and office space for its staff.  These lower-profile locations are 
appreciated by GOI staff and used for training, meetings, and 
follow-up assistance sessions. 
 
---------------------- 
GOALS VARY BY MINISTRY 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) While it is early to judge their overall impact, the 
"surge" has increased our ability to address both U.S. and GOI 
priorities more effectively.  This works best when both sides have 
agreed that they ARE priorities.  Key examples include: 
 
USAID Implementing Partners:  the Tatweer Program and Economic 
 
BAGHDAD 00001008  002 OF 004 
 
 
Growth II:  Fifty (50) of the 75 surge personnel were recruited to 
work across various ministries through two existing USAID projects: 
Tatweer and the Economic Growth II program.  USAID's National 
Capacity Development Project, known by its Arabic name, Tatweer 
(which means development) is the USG's principal national capacity 
development effort, a three-year, $209 million development project 
extending through July 2009.  It operates out of two Red Zone 
compounds, and has field offices in Mosul, Erbil and Basrah. 
Working with 10 ministries and five executive offices, it focuses on 
core areas of public management:  budgeting, procurement, project 
management, human resources, leadership/communication, strategic 
planning, decision-making and information technology. Tatweer's 44 
additional surge advisors expand ministerial engagement through 
mentoring and coaching on public administration skills, and 
addressing needed system reforms, with increased focus on GOI budget 
execution.  Economic Growth II advisors working with the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs designed and delivered a pilot system for 
the GOI's social safety net program (now in use in Baghdad).  They 
are currently working on a database for national roll-out of the 
program. 
 
Ministry of Health:  While two of three Department of Health and 
Human Services surge personnel have been on the ground for several 
months, the third arrived only in early March.  Surge personnel have 
benefited from the November 2007 change of Health Ministers. 
Working with the current Minister, surge personnel have identified 
strategic priorities:  transfer of U.S.-built assets (Primary Health 
Clinics), training for operation of donated equipment, and reform of 
the Iraqi system of procurement and distribution of medical 
supplies.  To this, surge personnel have recommended:  development 
of a field epidemiology program, enhanced coordination with PRTs on 
health care issues, and improved budget execution.  With the change 
of Minister, U.S. proposals have found greater support; in our view, 
the next 60-90 days will be critical to gauging our impact.  For 
that reason, we will add a six-month TDY staff member from CDC in 
April, and plan to add an additional one-year position for a health 
financial advisor. 
 
Ministry of Finance:  Surge personnel from the U.S. Treasury 
Department have focused on two key issues:  Iraqi implementation of 
an electronic funds transfer (EFT) system and budget training for 
ministerial and provincial Directors General.  EFT is a key 
priority; Iraq's present unit banking systems does not allow for 
funds transfer between bank branches.  EFT will also promote private 
sector banking.  For that reason, one member of the surge team has 
been assigned this task.  The second has managed budget execution 
training for Ministerial and Provincial Directors General.  Given 
changes in the chart of accounts and procurement regulations, and 
scant experience by provincial authorities, these courses are a key 
component in U.S. efforts to maximize the GOI's ability to spend its 
money.  Three surge personnel hired through USAID's Economic Growth 
II program are working closely with the MoF to restart the Iraqi 
Financial Management Information System, designed to bring 
efficiency and transparency in tracking and reporting executed 
budgets.  They have also developed a provincial budget tracking 
system, which six provinces are piloting. 
 
Ministry of Electricity/Ministry of Oil/Energy Fusion Cell:  USAID 
recruited and fielded 18 energy sector subject matter experts (to 
support the Coalition's Energy Fusion Cell (EFC), which works with 
the Ministries of Oil and Electricity.  The 18, who now comprise the 
Tatweer Energy Group, were in place by the end of January 2008, and 
have expanded our efforts with these two key ministries.  The 
experts have focused specifically on streamlining procurement and 
budget execution processes, and assisting with major contracting 
actions.  They also provide analysis and assistance in financial 
management, procurement, human resources, information technology, 
project management and training of ministry personnel.  Since their 
arrival, they have developed workplans in collaboration with the 
ministries and the Coalition's Energy Fusion Cell.  Ministers agreed 
to the general content by mid-March; task-specific versions based on 
this agreement are underway.  Access by Embassy/surge personnel is 
good; for example, there are near-daily meetings with MoE staff as 
well as the Minister. 
 
Ministry of Justice:  Surge personnel (a mix of DOD, DOJ and USAID 
resources) all arrived by the end of February.  Their key priorities 
are:  the land registry, budget execution, and a long-term plan for 
rehabilitation of the prison system.  One team member is also 
providing webmaster assistance to Iraq's official gazette and land 
registry offices.  The land registry project was specifically 
identified by the Ministry's Director General (DG) as a GOI "must 
do;" the land registry office was recently the target of an 
insurgent threat and its destruction would have significantly 
hampered development projects.  (In the event, MNF-I Stratops was 
 
BAGHDAD 00001008  003 OF 004 
 
 
invaluable in coordinating emergency protection of the office by the 
ISF with overwatch by MND-B.)  Surge personnel have proven 
particularly valuable in this field; for example, USAID Tatweer's 
surge advisor is providing technical assistance to the land registry 
office in Karada, including a pilot automation project.  Among the 
team's goals is to identify projects which the Iraqi government can 
and should fund; the MoJ, like many other ministries, has found it 
difficult to make decisions on funding anything outside their normal 
budgeting process.  Surge personnel face the same access issues as 
those working with other key ministries, although we have noticed an 
increasing willingness of MoJ officials to meet in the IZ. 
 
Council of Ministers Secretariat and Legal Departments/ 
Prime Minister's Office/Shura Council/Gazette/Minister of State for 
COR Affairs:  Surge personnel, who had all arrived by 
January/February, provide technical assistance to these institutions 
on legislative development across the board.  Access to and 
interaction with these institutions is relatively easy; all are in 
the IZ with the exception of the Gazette and Shura Council.  Surge 
personnel are assessing ways to train locally engaged staff to work 
with the Red Zone-based Shura Council and Gazette (the Shura Council 
is particularly wary of visible foreign influence).   Surge 
personnel have increased the U.S. ability to strengthen these 
institutions.  Among their proposals:  a "quick-start" training 
program for COR staff and members, to be announced March 31.  The 
Embassy proposed reobligation of IRRF funding to support the efforts 
of this surge team.  Tatweer surge advisors working in GOI executive 
offices continue to assist with GOI civil service reform, 
organizational reforms and requests for specialized training 
courses. 
 
Ministry of Agriculture: One of two surge personnel slated for the 
Ministry of Agriculture arrived in mid-February; the second is being 
recruited.  The surge advisor has two primary projects.  The first 
is developing plans for the revitalization of Iraq's agricultural 
research and education center in Abu Ghraib - a cluster of 
institutes that has historically been the backbone of Iraq's 
agricultural research and training.  Securing and revitalizing the 
Abu Ghraib "agriculture alley" will also offer enhanced 
opportunities for in-country training.  Because this expert has 
previous experience in agricultural cooperatives, he will also act 
as advisor to a PRT pilot project designed to develop cooperatives 
as a means to wean Iraqi farmers from over-reliance on central 
government decision-making and input supply.  Through Tatweer, 44 
ministry staff have become trained trainers; the ministry leads in 
the number of staff who have participated in the full range of 
public administration courses.  Ministry staff are also implementing 
a new organizational self-assessment tool introduced by Tatweer and 
institutionalized throughout the GOI. 
 
Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation:  While we had 
considered shifting this position, the Planning Minister's direct 
request for assistance changed our opinion.  The advisor, on the 
ground a few weeks, has quickly built his credibility with the 
Minister, despite the difficulty of travel to the Red Zone for 
meetings.  Mutual assessment of needs is underway; initial 
discussions have identified the need for cost-benefit analysis 
models which the Ministry of Planning (and other ministries) could 
use to prioritize project spending.  More targeted training is also 
a priority for the Ministry, including "train the trainer" courses 
that would maximize specialized knowledge - building on earlier 
training through Tatweer.  Tatweer surge personnel are also 
responding to specific requests from and developing capacity in the 
Ministry's National Center for Consultancy and Management 
Development (NCCMD), Central Organization for Statistics and 
Information Technology (COSIT), the Central Organization for 
Standardization and Quality Control (COSQC), and the Al Quds School 
for computers. 
 
---------------------- 
LESSONS LEARNED SO FAR 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) What have we learned so far?  First and foremost, that 
buy-in from the Ministries is essential to our effectiveness. 
Second - and related - is that Iraqis' sense of national ownership 
is on the rise; they want to be seen as leading their ministries. 
That means we need to minimize our profile as we continue to provide 
much needed expertise.  Third, the technical credibility of our 
experts is of paramount importance.  The better they are, the better 
they answer specific Iraqi needs, the more they are relied upon. 
Fourth, Arabic language skills are important - but not for all jobs. 
 Finally, security issues will continue to constrain our access for 
the time being.  We will need to be creative and flexible to 
overcome this hurdle. 
 
BAGHDAD 00001008  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
------------------------- 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Most Ministerial team leaders believe that the next three 
months will be a crucial proving ground for our surge personnel and 
their efforts.  While their fields of expertise are different and, 
in some cases, extremely specialized, both surge personnel and 
existing ministerial engagement teams recognize budget execution as 
a joint U.S.-GOI priority (and a key metric of success).  The GOI 
intends to propose a supplemental budget in the May-June timeframe. 
In order to be considered for additional funding, ministries must 
have committed 25 percent of their 2008 budget by May 1.  This will 
be a significant challenge - one that our advisors must work with 
their ministries to address. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Some surge personnel and ministerial engagement team 
leaders have already identified areas where additional U.S. advice 
would help boost ministerial capacity.  Our effort with the Ministry 
of Health is slated for a second, "mini-surge" in the coming weeks, 
when our Health team is joined by a six-month TDY CDC Public Health 
expert dedicated to working with PRTs on health issues.  A second 
health budget execution advisor, on financial issues, is currently 
being selected.  Our health team continues to explore with DOD 
whether they could assist in identifying an expert on pharmaceutical 
procurement and distribution.  In addition to a plus-up of the 
health team, the Embassy has proposed reobligation of existing IRRF 
funds to add 12 Treasury advisors -- an intensive effort to maximize 
Iraqi budget execution capability.  These funds, however, are 
subject to congressional approval. 
 
¶9. (SBU) With these exceptions, we believe it is time to stand pat, 
and let these surge experts focus on their priorities.  By our next 
quarterly assessment, however, it will be time to evaluate whether 
existing surge positions should be continued or redirected.  For 
some programs, transition to locally engaged staff may be 
appropriate.  But we will also need to look beyond the "surge 75" to 
our broader ministerial engagement teams.  Many of our experts are 
part of the Embassy's ITAO office, which is slated for gradual 
drawdown.  As the best ministerial advisors have technical expertise 
that ministries value, we will need to consider how to maintain a 
productive match of advisors to ministries. 
 
CROCKER