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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI510, MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI510 2008-04-11 12:37 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0011
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0510/01 1021237
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111237Z APR 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8669
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8153
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9390
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000510 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN 
RELATIONS, THE BEIJING OLYMPIC GAMES 
 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage April 11 on vice president-elect Vincent Siew's attendance 
at the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) and Siew's expected meeting with 
Chinese President Hu Jintao; on the Ministry of National Defense 
(MND)'s alleged violation of freedom of the press; and the worldwide 
protests against the Olympic Games torch relay. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an op-ed in the "Apple 
Daily" said Siew's attendance at the BFA and his expected meeting 
with Hu deserve extensive public review out of several concerns.  An 
editorial in the "Apple Daily" criticized a rumor that has been 
circulating in Taiwan's stock market, alleging that China will 
withdraw half its missiles deployed against Taiwan when Taiwan's 
President-elect Ma Ying-jeou is inaugurated on May 20, as simply 
"gossip."  Stephen Yates, former deputy assistant for national 
security affairs to U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, wondered in the 
"Taipei Times" what the Taiwan people can expect from the U.S. and 
China in terms of cross-Strait and U.S.-China-Taiwan relations as 
Taiwan president-elect Ma Ying-jeou's administration begins.  An 
editorial and a column in the "Liberty Times" criticized China's 
crackdown in Tibet and advocated a worldwide boycott of the Beijing 
Olympic Games.  End Summary. 
 
3. Cross-Strait Relations 
 
"The Boao Forum for Asia Tests 'One China with Respective 
Interpretations.'" 
 
Lai I-chung, a member of the executive board of Taipei-based public 
policy research institute Taiwan Thinktank, opined in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] (4/11): 
 
"... First, will quasi-Vice President Vincent Siew enter China by 
holding the passport of Republic of China or holding a Taiwan 
Compatriot Pass?  [Taiwan's President-elect] Ma Ying-jeou claimed 
that both sides of the Taiwan Strait can negotiate based on the 
'1992 consensus' which means 'one China with respective 
interpretations.'  According to Ma and Siew, Mainland is also part 
of the territory of the Republic of China although [the Republic of 
China] does not govern it; therefore, Siew should be able to use the 
passport of the Republic of China to attend the Boao Forum for Asia 
(BFA).  If Siew still has to enter China holding a Taiwan Compatriot 
Pass issued by the People's Republic of China, it not only shows 
that Ma's 'mutual non-denial' is not accepted by China but also 
means that the '1992 consensus,' which Ma insists is reality, is 
equivalent to accepting the 'one-China principle.' ... 
 
"Siew publicly advocated a 'cross-Strait common market' in the 2004 
BFA.  As a result, the general public can legitimately suspect that 
China made an exception to allow Siew to attend the BFA as a 
distinguished guest after registration had closed in order to 
realize the 'one-China market' by having a dialogue with Siew.  This 
[one-China market] includes the opening of negotiations with Taiwan 
on a Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) [Ed. - this is 
an agreement Hong Kong and mainland China concluded in 2003] and the 
Hong Kong-ization of Taiwan's economy, etc.  According to a poll 
commissioned by Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), people who 
consider that Taiwan should be more cautious regarding Taiwan's 
 
economic and trade exchange with China outnumber those who consider 
that Taiwan should be more open.  It demonstrates that policies such 
as 'a cross-Strait common market' and "the CEPA" are still very 
controversial without a domestic consensus.  It would be unthinkable 
what results would come out of a 'Hu-Siew meeting' when facing 
pressures from Beijing. ..." 
 
4. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations 
 
A) "Withdrawing Missiles Is Just Gossip" 
 
The mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] 
editorialized (4/11): 
 
"... It is not impossible that China withdraws missiles it deploys 
[against Taiwan] along the coast.  However, withdrawing missiles and 
disarmament requires long-term negotiation.  Both sides have to 
negotiate according to the principle of proportionality and cannot 
withdraw just by wishful talk.  Why does China want to withdraw 
missiles?  [Missiles] are the most efficient deterrence that China 
can utilize against Taiwan.  On what grounds must China give this 
gift [of withdrawing missiles] to [Taiwan's President-elect] Ma 
Ying-jeou for no reason?  China has abundant gifts in its diplomatic 
toolbox, such as allowing the three links, 'one China with 
respective interpetations,' trade favors, allowing [Taiwan's] 
officials to visit China and the United States, and a ceasefire in 
the diplomatic arena.  There is no point [for China] to use the 
extremely weighty card of withdrawing missiles at the outset and 
decrease its bargaining chips sometime in the future. 
RELATIONS, THE BEIJING OLYMPIC GAMES 
 
"What more crucial is, what Taiwan can offer in exchange if China 
withdraws its missiles?  China will definitely want Taiwan to 
decrease or stop purchasing advanced weapons from the United States. 
 The core of the lengthy negotiation is how many missiles [China] 
will withdraw in exchange for how many fewer advanced weapons Taiwan 
will buy [than originally planned].  However, this is also involved 
with the United States' attitudes and interests.  How will the 
United States allow Taiwan not to buy or to buy fewer weapons?  With 
two big sides [the United States and China] pulling and dragging, it 
will not only be difficult for a small party like Ma's authorities 
to find their niche in between the two big sides, but it will also 
be time consuming.  Do you still expect the possibility that China 
will withdraw missiles on May 20?" 
 
B) "What to Expect of the U.S. and China" 
 
Stephen Yates, President of DC Asia Advisory, a consultancy in 
Washington, and former deputy assistant for national security 
affairs to United States Vice President Dick Cheney, opined in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (4/11): 
 
"... So far there is no evidence that officials in Beijing or 
Washington are entertaining meaningful changes to treatment of 
Taiwan in international settings.  Beijing has not agreed to a 
"ceasefire" in efforts to take Taiwan's remaining diplomatic allies 
and has not defined what international space (if any) it will 
support for Taiwanese representatives.  And Washington has not 
linked its relief with Ma's victory to forthcoming relaxation of 
symbolic restrictions placed on interaction with Taiwanese officials 
(in the US and internationally). 
 
"For example, where is the international space that the US will now 
pro-actively advocate for Taiwan, even if Beijing continues to 
object?  Hard to imagine anything in the near-term, with so many 
other equities at stake with Beijing that the US is likely to see as 
more important. 
 
"Economic relations with China and the US are the area of greatest 
promise in terms of expanded interaction, although it is unclear 
what, if any, improvement it will lead to in Taiwan's economic 
performance.  Loosening restrictions on cross-strait investment, 
trade, transportation and tourism will clearly increase activity. 
Actual progress towards establishing a common market would do even 
more. 
 
"Similarly economic interaction with the US could expand if the US 
agrees to simultaneously open negotiations for a bilateral 
free-trade agreement.  But would deeper economic integration with 
either China or the US necessarily lead to more rapid GDP growth, 
lower unemployment, greater international competitiveness or higher 
consumer confidence? 
 
"For outside observers it is hard to assess how important near-term 
progress is to the fate of the Ma Administration. ..." 
 
5. The Beijing Olympic Games 
 
A) "Boycotting the Olympic Games Has Become a Courageous Global Move 
to Uphold Justice" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 720,000] 
editorialized (4/11): 
 
"... In contrast, [Taiwan's President-elect] Ma Ying-jeou, who 
during the presidential election threatened that he did not rule out 
the possibility to boycott the Beijing Olympic Games if China 
continued its crackdown in Tibet, unconsciously becomes China's 
puppet to transfer the world's attention by sending Vice 
President-elect Vincent Siew to attend the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) 
held on the Hainan Island, China, while the world is condemning 
China.  Frankly speaking, with the Beijing Olympic Games imminent, 
apparently there is not enough time to shift the Olympic Games to 
other places.  However, people in the world should not connive in 
the bloody Chinese crackdown in Tibet.  Protesting and interfering 
with the torch relay is indeed a courageous move to uphold justice. 
If Taiwan's coming government continues its policy of flattering 
China, it will not only be despised by the general public but will 
also lead Taiwan to a tragic, Tibetan-style destiny.  [Taiwan's 
incoming government] will be condemned by history." 
 
B) "A Cannibal Holding the Torch" 
 
The "Free Talks" column in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" 
[circulation: 720,000] wrote (4/11): 
 
"... Only emphasizing economic achievement without talking about the 
universal value of democracy is like a cannibal holding a torch and 
RELATIONS, THE BEIJING OLYMPIC GAMES 
 
bragging about headhunting.  People will not know whether to laugh 
or cry or, even more, feel appalled.  It turns out that China has to 
send its armed police forces to protect the torch.  Holding the 
Olympic Games not only does not improve [China's] national image, 
but it even makes 'its head covered with dust and its face covered 
with dirt', embarrassing it thoroughly." 
 
YOUNG