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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI494, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI494 2008-04-08 10:07 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0494/01 0991007
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081007Z APR 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8647
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8143
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9380
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000494 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their 
April 8 news coverage on Vice President-elect Vincent Siew's planned 
April 11-13 meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao at the Boao 
Forum on Hainan Island (China); on the island's soaring consumer 
price index; on President-elect Ma Ying-jeou's proposed economic 
policies; and on reform of the defeated DPP.  The pro-unification 
"United Daily News" front-paged a news story with the headline "Hu 
and Siew Will Meet One-on-One at the Boao Forum."  Also, several 
papers reported that U.S. President George W. Bush will personally 
approve the sale of F-16 C/D fighter aircraft to Taiwan after May, 
or most likely, after Beijing holds the Olympics in August. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times" slashed at Vice President-elect 
Vincent Siew's upcoming meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao and 
called it a humiliating trip that surrenders Taiwan's sovereignty. 
A "United Daily News" analysis, however, said the Hu-Siew meeting 
will create a new model for Beijing to figure out how to communicate 
with Taipei.  An op-ed in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China TimesLQ'D:QGQ$:Qf the election of the Ma-Siew ticket, Siew's 
trip will be akin to a trip from a tribute country, which will 
surrender Taiwan's sovereignty and humiliate our nation if Beijing 
fails to confirm and respect Siew's capacity as a quasi-Vice 
President.  Also, the Taiwan people will not understand or forgive 
such a move that tramples on Taiwan's sovereignty. ... 
 
"... Vice President-elect Siew's erroneous display of self 
disparagement can actually be traced back to the thinking behind 
President-elect Ma's remarks in Taiwan that 'one China is the 
Republic of China,' the '1992 consensus' indicates 'one China with 
respective interpretations,' or those to the international community 
that '[Taiwan] will join the World Health Organization under the 
name Chinese Taipei.'  The essence of [Ma and Siew's] thinking is to 
curry favor with China to the extent that [Taiwan] is willing to 
flinch and emasculate itself, or even to sacrifice its status when 
it is related to sovereignty.  Based on such a foundation of turning 
over [Taiwan's] sovereignty [to China], it is really doubtful to see 
how wisely the Ma-Siew team will present itself in terms of their 
ability and strategy to carry out their pledge to the Taiwan people 
-- namely, cross-Strait talks that will be peaceful, on an equal 
footing and beneficial to Taiwan. ..." 
 
B) "Hu-Siew Meeting, a New Model for Beijing to Figure out How to 
Communicate [with Taiwan]" 
 
Journalist Lai Ching-hung noted in an analysis in the 
pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] (4/8): 
 
"... Unlike [former President] Lee Teng-hui's style of sending 
'secret envoys' to China or the [cross-Strait] tension during the 
reign of Chen Shui-bian, Beijing expects that the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait can have friendlier interactions after Ma Ying-jeou 
and Vincent Siew take the helm.  It seems to be a viable approach to 
build a cooperative model between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
that differs from Lee's secret envoys, Chen's frontline propaganda, 
or the KMT-Chinese Communist Party cooperation platform.  Beijing 
also hopes to build a high-level communication channel so as to 
better and more quickly understand Ma's mainland policy and shorten 
its distance with him.  The upcoming Hu-Siew meeting will mark the 
beginning of friendly contact and an initial step to build a 
cooperation platform [across the Taiwan Strait], but it surely will 
not be a venue to resolve bilateral disputes." 
 
C) "Challenges Posed by Ma Ying-jeou's Victory on Beijing" 
 
Jing Huang, an independent commentator who used to work for the 
Brookings Institution, opined in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China 
 
Times" [circulation: 400,000] (4/8): 
 
"... Over the past years under Chen Shui-bian's reign, one of the 
biggest losses that Taiwan has suffered is the unprecedented 
deterioration of Washington-Taipei relations.  This development has, 
objectively speaking, brought about common interests between 
Washington and Beijing in the Taiwan issue, thus resulting in 
Washington's and Beijing's joint efforts to prevent Taiwan 
'independence' and to 'manage' the status quo across the Taiwan 
Strait.  Ma Ying-jeou declared in public that after the KMT comes 
back to power, he will seek to maintain the cross-Strait status quo 
using his three 'Noes' policy -- namely, no unification, no 
independence and no use of force.  This policy is not only the best 
option to restore Washington-Taipei relations but also a basic 
approach to resolve 'co-management' by Washington and Beijing on the 
cross-Strait situation, deterring Beijing's policy over the recent 
years to 'restrain Taiwan by way of Washington.' 
 
"As long as the cross-Strait status quo can be maintained, 
Washington will surely adjust its Taiwan policy based on its own 
strategic interests and will stick to its position in the 
cross-Strait relations.  These three forces, like the three legs of 
a tripod, are certainly a solid framework.  But if the three legs 
each do things in their own ways based on their own interests 
without coordinating with each other, how will the 'tripod' remain 
steady? ..." 
 
D) "Washington Sends Mixed Signals" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (4/8): 
 
"...  Again last week, Washington demonstrated that the manner in 
which governments formulate policy is anything but rational, and 
seldom the result of a decision by a single actor. On the Gordian 
knot that is the Taiwan Strait, Washington has long been of two 
voices - the Pentagon's and the State Department's. While the former 
emphasizes arming Taiwan in a balance-of-power struggle with China, 
the latter strives for better relations with Beijing, often to the 
detriment of Taipei, democracy and human rights in general.  What 
happens when two such lines of direction clash is mixed signals, 
which is what we were served last week in a Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) report on the impact of last month's election. 
 
"One should not be surprised, then, if in the past year or so, this 
resulted in a sometimes overt, sometimes underhanded, support for 
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) president-elect Ma Ying-jeou, who 
was seen as key to diminishing tensions in the Strait. While it 
would be unfair, given the wide margin of victory, to blame the 
State Department for the DPP's loss in the election, it remains that 
eight years of heavy criticism cannot have helped its candidate's 
cause. When Ma won, we could almost hear the sigh of relief blowing 
across the Pacific. At last, friendlier ties in the Strait, a chance 
for peace. 
 
"The festive mood lasted a week or so, whereupon other voices in 
Washington began to resonate. It now seemed that Taiwan may perhaps 
be growing too close to China, which, as the CRS report stated, 
could threaten US interests in the region and have a negative impact 
on weapons sales to Taiwan. All of a sudden, peace no longer seemed 
to be such a good thing.  What this all means is that rather than 
speaking in a single voice, governments (at least democratic ones) 
have at their core conflicts of interest and Washington's wavering 
over the past eight years was an expression of that reality. It may 
very well be that in the next weeks and months, the voices clamoring 
for not-so-friendly ties in the Taiwan Strait will be in the 
ascendance.  Should this be the case, Ma may have more in common 
with Chen than he'd care to admit." 
 
YOUNG