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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 001065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV ET
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS HERALD 8: A TALE OF TWO TURNOUTS 
 
REF: ADDIS 1000 (AND PREVIOUS) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Ethiopia voted on April 13 in the first round of 
local elections.  With only a handful of unknown or 
apparently-partisan domestic election observer 
organizations authorized by the National Electoral Board 
(NEB) and a pointed statement to diplomats and foreigners 
not to loiter or linger around polling stations, the world's 
perception of these elections is effectively limited to the 
Ethiopian Government's reports and spin with no ability to 
confirm or prove wrong allegations of malfeasance.  But with 
so few opposition candidates able to run, the result of the 
election was not in doubt.  Despite restrictions, Mission 
personnel did observe approximately 25 polling stations, as 
well as street dynamics, around Addis Ababa.  In stark 
contrast to the NEB's claim of over 95 percent voter turnout, 
Post's first hand snapshots of round one voting suggest an 
abysmal turnout and overwhelming voter malaise in the 
capital city.  Restrictions on observation preclude Post 
from any independent assessment of rural polling dynamics. 
End Summary. 
 
ELECTION OBSERVERS: LARRY, MOE, CURLY - YES, BUT NOT CARTER 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) After months of pressure by the diplomatic community 
 the NEB finally released directives for how domestic 
organizations can request to observe elections on February 29. 
Two reputable organizations who took leading roles in past 
election observation efforts, the Organization for Social 
Justice in Ethiopia (OSJE) and the Action Professionals' 
Association for the People (APAP), chose not to even request 
permission to observe the elections due to a lack of 
confidence in the process, according to officials who informed 
us in private.  While the NEB has declined to report how many 
organizations applied to observe, they did approve -- through 
private responses to the petitioners and without any public 
release -- eleven domestic organizations.  While the NEB's 
failure to respond to the Ethiopian Human Rights Council's 
(EHRCO) request to observe kept this reputable organization 
indoors on polling day, the eleven approved organizations 
are overwhelmingly small, unheard-of groups or organizations 
known to maintain strong, close ties to the government with 
little or no experience in election observation.  The eleven 
approved domestic observation organizations are: 
 
--Union of Victims of the Derg Regime and Family Members: A 
well known organization working closely with the Ethiopian 
Government (GoE) to support the prosecution of Derg leaders, 
 
--Martyrs Monument Building Association: An organization 
which works closely with the Union of Victims of the Derg 
Regime which focuses on building monuments around the 
country to the valor of those opposed to the previous regime, 
 
--South Ethiopia Nations and Nationalities Regional 
Government Legal Professional Association: A civic 
association active in the south with no previous election 
observation record, 
 
--SNNPRS Youth Association - Addis Ababa Chapter; Amhara 
Region Youth Association -- Addis Ababa Chapter: These youth 
associations are normally supported by local governments or 
the Federal Ministry of Youth and Sports with no previous 
election observation experience, 
 
--Scholars Association for Development; Initiative for 
Human Development: Two newly formed organizations with 
no previous election observation experience or track- 
record otherwise, 
 
--Addis Ababa Islamic Affairs Supreme Council: Generally 
perceived as working closely with the government, the 
Council oversees Islamic affairs in the capital and 
participated in observing the 2005 elections, 
 
--Ra-iy Ethiopia Association: A small NGO engaged in 
women's and children's issues and HIV projects, 
 
--Wegegta Reproductive Health and Anti-AIDS Association: 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001065  002 OF 004 
 
 
A first time election observer group normally engaged in 
reproductive health and HIV/AIDS activities, 
 
--Tinsae Ethiopia Association: A never before heard of 
organization. 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to the Dutch Ambassador, Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi informed the Dutch and Japanese Ambassadors, 
chair and vice chair respectively of the "Ethiopia Partners 
Group" of ambassadors, on March 28 that no international 
observers would be invited to monitor these elections and 
foreign diplomats would not be allowed to enter polling 
stations or stay in their vicinity.  The Prime Minister 
noted that "there is no added value" for diplomats to visit 
polling stations, as all information on the elections, 
procedures, infrastructure, etc. could be obtained by 
talking to Ethiopian citizens. 
 
WHAT IF THEY HOLD AND ELECTION AND NOBODY COMES? 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The prevailing public sentiment around Addis Ababa 
throughout the electoral process has been one of resignation 
 and malaise.  While the NEB had claimed to register 1.1 
million voters in Addis Ababa, many on the street had 
detailed persuasion tactics, applied particularly against 
women and the poor, threatening the withholding of local 
government administered public services unless individuals 
registered to vote.  Obvious voter and public turnout on 
election day was consistent with this.  Director of the 
State Department's Office of East African Affairs James 
Knight, P/E Chief, and Political Specialist conducted a 
windshield tour of Addis Ababa's diverse neighborhoods to 
glean election day dynamics within the Prime Minister's 
rigid parameters.  Other mission personnel conducted 
similar reviews. 
 
¶5. (SBU) While people were out and about throughout the 
capital city, the numbers of vehicles on the road and the 
number of people going about their daily business was 
notably less than any average Sunday morning.  Throughout 
Addis, polling stations opened uniformly one hour late. 
Popular speculation argues that this move was an effort 
to allow voters' queues to grow to present a photo op of 
robust voter turnout.  Whether or not this hypothesis is 
accurate, long lines were as notably absent from the 
capital's streets at opening time as they were throughout 
the day.  Of the approximately 25 polling stations visited 
by Mission personnel, only two had notable numbers of 
people.  In the only polling station exhibiting any sort 
of line, roughly twenty people -- almost all women -- were 
seen.  Mission personnel also observed approximately 10-15 
individuals at various stages of entering, exiting, and 
lingering at one other polling station, this in the capital 
city's largely-Tigrean neighborhoods.  This latter polling 
station was the only polling station to have a mobile 
police unit parked outside in addition to the standard 
four-to-five police officers manning polling station 
entrances. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Among the other polling stations visited, the 
only people present at ten of these were police, without 
any apparent civilians or voters.  Among the other polling 
stations visited, on average only two-to-three voters were 
ever seen.  The police presence at these polling stations 
ranged from three to seven.  Two polling stations were so 
quiet that even the police manning the entrance were 
having their shoes polished.  According to long-term Addis 
Ababa residents, not only was the public turnout at 
polling stations and on the streets dramatically lower 
than the strong 2005 turnout, but it was also notably less 
than even the more modest turnouts for the 2000 national, 
and 2004 local elections.  Contacts at other embassies 
report similar findings from their reviews of election day. 
 
GOE: TURNOUT IS ROBUST 
---------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) While the public turnout observed mirrored the 
notable absence of public excitement on the streets of 
Addis Ababa, the NEB's reports of voter turnout provided 
a stark contrast.  Two hours before polling stations 
closed, the state-run Ethiopian News Agency (ENA) quoted 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001065  003 OF 004 
 
 
the NEB Chairman Dr. Merga's report that 93 percent of 
the registered voters nationwide had voted.  In an 
attempt to support these claims of high turnout, 
Ethiopian Television ran file footage of very long lines 
of anxious voters waiting outside of polling stations -- 
from the 2005 national elections.  Upon the conclusion 
of voting, ENA quoted Dr. Merga's statistic that 95 
percent of the 26 million registered voters had done 
their civic duty.  The Foreign Ministry on April 14 told 
P/E Chief that voter turnout in Addis was likely a bit 
lower, estimated around 85 percent.  In response to P/E 
Chief's mention of the absence of queues, limited 
numbers, and reduced level of people on the streets, 
MFA's Director for the Americas explained these 
observations away by noting that the number of polling 
stations had increased from previous elections, so there 
is little reason why people would have to wait in line, 
and thus, no lines to be observed. 
 
¶8. (SBU) A cursory review of the statistics posted at 
polling stations after the elections suggests a far cry, 
at least in Addis Ababa, from the 95 percent voter turnout. 
With each polling station designed to accommodate 
approximately 1,000 voters, one would expect a total of 
around 950 votes cast at each polling station.  In a 
random sample of five polling stations, however, the total 
number of votes cast for all candidates vying were: 60, 
247, 117, 627, and 418.  Assuming that these polling 
stations were to accommodate 1,000 voters, these levels 
would suggest 6, 25, 12, 63, and 42 percent voter turnout 
respectively.  If the NEB's claimed 95 percent turnout is 
accurate, however, these vote totals suggest a massive 
number of spoiled ballots or protest votes against the 
election process (a strategy that several opposition 
supporters had earlier pledged to invoke). 
 
OPPOSITION DYNAMICS 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) With opposition parties able to register 
candidates for only four-tenths of one percent of the 
contested seats and the largest opposition party 
boycotting the elections, Post expected minimal actual 
election day malfeasance.  The largest remaining 
opposition party, the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement 
(OFDM), however, reported that several of its party's 
election observers were beaten to dissuade them from 
observing polling station activities.  Initial polling 
station results suggest that despite winning large 
margins in the 2005 elections not a single OFDM candidate 
won in these same constituencies on April 13.  The United 
Ethiopian Democratic Forces' (UEDF) Beyene Petros reported 
that despite having announced its boycott of the elections 
on April 10, UEDF intended candidates still encountered 
police at their houses on election day telling them not to 
go outside.  Even the small Afar Liberation Front reported 
that 15 of its party's candidates and 20 party election 
observers were arrested on the morning of the election. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The most dramatic source of public animosity 
toward the government and ruling party is focused around 
Addis Ababa's City Hall, where in 2005 the opposition won 
137 out of 138 seats and the Mayorship.  This time, 
between the impediments to opposition party candidate 
registration and the boycott of the elections which 
alleged intimidation tactics prompted, the ruling EPRDF 
looks poised to take the overwhelming majority, if not 
all, of the city council seats. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Unable to directly observe election day dynamics, 
or even to mingle outside of polling stations, Ethiopia's 
resident diplomatic community's ability to assess the 
integrity of the April 13 elections (and coming round two, 
kebele level elections on April 20) is severely hampered. 
Nevertheless, the direct observations of election day 
atmospherics are equally as dissonant with the NEB and 
GoE's reports as have been the opposition's allegations 
of harassment and intimidation from the GoE's explanation 
of these throughout the 2008 electoral process.  The 
challenge facing the United States and the international 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001065  004 OF 004 
 
 
community is to convince the GoE and ruling party to ease 
both its iron fisted grip on political space and 
impediments to credible, neutral verification of the 
political environment to regain public confidence in the 
democratic process before public frustration and anger 
erupts into insecurity.  The Ambassador and Post firmly 
believe that we must begin now to lay the groundwork for 
opening political space in advance of the 2010 national 
elections or face the potential violence that sustained 
harassment and intimidation risks spurring.  Current 
ethnic and internal political dynamics suggest that an 
outbreak of political violence in Ethiopia will 
significantly surpass Ethiopia's post-election violence 
of 2005 as well as that in Kenya more recently, and 
place in jeopardy our national interests in Ethiopia and 
the Horn of Africa.  The Embassy will lay out a game-plan 
for how to move this forward in coming reports.  End 
Comment. 
YAMAMOTO