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Viewing cable 08USUNNEWYORK258, UNSC REFORM: GERMAN-LED GROUP TABLES PROPOSAL IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08USUNNEWYORK258 2008-03-20 23:54 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN USUN New York
VZCZCXRO0905
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0258/01 0802354
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 202354Z MAR 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3958
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 1139
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 0400
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0911
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 1948
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 0111
RUEHPL/AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS IMMEDIATE 0130
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 0450
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 0282
RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON IMMEDIATE 0236
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2118
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8442
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 0922
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE 0223
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 0033
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 USUN NEW YORK 000258 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KUNR UNSC GM JA IT BR IN PK
SUBJECT: UNSC REFORM: GERMAN-LED GROUP TABLES PROPOSAL IN 
ORDER TO SPARK NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: 2007 USUN 1225 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  During a March 18 meeting of the 
German-led Over-Arching Process on UNSC reform, Cyprus 
presented a proposal on behalf of a small drafting group that 
it hoped could serve as a basis for the inter-governmental 
negotiations on Council expansion set to take place in 2008. 
The proposal (contained in para 14) calls for 22 seats on the 
Council overall, although Cyprus said this number, as well as 
most other aspects of the model, are negotiable.  Japan and 
Brazil said the text could serve as the basis for 
inter-governmental negotiations if it were modified slightly. 
 India, however, said it would be "difficult" to present this 
text because it does not address concerns of developing and 
small island states.  African states similarly complained 
that the draft proposal did not reflect their insistence on 
two permanent seats for Africa with veto rights.  None of the 
members of the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) bloc, which was 
formed to oppose the G-4 aspirants push for permanent 
membership, attended the German-hosted meeting.  The UK and 
France welcomed the text as a step forward, although they did 
not agree with all of its contents.  USUN participated in the 
meeting, but instead of commenting on the text, reiterated 
long-standing U.S. principles on UNSC reform.  After the 
meeting, the drafting group presented the text to PGA Kerim, 
who reportedly plans to convene the Open-Ended Working Group 
(OEWG) in a few weeks to determine if the draft commands 
sufficient support to begin inter-governmental negotiations. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (C) COMMENT:  It is tempting to view most UNSC reform 
discussions as just more sound and fury, signifying nothing. 
With the Africans and UFC opposed to some or all of the 
drafting group's proposal, this latest gambit may well suffer 
the fate of its forebears.  But we see three risks on the 
horizon.  First, in order to "test" the support the drafting 
group proposal enjoys, the PGA might agree under G-4 pressure 
to conduct a straw poll of sorts, which would reveal the 
exact level of support each model enjoys and undermine the 
OEWG's tradition of consensus decision-making.  Second, if 
the PGA refuses to proceed to inter-governmental negotiations 
because the text does not enjoy consensus support, countries 
such as India might decide to table a UNSC reform resolution 
of their own (similar to India's L69 gambit of last year) and 
force a vote.  This, too, would end the OEWG practice on 
consensus decision-making. 
 
3. (C) COMMENT cont'd:  But the biggest risk we see is 
farther down the road.  Japan, Brazil, and Germany now seem 
to have effectively conceded that their aspirations for 
permanent UNSC membership will not be met anytime soon, and 
have agreed to negotiate largely on an interim UNSC expansion 
model.  India still resists this idea but may come around if 
a specific proposal secures significant support.  If the G-4 
and UFC both eventually support an interim model with only 
long-duration non-permanent seats, Africa might be more 
willing to ditch its insistence on two permanent seats with 
veto rights, and settle instead for a large expansion of 
non-permanent seats for Africa and other regional groups.  To 
protect the core U.S. interest of ensuring at most a modest 
expansion of the Council that preserves its effectiveness, we 
must carefully navigate the next few months to avoid that 
outcome, while ensuring that we do not galvanize support for 
a particular model because of active U.S. opposition.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
Germany Convenes Over-Arching Process 
------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) German PR Matussek hosted a meeting on March 18 of 
the Over-Arching Process on UNSC reform to discuss a draft 
text produced by a small drafting group led by Cyprus.  The 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000258  002 OF 007 
 
 
text of the proposal is contained in para 14.  The drafting 
group began meeting in January 2008 in order to respond to 
the PGA's call for member states to submit "elements" for the 
inter-governmental negotiations on UNSC reform set to take 
place in 2008 (reftel).  Although the drafting group was 
initially convened by Germany, Cyprus soon took the lead, 
reportedly to suggest that the group was independent of 
Germany's support for the G-4 (Germany, Brazil, India, and 
Japan) model for UNSC expansion.  The drafting group 
eventually comprised Germany, the UK, Romania, Malaysia, the 
Netherlands, and was chaired by Cyprus.  As a result, after 
making brief introductory comments, the German PR yielded the 
floor to Cypriot PR Mavroyiannis to chair the meeting and 
explain the draft proposal. 
 
5. (SBU) Although the Germans said the meeting was open to 
all participants, they invited only those countries that had 
either participated in previous meetings of the Over-Arching 
Process, or those whom they believed might be willing to 
attend.  USUN estimates that roughly 50-60 PRs / DPRs 
attended the meeting, from Asia (we observed Bangladesh, 
India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam), 
Africa (Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Tunisia), 
Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, Panama), Europe 
(Denmark, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Portugal, Czech 
Republic, Romania).  Of the P-5, only China did not attend. 
The UK was represented by its PermRep, France its DPR, and 
Russia by its UNSC reform expert.  USUN was represented by 
Political MinCouns and by PolOff (notetaker). 
 
Cyprus Explains the Draft Text 
------------------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) Cypriot PR Mavroyiannis said the objective of the 
meeting was to share the draft proposal and to seek the views 
of the broader membership.  He emphasized that the options 
presented in the paper do not/not reflect the national 
position of any one member state, including those countries 
in the drafting group.  Rather, the drafters sought to 
produce a text that could serve as a basis for 
inter-governmental negotiations on UNSC reform, and in doing 
so even put forth positions that conflict with their own 
national positions.  Nevertheless, Mavroyiannis maintained 
that in using the draft text as a basis for negotiations, no 
member state would be abandoning its own position on UNSC 
reform.  The entire proposal was negotiable, he said, which 
was why so many elements in the text were explicitly placed 
in brackets. 
 
7. (SBU) Mavroyiannis said it would be impossible to create a 
"perfect Security Council," so the drafters tried to see if 
the current UNSC could be "improved."  He acknowledged that 
under the draft text, the Western Europe and Others (WEOG) 
Group would have six seats and the African Group would have 
only five, but maintained that this was an improvement in the 
current regional allocation.  Insisting that the text could 
"not just be a compilation" of various UNSC expansion models, 
Mavroyiannis admitted that there were aspects of certain UNSC 
expansion models missing from the draft text.  But he said 
some of these elements, such as whether the veto would be 
extended to new permanent members, had not been abandoned, 
but just "parked" for the time being.  Mavroyiannis stressed 
that the overall number of 22 seats was negotiable, 
explaining that if the drafters had started at 26 (the number 
of seats in the African Union model), there would have been 
no way to decrease that number during the negotiations.  He 
also underscored the importance of the section in the draft 
proposal on improving UNSC working methods. 
 
UFC Doesn't Show and Rejects Process 
------------------------------------ 
 
8. (SBU) None of the members of the Uniting for Consensus 
(UFC) bloc, which was formed to oppose the G-4 aspirants push 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000258  003 OF 007 
 
 
for permanent membership, attended the German-hosted meeting. 
 (Note: Principal members of UFC include Italy, Pakistan, 
South Korea, Argentina, and Mexico. End Note.) Instead, just 
before the German meeting was convened, Italian PR Spatafora 
sent PGA Kerim a letter on behalf of the UFC that outlined 
the group's views on a process to reach inter-governmental 
negotiations.  The objective of the process proposed by the 
UFC would be to reach agreement only on an "intermediate" 
solution to UNSC reform based on the report of the two 
facilitators in the 61st UNGA session.  (Note: This objective 
would rule out any expansion of the category of permanent 
members of the UNSC.  End Note.)  The Italian letter also 
stipulates that "transparent and open consultations and 
inter-governmental negotiations" should be conducted in the 
Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), which operates on the basis 
of consensus.  It also suggests that "no unilateral 
initiatives or action" should be carried out outside the OEWG. 
 
Some G-4 Pleased; Others Less So 
-------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Although Japan and Brazil proposed amendments to the 
draft text, they appeared largely satisfied with the effort, 
and said that if the text were modified slightly it could 
serve as the basis for inter-governmental negotiations.  The 
Japanese and Brazilian concerns centered on amending the 
wording of section 4.3 to make it clear that this option 
would create new permanent members of the UNSC, rather than 
just make the proposed geographic allocation of seats 
permanent.  Japan also asserted that there must be "no 
preconditions" to inter-governmental negotiations, and 
highlighted the OEWG's reliance on consensus as one such 
pre-condition.  Indian PR Sen, however, launched a long 
critique of the draft proposal, claiming that it would be 
"difficult to present the draft in its current form."  He 
complained that it neither reflects the views of adherents of 
the G-4 model nor the African Union model, nor does it 
address the need for greater representation on the UNSC by 
developing countries and access for small island states.  Sen 
concluded by arguing that the text must be improved in 
"radical, dramatic ways." 
 
Africans Still Insist on Whole Pie 
---------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Although Zambia, Mauritius, and Tanzania were the 
only African delegates to speak at the meeting, their views 
seemed to reflect broader African views of the draft text 
heard outside the meeting.  Recalling the AU's position on 
UNSC reform as embodied in the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus, which 
calls for two new permanent members from Africa with veto 
rights as well as three additional non-permanent seats, all 
three speakers criticized the draft proposal for omitting the 
issue of the veto.  They noted that at the AU summit in 
January 2008, African Foreign Ministers had given their 
PermReps the authority to "participate" in the upcoming 
inter-governmental negotiations, but on the basis of the 
Ezulwini Consensus.  Therefore, they said AU PermReps could 
not support the draft proposal if it did not include 
extending the veto to new permanent members.  Noting that the 
AU proposal called for 26 members of the Council overall, 
Mauritius argued that an expansion to just 22 members would 
be insufficient to reflect adequately the views of the 
broader membership.  Tanzania complained that Africa was not 
represented in either the drafting group or the PGA's Task 
Force on UNSC reform. 
 
Mixed Reaction From Others 
-------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Reactions from other delegations were mixed, with 
most Europeans welcoming the text as a step forward, and 
other representatives assailing its omissions.  UK PermRep 
Sawers noted that he had joined the drafting group to move 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000258  004 OF 007 
 
 
the UNSC reform process forward, and although the draft 
proposal contained several elements that do not reflect the 
UK position, any sense of consensus around this text would be 
a positive development.  France also praised the "progress" 
that the draft text represented, although it expressed 
concern about some of the elements in the proposal on UNSC 
expansion and working methods.  Russia reaffirmed the need 
for consensus on matters pertaining to UNSC reform, supported 
the U.S. view that the Council should address its own working 
methods, and asserted that any effort to restrict P-5 vetoes 
is not realistic.  Singapore and Jamaica both criticized the 
draft for inadequately reflecting the views of small island 
states and other important constituencies.  Panama also 
criticized the proposal for allocating too many seats to 
Europe at the expense of other regional groups.  Romania and 
Denmark largely supported the draft proposal as a basis for 
negotiations. 
 
U.S. Reiterates Reform Principles 
--------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) PolMinCouns spoke towards the end of the meeting, 
after the UK and France had praised the draft proposal. 
Noting that the draft text had just been circulated, he said 
the U.S. would study the details, but we wanted to make 
several general comments about Council enlargement.  First, 
he emphasized that any expansion of the Council must preserve 
its ability to respond quickly and effectively to threats to 
international peace and security.  This requires only a 
modest expansion, as decision-making with fifteen countries 
is already difficult enough.  Second, modest Council 
expansion must be part of a comprehensive package of UN 
reform in areas such as General Assembly financing and 
decision-making, but we had yet to see any movement on these 
issues.  Third, the Council itself should discuss its own 
working methods, not the UNGA.  Fourth, it is vital to 
achieve the broadest possible support for Council expansion, 
in order to ensure that no significant portion of the 
membership is alienated by the result.  For this reason, the 
U.S. believes the OEWG should be the forum to carry forward 
discussions on inter-governmental negotiations. 
 
Next Steps: Spotlight Shifts to PGA 
----------------------------------- 
 
13. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting, the Cypriot PR 
noted that the drafting group planned to revise the proposal 
to reflect some of the views expressed, and then submit the 
revised text to PGA Kerim as a basis for inter-governmental 
negotiations.  He welcomed other submissions to the PGA as 
well, although he noted that neither the UFC nor the African 
Group appeared inclined now to submit proposals of their own 
(excluding the Italian letter, which Mavroyiannis said 
focused only on procedure and not at all on substance).  USUN 
subsequently learned that the drafting group submitted a 
slightly modified text (with just a wording change in 4.3 to 
satisfy Indian/Brazilian concerns) to PGA Kerim on March 20. 
According to the Germans and Japanese, the PGA committed to 
them that once he received such a submission, he would 
convene the OEWG to test if the proposal enjoys widespread 
support as a basis for inter-governmental negotiations, and 
then proceed to the UNGA plenary to begin those negotiations. 
 However, the Italians told USUN that the PGA promised them 
to proceed to inter-governmental negotiations only if the 
draft text enjoys "consensus" support within the OEWG.  With 
opposition from the UFC and possibly AU, consensus support 
would obviously be impossible.  USUN also understands that 
PGA Kerim will be traveling for the next ten days, so he 
would not be able to convene an OEWG meeting until at least 
early April. 
 
Text of Drafting Group Proposal 
------------------------------- 
 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000258  005 OF 007 
 
 
14. (SBU) The text of the drafting group proposal is below: 
 
Introduction: 
 
Since 2005, the main claims regarding the enlargement of the 
Security Council could be broadly represented as follows: 
adding permanent seats with veto, adding new permanent seats 
without veto, adding more non-permanent seats. These 
positions have not proven reconcilable thus far and have 
warranted alternative thinking, which began to be elaborated 
by the five facilitators appointed by the President of the 
61st session of the General Assembly, through their report of 
20 April 2007.  While the legitimate positions official1y 
tabled in 2005 are retained by their proponents, their lack 
of realization potential at this juncture has pointed to an 
apparent willingness to negotiate on the basis of achieving 
intermediate reform, through the identification of the 
highest common denominator at this stage. 
 
Affording serious consideration to this emerging approach 
neither amounts to, nor entails relinquishing any claims. 
Rather, its attempt is to improve representation on the 
Security Council, without sacrificing its effectiveness, as 
compared to its current, as opposed to its desired, form. As 
such, for the purpose of achieving such intermediate reform, 
the scope of the negotiation would be narrower, focusing on 
points of convergence in the short-term rather than divisive 
elements. By engaging in negotiations to determine what is 
feasible in terms of Security Council reform, States are not 
bound by any outcome, nor does their involvement imply that 
the parameters of these negotiations represent, at any time, 
their ideal or preferred reform. What is sought at this point 
is an inclusive negotiation in good faith to achieve progress. 
 
Elements for Security Council enlargement: 
 
1. The Security Council shall be enlarged to (22) members. 
 
2. Of these seven new seats: 
 
a. Two will be allocated to member States of the African 
Group, 
b. Two will be allocated to member States of the Asian Group, 
c. One will be allocated to member States of the Latin 
American and Caribbean Group, 
d. One will be allocated to member States of the Western 
European and Others Group, and 
e. One will be allocated to member States of the Eastern 
European Group. 
 
3. The election of member States in all new seats will be 
subject to regular election procedures by two thirds majority 
at the General Assembly in accordance with Article 18 of the 
Charter. 
 
4.1." (The seats allocated under paragraphs (a-d) (awe) of 
paragraph (2) above could, in principle, be fiIled by the 
member States elected thereon, for the entire duration of 
intermediate reform.). 
 
4.2.1: (However, at (five year) intervals, any member State 
may chal1enge the incumbent(s) (from its own regional group) 
that is (are) serving In long-term seat(s) under paragraph 
4,1. If this challenge is backed (by the majority of the 
members of that regional group, and subsequently,) by a 
(simple) majority in the General Assembly, the seat(s) wi11 
reopen to election and all members of that regional group, 
including the Incumbent(s), shall be eligible.). 
 
OR 
 
4.2.2. (However, at (five-year) intervals, any member State 
may chal1enge the incumbent(s) (from its own regional group) 
that is (are) serving in long-term seat(s) under paragraph 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000258  006 OF 007 
 
 
4.1. In such an event, the seat(s) wiI1 re-open to election 
and all members of that regional group, including the 
incumbent(s), shall be eligible.). 
 
4.3. (Seats allocated under a-d above shall be permanent). 
 
4.4. (Member States elected to fill these seats will be able 
to serve for a (five) year period and (be eligible for 
re-election) (not be eligible for re-election)). 
 
4.5. (Member States elected to fill these seats wi1I be able 
to serve for a two year period and (be eligible for 
re-election) (not be eligible for re-election). 
 
5. (The seat allocated under (e) wi1l be a regular two-year 
non-permanent seat). 
 
6. (At least half of the total number of seats of each 
regional group after enlargement (excluding the P5) will 
continue to be regular two-year non-permanent seats.). 
 
7. Reform should include mandatory review after a fixed 
period of time, the exact duration of which must be 
determined before the reform comes into force and will form 
an integral part of the reform package. A mandatory review 
conference to consider the provisions set out in the 
paragraphs above will take place (15-years) after these 
provisions have entered into force. 
 
These provisions will remain in place until a decision 
amending them has come into force.  The provisions are 
without prejudice to the process leading up to, the 
negotiations during, or the decisions made at the review 
conference. 
 
Elements for working methods 
 
In addition to enlargement, and regardless of the time1ine 
for the ratification of relevant Charter amendments necessary 
for it, the General Assembly could simultaneously recommend 
concrete improvements on SC working methods, including 
implementation of those contained in 8/2006/507. We might, at 
that time, proceed to de-link the two processes. Such 
measures include: 
 
a) Making available at all times information regarding the 
Council's meeting schedule, 
 
b) Designating a contact point for providing information on 
the work of the Council to delegations of member States not 
members of the Council, 
 
c) Consulting with the member State(s) directly affected by 
an item under examination, d) Explaining one's vote in cases 
where there is no unanimity, and especially when a negative 
vote has been cast by a permanent member of the Security 
Council, 
 
e) Conducting as many of the Council's proceedings as 
possible in an open format and establishing mechanisms for 
receiving the input of member States that are not members of 
the Council, 
 
f) Appealing to permanent members of the Security Council to 
ascertain that war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity would not be committed and that other irremediable 
negative developments would not occur as a result of blocking 
Security Counci1 action, 
 
g) Consistent implementation of the possibility to include 
non-Council members in the deliberations of the Council when 
these concern those Member States (articles 31 and 32 of the 
Charter), 
 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000258  007 OF 007 
 
 
h) More structural consultation with Member States when the 
SC discusses resolutions that require implementation by the 
Member States. Although the recommendations are non-binding, 
such consultations should be obligatory. This concerns in 
particular the work of the subsidiary organs of the Council, 
) 
I) Expand consultation and cooperation with regional 
organizations and countries in the region, not only in 
thematic, public meetings, but also in private meetings, 
 
j) Consistent consultations with potential TCC's in the early 
phase of a new operation, and regular substantive meetings 
during ongoing operations. TCC's to be invited to private 
meetings of the SC in which the mandate of a Peacekeeping 
Operation is discussed. Open participation in the SC Working 
Group on Peacekeeping Operations, 
 
k) A permanent member of the Security Council using its veto 
should explain the reason for doing so at the time the 
relevant draft resolution is rejected in the Council and a 
copy of the explanation should be circulated as a Security 
Council document to all Members of the Organization. 
 
- Options 4.J, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 are: mutually exclusive 
 
- Options 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 are mutually exclusive and apply 
only with respect to option 4.1. 
KHALILZAD