VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0255/01 0801041
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201041Z MAR 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3951

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000255 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KUNR UNGA
SUBJECT: USUN CONCERNED WITH UN ACTIONS IN ALGIERS PRIOR TO 
AND FOLLOWING DECEMBER 11, 2007 ATTACK ON UN 
PREMISES/BRAHIMI PANEL WILL NOT ESTABLISH ACCOUNTABILITY 
FOR UN'S OPERATIONAL SECURITY FAILURES 
 
1.(U) USUN has had informal discussions with UN staff, 
including Diana Russler (pls protect), from the Department of 
Safety and Security (DSS) regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the December 11, 2007 bombing of the UN field 
office in Algiers that killed seventeen (17) people. These 
conversations have also addressed the "Independent Panel on 
Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises," (Brahimi 
Inquiry) led by Lakdar Brahimi, which was established by the 
Secretary-General (SYG) in response to the bombing. Russler 
 
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expressed her concern that the Terms of Reference (ToR) for 
the Brahimi Inquiry does not include a mandate to establish 
accountability for possible security failures relating to the 
bombing. The United Nations Staff Union has expressed the 
same concern in a letter to the SYG dated February 22, 2008. 
See para 10 for text of letter from the UN Staff Union to the 
SYG. 
 
2.(U) Russler stated that she had expressed concerns with the 
actions of the UN and UNDP regarding security at the UN field 
office in Algiers both prior to and following the bombing. 
Russler stated that prior to the bombing, the UNDP Resident 
Coordinator (RC), Mr. Marc de Bernis, ignored threat 
assessments and reports warning of a possible attack from a 
DSS security officer in Algiers, Mr. Babacr Ndiaye (who was 
killed in the bombing). Russler also stated that the U/SYG 
for DSS, Mr. David Vaness, coordinated with UNDP to draft a 
confidential preliminary report for submission to the SYG. 
 
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She said that this confidential report omits analysis from 
the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) and 
others within DSS, and also sought to deflect accountability 
for the security failures in Algiers from DSS, UNDP and the 
Algerian Government. Russler told USUN that U/SYG Vaness 
stated that he will resign if he and/or DSS is blamed for the 
Algiers bombing. This confidential report, which was 
apparently leaked to the Washington Times, states that the UN 
did in fact receive advance warnings of an impending attack 
from Mr. Ndiaye. See para 6. 
 
3.(U) UN RECEIVED WARNINGS OF ATTACK ON UN PREMISES IN 
ALGIERS. Russler stated that the DSS security officer in 
Algiers, Mr. Babacr Ndiaye of Senegal, issued several threat 
assessments and other reports to the UNDP RC, Mr. Marc De 
Bernis, in which he warned of the high probability of an 
attack on the UN premises in Algiers. Russler stated that 
reports issued by Mr. Ndiaye included specific 
recommendations to raise the threat level from Phase One (the 
lowest threat level) and to install retractable 
metal-barricades to protect against car bombings. Notably, 
both the SYG and the UNDP Administrator have stated in the 
media that no one in the Organization received any advance 
warnings from "whatsoever sources on this issue." 
 
4.(U) Russler stated that DSS retrieved Ndiaye's laptop and 
safe contents from the attack site. Included in these 
materials are copies of the threat assessments and other 
reports that Ndiaye sent to the UNDP RC in Algiers and to DSS 
at UN Headquarters in New York. Russler stated that she will 
only share copies of these materials with the Panel 
established by the SYG. 
 
5.(U) U/SYG VANESS'S CONFIDENTIAL REPORT TO THE SYG: Russler 
stated that after the attack, she was tasked with drafting an 
initial confidential report for submission to the SYG. 
Russler stated that her draft report sought to establish 
preliminary accountability for the operational security 
failures in Algiers. Russler stated that U/SYG Vaness, in 
coordination with UNDP, subsequently "gutted" the report of 
much of its substantive analysis and removed sections which 
sought to establish initial accountability within DSS and 
UNDP. Russler stated that when U/SYG Vaness submitted his 
revised report for clearance to the Inter-Agency Security 
Management Network (IASMN), the IASMN refused to clear on the 
draft because it was "a piece of crap." Russler stated that 
U/SYG Vaness disregarded the edits and recommendations 
submitted by IASMN and submitted the report as revised by him 
and UNDP directly to the SYG without IASMN clearance. 
 
6.(U) A copy of this confidential preliminary report has 
apparently been shared with the Washington Times. In an 
article dated March 14, 2008, the Washington Times reports 
that the preliminary report states that "The hostile intent 
against the UN in Algeria was present and well-known before 
the attack" and that "six months before the attack, 'the 
media branch for (Al Queda in the Maghreb) issued a direct 
threat against the U.N." Furthermore, the Washington Times 
article states that the preliminary report states that "care 
has been taken not to apportion blame or responsibility." 
 
7.(U) SYG ESTABLISHES PANEL TO BE LED BY LAKHDAR BRAHIMI. The 
"Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and 
Premises" was established by the SYG to review security 
 
 
 
 
arrangements around the world. The Panel is led by Lakhdar 
Brahimi and consists of the following five (5) members: 
Elsayed Ibrahime Elsayid Mohamed Elhabbal (Egypt); Anil Kumar 
Gupta (India); Unit Pamir (Turkey); Thomas Boy Sinabde (South 
Africa); Margareta Wahlstrom (Sweden). The Brahimi Inquiry 
began its work on March 1, 2008. Russler stated that the ToR 
for the Brahimi Inquiry were ostensibly drafted by the 
Algerian government and expressed her concern that the ToR 
for the Brahimi Inquiry do not include an element of 
accountability for the Algiers bombing. The Brahimi Inquiry 
will not examine the facts of the UN security situation in 
Algiers prior to the bombing with a view to establishing 
accountability among DSS, UNDP, and/or the Host Country. 
Instead, the Brahimi Inquiry will conduct a global 
examination of security threats to the UN more generally. 
 
8.(U) The UN Staff Union has echoed the concern expressed by 
Russler. In a letter from the Head of the Staff Union, Mr. 
Stephen Kisambira, to the SYG dated February 22, 2008, the 
Staff Union "express its alarm and disappointment that you 
appear to have no interest in seeking a determination of 
accountability or the 11 December 2007 terrorist attack on 
the United Nations premises in Algiers." (See para 10 for 
full text of letter from Staff Union to SYG). 
 
9.(U) In the aftermath of the Canal bombing in 2003, SYG 
Annan established the "Independent Panel on the Safety and 
Security of UN Personnel in Iraq". Per the recommendation of 
this Panel, SYG Annan subsequently established the "Security 
in Iraq Accountability Panel" (SIAP) to undertake an 
independent audit and accountability procedure to review the 
responsibilities of key individuals in the lack of preventive 
and mitigating actions prior to the attack on the UN 
Headquarters building in Baghdad. SIAP specifically sought to 
"identify individuals in HQ and in the field who were 
responsible for the managing and monitoring of security of UN 
personnel and property in Baghdad and make findings whether 
they should be held accountable by the Secretary-General." 
The report of SIAP was widely regarded as responsible, 
unbiased and transparent. The findings of the first Panel 
established by SYG Annan led to the overhaul of the UN's 
security apparatus and the establishment of DSS. The Algiers 
bombing was the most deadly attack directed against the UN 
since the establishment of DSS. The bombing revealed 
significant shortcomings in the UN's operational security 
framework. Based on the testimony from individuals within DSS 
and reports in the media concerning security failures in 
Algiers, the ToR for the Algiers Panel does not contain an 
accountability mechanism similar to what was established by 
SIAP so that security lapses in security can be addressed and 
responsible individuals can be held accountable. 
 
10.(U) Text of letter from Mr. Stephen Kisambira, President, 
United Nations Staff Union to Secretary-General Ban, February 
22, 2008. Begin letter text: 
 
Dear Mr. Secretary-General, 
 
The United Nations Staff Union wishes to express its alarm 
and disappointment that you appear to have no interest in 
seeking a determination of accountability or the 11 December 
2007 terrorist attack on the United Nations premises in 
Algiers. During a press conference on 7 January 2008, you 
were asked whether you thought it was "imperative for the 
credibility of the United Nations that there will be an 
independent investigation that is not being done by the 
person who was in charge of security to see whether security 
procedures w ere actually followed." Your response was, "I 
will see; I will reserve my judgment until I have a full 
report from DSS." 
 
Following the receipt of the "full report from DSS," which 
specifically did not seek to establish accountability, on 14 
January 2008 you were quoted in the media as saying "We are 
now going to try to find out more facts, and it's not only 
limited to the Algiers case" and that "We'd like to engage 
other member states, and other international experts on this 
issue, and try to find out ...what we can do more to 
strengthen our measures against all these possible attacks 
against the United Nations." 
 
We fully agree that it is imperative to "find out more facts" 
and to "do more to strengthen run measures against all these 
possible attacks." We would expect the involvement of the 
staff in such measures. On 5 February 2008, however you 
appointed chairperson to lead a panel to review United 
Nations security worldwide in response to the attack in 
Algiers, without the involvement of staff. We find it 
disturbing that on such an important matter no consultations 
with the staff were made prior to the announcement. There are 
many questions regarding the appointment of the panel and the 
 
 
 
 
definition of its terms of reference that must be answered 
before staff can find it acceptable. The panel, as presently 
announced, raises issues regarding lack of accountability and 
possible conflicts of interest. 
 
We implore you to direct that the team led by Mr. Brahimi 
also examines, under its terms of reference, lapses in the UN 
security system which may have led to an increase in the loss 
of life in Algiers on 11 December 2007, compared to the loss 
of UN staff at the Canal Hotel attack in 2003. 
 
Following the Canal Hotel attack your predecessor 
commissioned the "Report of the Independent Panel on the 
Safety and Security of the UN Personnel in Iraq" to, inter 
alia, "examine the adequacy of UN security policy, management 
and practices in Iraq prior to the attack." This report 
recommended that "In the case of Iraq, the Panel believes 
that the seriousness of the breaches in the security system 
by the UN managers in charge at Headquarters and in the field 
warrants the setting up of a separate and independent audit 
and accountability procedure to review the responsibilities 
of key individuals in the lack of preventive and mitigating 
actions prior to the attack on 19 August." 
 
Your predecessor acted on this recommendation, and created 
the Waltzer Panel which in fact found that several UN 
officials were responsible for their lack of preventative and 
mitigation actions. We respectfully request that you direct 
the Brahimi Panel to have the same responsibility that was 
given to the Waltzer Panel. Unfortunately the impression 
created by your public statements and those by your 
Spokespersons is that the Brahimi Panel will not examine the 
facts of the United Nations security system prior to the 
Algiers bombing, but rather will be a global examination of 
security threats. While there is merit in such an 
examination, it must not be allowed to overshadow the 
imperative question of accountability or Algiers. 
 
On 10 January 2008, you stated to representatives of Member 
States that you "will work to deliver results; to create a 
stronger UN through full accountability of all parties." By 
avoiding the question of accountability for security failures 
in Algiers, you are not following your own words, and you are 
not leading by example. On 4 February 2008, you stated that 
your "overall goal is to develop an accountability framework 
that outlines clear roles, responsibilities and authorities 
for all levels and stakeholders of the Organization." 
 
We believe that without accountability there is impunity. We 
ask that you not be complicit in a cover-up of what happened 
prior to the 11 December attack. The staff is sick and tired 
of the impunity extended by the office of the 
Secretary-General to senior managers for their failings 
 
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especially in situations where it has led to death and 
disability. We request for an immediate and public 
clarification of your intentions. 
 
Please accept, sir, the assurances of our highest 
consideration. End letter text. 
KHALILZAD