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O 261045Z MAR 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8552
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8080
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9788
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RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1949
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 6543
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 000440 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: EXPLAINING MA'S 
VICTORY 
 
REF: TAIPEI 00421 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  The KMT's Ma Ying-jeou won a 
record-breaking 58.4 percent of the votes in Taiwan's 
presidential election on March 22, beating the ruling DPP 
candidate Frank Hsieh, who took 41.6 percent of the vote 
(Reftel).  Most observers here place the major responsibility 
for the defeat on President Chen, whose family and some high 
officials  have been embroiled in corruption controversies 
since 2005.  Some experts caution against viewing the results 
as a rejection of Taiwan independence or as an affirmation of 
Ma's accommodating cross-strait policies.  The outcome also 
represents a genuine "victory" for Ma, who capitalized on 
personal popularity and a strengthened KMT campaign 
performance that focused on the economy.  The DPP is expected 
to enter into a struggle over leadership, party line and 
future direction, while the KMT has an opportunity to offer 
reconciliation and try to heal the social divisions resulting 
from a hard fought campaign.  Most are hopeful Ma's victory 
will lead to cross-Strait progress, but note it is up to 
Beijing to decide how to respond to Ma's moderate overtures. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  A broad range of prominent local and international 
experts analyzed the results and implications of Taiwan's 
March 22 presidential election at several post-election panel 
discussions attended by AIT.  The following summarizes some 
of the more interesting views that experts expressed about 
the reasons for Ma's decisive victory and the implications 
for domestic politics, cross-Strait relations, and 
U.S.-Taiwan relations. 
 
A Referendum on President Chen... 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The KMT's Ma Ying-jeou scored a decisive victory 
over DPP candidate Frank Hsieh in the Taiwan presidential 
election on March 22, winning by a margin of 58.4 - 41.6 
percent of the votes (Reftel).  Observers here note that this 
election is the latest in a string of defeats for the DPP 
since 2005, when President Chen's family and some senior DPP 
officials first became embroiled in corruption cases.  They 
place the major responsibility on Chen for the DPP defeats, 
including Hsieh's electoral loss.  In their view, the 
balloting on March 22 was a clear repudiation of the 
president by a public dissatisfied with the government's 
management of the economy and promotion of 
ideologically-charged partisan politics.  However, many local 
commentators, especially those with pro-Green views, caution 
against viewing the election as a rejection of Taiwan 
identity or independence, or as an affirmation of Ma's more 
accommodating cross-Strait policies, noting this was more a 
vote against the DPP than a vote for the KMT and its 
policies. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Hsieh, who faced an uphill battle, is generally 
seen as doing as well as could be expected under very 
unfavorable circumstances.  Under Chen the DPP failed to 
enlarge its base of support.  In part because of the 
corruption problems and KMT attempts to recall or force him 
to resign, Chen moved away from the political mainstream to 
embrace more extreme pro-independence initiatives.  This 
damaged the attractiveness of the party to many voters by 
giving the impression that the administration was not taking 
seriously their genuine economic and social-welfare concerns. 
 A normally unified party, moreover, was racked by fissures 
resulting from a highly contentious primary campaign in the 
spring of last year.  Some also fault Hsieh for running an 
overly negative campaign and point out he was not a very 
proactive campaigner, making many fewer public appearances 
than Chen did when he was the candidate. 
 
...And a Vote of Confidence for Ma 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The election outcome also represents a genuine 
 
TAIPEI 00000440  002 OF 004 
 
 
"victory" for Ma, who was able to capitalize on his personal 
popularity and a strengthened campaign performance by the KMT 
focused on the economy.  Some experts say the KMT led by Ma 
has changed in some key aspects from what it was eight years 
ago.  It has successfully moved away from core 
pro-unification ideals to accommodate the preferences of the 
mainstream Taiwan majority, effectively neutralizing the 
DPP's efforts to play the Taiwan-identity card.  Ma, with 
widespread personal appeal as a clean and moderate 
politician, is a much stronger candidate than Lien Chan was 
in 2000 and 2004.  After 15 years of division, the pan-Blue 
camp learned that disunity helped only the DPP, and it fully 
unified behind Ma.  The KMT also ran a well-organized, 
effective campaign that showed creativity and reduced the 
advantage previously held by the DPP in this area. 
 
Political Trends Underpinning the Results 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Ma won by an impressively large margin, which had 
already been presaged in the results of local and legislative 
elections since 2005.  Those elections showed overall support 
for the KMT had risen from approximately 50 percent to 
perhaps slightly under 60 percent.  Some argue the shift 
began with Ma's election as KMT chairman in 2005 and 
accelerated when corruption scandals involving Chen's family 
and staffers that began to surface later that year.  The 
overall vote share for the DPP dropped from about 50 percent 
in 2004 to around 40 percent in the 2005 local and 2008 
legislative elections, a decline of 8-10 percent.  Much of 
that decline shifted to the KMT, but some was a result of 
light Green voters sitting out elections. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The independent voters that largely have swung in 
support of the KMT over the past few election cycles are a 
heterogeneous group, ranging from white-collar middle class 
professionals who vote on issues to working class people who 
lack strong party identification and are more susceptible to 
mobilization.  One scholar suggested many of these 
independent voters live in central Taiwan, a key battleground 
where the KMT made large gains.  Compared to 2004 when Chen 
narrowly won central Taiwan, Hsieh lost this area by an 
overwhelming number of votes.  Also notable was Ma's ability 
to erode the DPP's vote share in southern Taiwan, winning the 
larger cities of Kaohsiung, Tainan, and Chiayi and reducing 
the DPP majority in the five largely agricultural counties of 
Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Pingtung, which Hsieh 
won by only a small margin. 
 
Referenda Concerns 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  The failure of the two UN referenda to meet the 
participation threshold required for validation (50 percent 
of all eligible voters) is seen by some as detrimental to 
Taiwan's democratic development because it diminishes the 
effectiveness of national referenda as one of the important 
tools for determining public policy.  The DPP's 
politicization of referenda degrades their value.  In 
addition, some are concerned that the international community 
may misinterpret the failure of the UN referenda. 
 
Implications for Taiwan Democracy 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  The free, fair and clean election showcased 
Taiwan's vibrant democracy, experts agree.  Some invoke 
Harvard professor Sam Huntington to suggest that the second 
transfer of power between political parties signifies Taiwan 
is transitioning from a young to a "mature" democracy. 
Independent voters played a pivotal, healthy role, and chose 
to vote based on the issues and their everyday concerns, 
rather than the more partisan ideological politics and agenda 
setting by the political parties and media.  Hsieh and the 
DPP, furthermore, took the loss graciously, affirming the 
results as the will of the people and a personal failure for 
Hsieh but a success of the democratic process.  Ma's wide 
margin of victory and the KMT's earlier overwhelming victory 
 
TAIPEI 00000440  003 OF 004 
 
 
in the January legislative elections give Ma a strong 
mandate, but the public will now hold the KMT fully 
accountable for the future performance of the government. 
 
Implications for Domestic Politics 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  After experiencing the latest in a string of 
electoral defeats, the DPP will undergo a period of 
introspection and, perhaps, reform, several experts believe. 
While the breakup of the party remains only a remote 
possibility, the coming months are likely to see a heated 
debate over party line between moderates and independence 
fundamentalists and also a power struggle as the party 
prepares to hold an election in late May for party chairman. 
In the short-term, some say, the deep Green could hold the 
upper hand and the DPP may move to consolidate its base 
before attempting to move back toward the center to prepare 
for the next local elections slated for late 2009.  Some 
point out the DPP still represents 42 percent of the voters 
and the party could return to power in four years if the KMT 
runs into corruption problems or Ma's cross-Strait policies 
do not win support from the Taiwanese majority. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Ma has an opportunity to lead Taiwan toward 
national reconciliation, putting in the past the highly 
charged politics of the Chen era.  Some say Ma could help 
this process by reaching out to the DPP and independents, 
offering positions in the next administration and pardoning 
Chen if he is indicted and convicted after leaving office. 
The public will expect Ma and his administration to be more 
transparent in conducting business and deals with Beijing. 
Perhaps Ma's greatest challenge will be managing and 
balancing the competing interests of the party bureaucracy, 
the KMT Legislative Yuan (LY) caucus, and the executive 
branch.  Key tests for Ma will be his ability to check 
corruption and whether he follows through on pledges to 
appoint some politically independent professionals to 
positions in supervisory institutions such as the Control 
Yuan, Examination Yuan, and the Council of Grand Justices. 
 
Implications for Cross-Strait Relations 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Most local observers agree it is now up to 
Beijing to decide how to respond to Ma's moderate 
cross-Strait policies and statements.  Challenges Ma may face 
in dealing with China could include possible attempts by 
Beijing to further limit Taiwan's international space, 
conflicting signals from Beijing, reflecting differences 
within the Chinese leadership over how to engage Taipei, and 
Chinese reactions to Ma's criticisms of Beijing's poor human 
rights record.  The weakened position of the DPP could lead 
Beijing to think it will have greater leverage over Ma. 
Several experts suggest Ma cannot fulfill his cross-Strait 
promises without serious concessions and flexibility from 
Beijing.   China needs to react positively to Ma's overtures 
to show the Taiwan public that a more moderate approach can 
bring benefits to Taiwan.  Ma will also have to be careful to 
reassure the Taiwanese that moves to improve relations with 
Beijing will not "sell out" Taiwan to China.  Several experts 
suggest a unified front would strengthen Ma's bargaining 
position and hope he will consider the DPP's views while also 
balancing competing cross-Strait strategies from within his 
own party.  Others note that a stronger relationship with the 
U.S. and other "unofficial" partners would also improve 
Taiwan's position vis-a-vis Beijing. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Experts suggest that if Beijing is unable to move 
on cross-Strait relations with a Ma administration, then 
future prospects for progress will be even dimmer.  Regional 
and international politics, however, could complicate the 
process leading to a cross-Strait rapprochement.  Some note 
that U.S. arm sales to Taipei, the possibility of a 
U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement, and the improvement of 
U.S-Taiwan ties could make it more difficult for Beijing to 
make concessions.   Others argue that this would increase 
Taiwan's leverage but not necessarily block progress, a view 
 
TAIPEI 00000440  004 OF 004 
 
 
Ma and his closest advisers have favored. 
 
Implications for U.S.-Taiwan Relations 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Ma's victory could usher in an era of greater 
stability in northeast Asia, which would be welcomed by the 
U.S., most observers agree.  Ma could turn the triangular 
Beijing-Taipei-Washington relationship from a "zero sum" into 
a "positive sum" game.  The key is restoring trust, 
credibility, stability, and continuity to the U.S.-Taiwan 
relationship, which some suggested could be advanced by a Ma 
visit to Washington prior to inauguration.  If packaged as a 
move to enhance stability in the Taiwan Strait and a step to 
lay groundwork for future cross-Strait dialogue, Beijing may 
pull its punches in objecting to such travel by the 
president-elect, the experts maintain. 
YOUNG