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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 17 STATE 031896 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
BERN ALSO FOR LIECHTENSTEIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL
SUBJECT: PSI OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING IN LONDON, 
UK (FEBRUARY 4-6, 2008) 
 
 SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  The sixteenth Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting took place in London, 
UK on February 4-6, 2008.  Immediately following the OEG on 
February 7, the UK Ministry of Defense hosted an outreach day 
with six invited countries from the Gulf/Levant region. 
Information contained in this cable is provided for Posts, 
information and is not to be passed to non-OEG participant 
governments.  A follow-on cable septel will provide a 
non-paper to pass to host nation governments of all 
PSI-endorsing states to keep them abreast of developments in 
the PSI community. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
¶2.  Meeting Summary: UK hosted the sixteenth Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) Operational Experts Group (OEG) 
meeting in London on February 4-6, 2008.  All twenty 
participants in the OEG attended (Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, 
Singapore, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United 
States). Russia sent only a representative from its local 
embassy, claiming visa difficulties.  The OEG focused on 
three main objectives: reviewing the first five years of PSI 
and identifying challenges for the future; outreach to 
non-OEG PSI partners; and enhancing the operational momentum 
of PSI.  The agenda also included presentations and 
discussions on the 2005 SUA Protocol, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) amendment process, new national 
counterproliferation structures created to facilitate 
interministerial work within the Canadian government, a 
Germany-hosted PSI website, an update on the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), and the U.S.-hosted PSI fifth anniversary 
event planned for May 28-29 in Washington.  The OEG heard 
presentations from three invited industry organizations, 
including Lloyds Maritime Intelligence Unit, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), and Hutchinson 
Ports (UK) Ltd.  New Zealand distributed final copies of the 
PSI Model National Response Plan and countries were asked to 
describe their recent and planned outreach activities to 
non-OEG and non-PSI countries.  Finally, delegations received 
an update on future PSI exercises.  Break-out sessions were 
conducted on the legal, law enforcement, exercise and 
intelligence areas related to PSI.  New this time, the UK 
 
STATE 00031896  002 OF 017 
 
 
organized the first ever joint legal/law enforcement breakout 
group.  Items proposed by the U.S. included: a master PSI 
activities calendar to include exercises and outreach 
activities and the development of diverse unclassified PSI 
success stories for use at the PSI 5th Anniversary event in 
Washington, DC to be held May 28-29, 2008. For further 
detail, see Chairman's Statement in para (10). 
 
¶3.  Delegation:  The U.S. delegation was led by Richard 
Douglas, OSD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats. 
The delegation included representatives from the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (Policy and General Counsel), the 
Department of State (ISN), the Joint Staff (J5 and Legal 
Counsel), U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. 
Pacific Command, U. S. Strategic Command, the Department of 
Homeland Security (Customs and Border Protection and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Department of Energy, and the Defense 
Intelligence Agency. 
 
¶4.  Introduction: Dr. Kim Howells, Minister of State of the 
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, welcomed PSI Operational 
Experts to London on February 4, 2008.  The OEG was chaired 
by Commodore Simon Williams of the UK MOD.  Dr. Howells 
suggested three primary areas for the OEG to consider: 
identifying priorities for future work based on an analysis 
of the successes achieved to date; outreach to countries that 
support PSI but that do not participate in the OEG; and 
renewed operational and practical work. 
 
¶5.  The OEG Process - 5 Years On:  A key objective of the 
London OEG was to assess the first five years of PSI.  OEG 
participants discussed PSI successes and the challenges to 
address for the future.  Presentations emphasized the notable 
growth of PSI - in the number of endorsing countries from 11 
at the start of the Initiative to over 85 presently - and 
identified key challenges including how to grow inclusively, 
how to sustain PSI,s momentum and how to adapt to the 
changing proliferation threat.  The ensuing discussion 
brought out a need to develop effective information 
strategies to various PSI audiences, including participants' 
own national governments, non-OEG PSI endorsing states, and 
media and the general public.  Delegations were encouraged to 
develop a diverse set of unclassified PSI success stories to 
complement those information strategies. 
 
¶6.  Outreach:  The second priority of the London OEG was to 
focus efforts on assisting non-OEG PSI partners' 
understanding of and capabilities to support PSI activities. 
Presentations offered specific suggestions that OEG countries 
 
STATE 00031896  003 OF 017 
 
 
could consider to maximize effectiveness of outreach 
activities.  Several delegations noted the need to increase 
coordination of outreach activities.  All countries made 
brief presentations on their recent and planned outreach 
activities. 
 
¶7.  Enhancing Operational Momentum:  The final objective of 
the OEG was to retrain the OEG's focus on operational 
progress.  In this vein, several topics were raised, 
including capacity-building and technical assistance, a 
password-protected website that Germany created, and 
improvements to national organization structures that 
facilitate whole-of-government support for PSI. Additionally, 
delegations heard updates on the 2005 Protocol to the 
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) and the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) amendment process.  The 
U.S. reminded delegations that the U.S. Executive Branch 
transmitted the 2005 SUA Protocols to the Senate in October 
2007 and announced that the first briefing on the SUA 
Protocol to Senate staff was provided on January 23, 2008. 
It was well-received, and the Senate staff members expressed 
interest in receiving further information. 
 
¶8.  Turkey offered insights into some of the difficulty it 
experiences as the recipient of frequent requests for 
interdiction assistance, noting a need for more and better 
information and longer lead times for decision-making and 
options development.  Turkey's intervention highlighted the 
perspectives of requested versus requesting parties in any 
interdiction case and the need for PSI partners to work 
together to devise mutually workable solutions. 
 
¶9.  The U.S. offered to do the following: (a) facilitate a 
virtual working group to coordinate outreach activities led 
by OEG countries; (b) collate responses to the legal 
non-paper on disposition and liability with a goal of 
creating a document that captures the OEG's understanding of 
the international and national laws that govern interdiction, 
disposition and liability; (c) host a conference and outreach 
event May 28-29, 2008 in Washington to commemorate the fifth 
anniversary of PSI; and (d) sponsor multi-day 
capacity-building workshops for non-OEG PSI partners. 
 
¶10. Begin Chairman's Statement: 
 
 
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT: PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE 
OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM 
February 4-6, 2008 
 
 
STATE 00031896  004 OF 017 
 
 
¶1. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational 
Experts Group (OEG) met in London, United Kingdom from 
February 4th - 6th, 2008.  Twenty OEG countries were present 
- Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
Welcoming Remarks 
 
¶2. DR Kim Howells, Minister of State, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, welcomed PSI Operational Experts to 
London. DR Howells stressed UK's commitment to countering the 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, their means of 
delivery, and related materials, and the key role that PSI 
plays in this work. He emphasized the importance that, after 
nearly five years of work, the Group should develop fresh 
ideas to take its work forward. DR Howells identified three 
areas in particular where he believed there was scope for 
continued and vitalized development: fresh priority work in 
the future based on an analysis of the successes achieved to 
date; outreach to countries who support PSI but who do not 
participate in the OEG; and renewed operational and practical 
work. 
 
The OEG Process - 5 Years on 
 
¶3. The Group reviewed the successes achieved by the OEG since 
it was launched in 2003, and the challenges and key 
priorities for the future. The UK and Greece gave overviews 
of what had been undertaken and achieved since the launch of 
the group, emphasizing the high-paced tempo it has adopted 
from the start, how the Group has acquired deeper 
understanding of the best ways to approach the multifaceted 
nature of interdiction work, and how it has broadened its 
activities to ensure comprehensive coverage of interdiction 
work. The OEG had also been active in capacity building (for 
example, the production of the Model National Plan - which 
Portugal offered to translate - and the WMD Handbook) and in 
adopting flexible working practices to respond to the dynamic 
evolution of the proliferation threat. 
 
¶4. The US, New Zealand and Poland set out the challenges and 
key priorities for the future. The principal challenges were 
seen as maintaining the success of the initiative whilst 
stimulating its increasing membership, sustaining the 
momentum of work, and adapting to new developments in the 
proliferation threat; the key priorities were seen as being 
to regionalize and deepen outreach, to align the exercise 
programme with prioritized operational issues, to develop 
knowledge using new tools. Turkey stressed the importance of 
 
STATE 00031896  005 OF 017 
 
 
accurate and timely intelligence-sharing, as well as 
adherence to the principle of control at origin. The OEG 
needed to remain alert to any need to develop fresh avenues 
of work, for example in identifying the scope for new 
elements of international legislation and new policy 
initiatives; there was also a need to develop a comprehensive 
media and public relations strategy to ensure that PSI was 
better understood by opinion formers and the wider public. 
 
¶5. During the discussion some countries proposed a range of 
ideas which might contribute to increasing the effectiveness 
of the PSI, for example Regional OEGs, working groups or a 
focal point. 
 
Outreach 
 
¶6. The United States and New Zealand gave presentations on 
the opportunities and challenges of outreach to non-OEG PSI 
endorsees. It was emphasized that the OEG operates on behalf 
of all endorsing States, and that the priorities for outreach 
to these endorsing States should be: to improve their 
knowledge and dispel the myths of PSI; to improve Partners, 
capacity to contribute effectively to PSI 
counter-proliferation efforts and interdictions, in 
particular in linking agencies across Government to handle 
and respond to requests for assistance. It was noted that it 
would be important to vary the type of capacity building 
offered to Partners, and to ensure that there were regular 
opportunities for dialogue, including through 
regionally-based outreach. Equally, it was recognized that 
outreach was resource-intensive and that OEG Participants 
should look to combine their outreach efforts. New Zealand 
circulated both hard and e-copies of the finalized PSI Model 
National Response Plan as well as a 10-page summary of it. 
 
¶7. A number of OEG Participants briefed on their recent 
outreach activities. Poland briefed on the outreach 
undertaken as part of Exercise EASTERN SHIELD in 2007, and 
the seminars in the Black Sea and Gulf regions; further 
activity was being planned for 2008, including an exercise in 
Croatia. France briefed on Exercise GUISTIR, which took place 
in Djibouti, March 10-12 2008; this to include a seminar 
followed by a LIVEX, and its main aim would be outreach to 
Maghreb and Red Sea countries. Japan briefed on the outreach 
elements of Exercise PACIFIC SHIELD 07, which involved 
outreach to PSI Partners from Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and 
Europe, as well as to non-PSI endorsees; all parts of the 
exercise were fully open to all countries and the media, to 
allow a high level of discussion between those involved. 
Turkey briefed on Black Sea security, setting out a number of 
maritime security arrangements and initiatives in the region, 
 
STATE 00031896  006 OF 017 
 
 
including BLACKSEAFOR, Operation Black Sea Harmony, and 
Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field 
in the Black Sea. 
 
¶8. Australia briefed on its outreach activity in the 
Asia-Pacific region, highlighting the need to have a good 
understanding of individual non-OEG Partners' concerns. 
Table-top exercises were seen as good outreach vehicles, in 
particular because they demonstrate the need for an 
inter-agency approach. Equally, outreach on PSI should be set 
in the wider context of maritime security. 
 
9 In a Tour de Table, other OEG Participants briefed on the 
outreach activities they had undertaken recently, and their 
future plans. A recurrent theme was the need to co-ordinate 
PSI outreach activity with broader export-control and 
counter-proliferation outreach activities. 
 
Enhancing Operational Momentum 
 
¶10. In this session, the UK introduced its thoughts on 
enhancing operational momentum through presentations on the 
lessons process and the experience of HM Revenue and Customs 
in PSI. The UK offered to "streamline" the lessons database. 
We need to make sure that in operationalising PSI we achieve 
the aims of deterring proliferators. 
 
Capacity Building/Technical Assistance 
 
¶11. Australia updated the Group on the progress made by ICAO 
on the proposal to create a new transport offense for the 
carriage of WMD and related materials by air. A draft text to 
support this proposal had been circulated, and was being 
considered by a special sub-committee in Montreal in February 
¶2008. Australia asked states to discuss the text and consult 
with relevant national authorities, prior to the Montreal 
meeting. Outreach to the Air Transport industry, both 
internationally and nationally, was being considered. The UK 
gave a presentation on its experience of establishing a 
Competent Authority for obtaining Flag-State consent for 
at-sea boarding under the Protocol to the Convention on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea, setting out the 
information a Competent Authority would need in order to come 
to rapid decisions on consent, and the parallels with the 
system already in place for granting boarding consent under 
counter-narcotics legislation. 
 
National Organization 
 
¶12. Canada provided an update on its national CP coordination 
structure, which had been instrumental in facilitating strong 
 
STATE 00031896  007 OF 017 
 
 
interagency coordination and cooperation on the full range of 
CP issues and activities. Turkey briefed on the establishment 
of a national Naval CBRN detection team, which would be used 
to augment maritime boarding teams. Singapore briefed on the 
changes to their Strategic Goods (Control) Act which come 
into effect in January 2008, to allow all items controlled 
under the four international export control regimes to be 
covered in its national legislation; outreach to Singaporean 
industry had been conducted as part of the programme of 
implementation of these amendments. 
 
Classified OEG website 
 
¶13. Germany briefed on the development of a classified PSI 
website, which would provide access to a full range of PSI 
tools, including OEG points of contact, a master event list, 
OEG Chairman's statements, PSI Law Library, the PSI Model 
Response Plan, and the Exercise Lessons Learned. 
 
Updates 
 
¶14. The UK updated the Group on the work being undertaken by 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Proliferation 
Finance. Work was being undertaken to develop a typology for 
Proliferation Finance, which was due to be finalized in June 
2008; this would form the starting point for future guidance. 
In the longer term, FATF would undertake work on broad-based 
prohibitions, which would be informed by the conclusion of 
the work on typologies. Furthermore, the Plenary meeting of 
FATF in February 2008 would discuss adding Proliferation 
Finance to the Task Force's regular mandate. 
 
Break-Out Group Reports 
 
OEG Legal Breakout Session. 
 
¶15. Presentations were given by: 
 
-- Greece on the implementation of the SUA Protocols in the 
Greek legal system. 
 
-- Japan on domestic legal issues highlighted by their 
Pacific Shield exercise. 
 
-- Australia on air transport offenses in relation to 
possible amendments to the Montreal Convention which would be 
discussed further in ICAO in two weeks' time. 
 
-- The US on the overflight consent matrix; its domestic 
implementation of the 2005 SUA protocols and Law of the Sea 
Convention; the PSI Law Library; its non-paper on 
 
STATE 00031896  008 OF 017 
 
 
interdiction, disposition and liability; and its views on 
liability incurred during maritime interdictions. 
 
-- The UK on the Super gun case. 
 
-- The Greek presentation on the implementation of the SUA 
Protocols generated lively discussion on its liability 
provisions in article 8bis(10)(b). A number of countries 
explained that liability issues still remained for them. 
 
¶16. It was agreed that the US non paper on the International 
Legal Framework for Interdiction, Disposition and Liability 
circulated at the Rhodes OEG provided a useful framework for 
PSI partners to set forth domestic considerations they may 
have with regard to interdiction, disposition, and liability. 
 The US agreed to collate any responses with a goal of 
creating a document that captures the OEG's understanding of 
the international and national law that governs interdiction, 
disposition and liability. 
 
OEG Law Enforcement Breakout Session 
 
¶17. Presentation on a new type of procurement network from 
the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. OEG law enforcement 
group learned about a new type of procurement method using 
Internet mail forwarding companies, originally set up for 
legitimate purposes, that use virtual offices for reshipping 
schemes to enable proliferators to evade export controls. 
Proliferators can place orders for controlled items 
manufactured in the US and arrange for shipment to the US 
mailing address for the virtual office. Goods are 
photographed and placed on a password protected website 
enabling the proliferators or foreign clients to view the 
items in the first instance.  Goods are then shipped to 
overseas addresses evading export controls and foreign import 
restrictions.  To date, this system has identified goods such 
as missile & electronic components & conventional firearms 
procured using this system. 
A variation on this scheme has been identified whereby the 
virtual office clones a manufacturer's website and adds its 
own company name as a legitimate distributor for the 
manufacturer's goods. When the manufacturer "googles" and 
checks the company name it will come up as a legitimate 
distributor for type of goods concerned - due to the cloned 
website. 
 
¶18. Presentation on the UKs UNSCR Enforcement Plan. 
 
-- UK's presentation focused on 3 specific areas: 1) the 
development of an Iran action plan 2) risk profiling and 3) 
the identification of high risk dual use goods for export. 
 
STATE 00031896  009 OF 017 
 
 
 
-- The action plan was developed to ensure implementation of 
UNSCRs and at the same time assess HMRC's current activity 
and capability in this area.  The plan involved the 
development of a risk picture using a systematic method of 
capturing information on entities dealing and exporting high 
risk goods to Iran and known diversionary countries from a 
variety of different sources.  A list of UK companies was 
formulated & risk assessed for visits by compliance officers 
- focusing on non compliance with export controls (e.g. lack 
of understanding through ignorance) to deliberate attempts to 
evade controls. Work is still ongoing and results are yet to 
be assessed but the plan has placed a greater UK compliance 
focus and tightening of controls on goods exported to Iran. 
 
-- Complementing the compliance plan, UK discussed the 
conduct of an exercise last year focusing on 2 key risk areas 
: 1) aircraft parts to Iran 2) selected CN Commodity Codes on 
the EU dual use list correlation table. Automated risk 
profiling was used and results were encouraging; over 200 
consignments were inspected and 8% of these warranted further 
investigation. 
 
¶19. The group discussed pros and cons of automated profiling 
noting in particular the importance of officers' own 
initiative when profiling. Automation was no substitute for 
this. Also, it cannot target goods in transit nor does it 
allow for the checking of all relevant documentation 
concerning the movement of goods. On the positive side it 
allowed for new risks and profile changes to be made quickly 
and allowed Customs Officers to be deployed on other work. 
 
¶20. In summary, OEG LE members felt that whilst the use of 
traditional customs techniques based on customs data can be a 
good profiling tool that yielded positive results, it was no 
substitute for enforcement activity predicated on quality and 
specific intelligence. That said, countries acknowledged the 
importance of profiling work and focused exercises from time 
to time, as it enabled law enforcement agencies to 
concentrate on areas that for a variety of reasons, might 
lack enforcement attention. 
 
-- One OEG member is currently developing risk analysis tools 
to help tighten export controls - using details of end users, 
brokers, suspect end users and exporters. 
 
¶21. Joint presentation from Norway and UK - very recent case 
study concerning dual use goods to Iran demonstrating 
excellent cooperation between Norwegian, British and third 
country authorities. 
 
 
STATE 00031896  010 OF 017 
 
 
-- The investigation concerned the procurement of 14 
gyrocompasses capable of being used as internal components of 
ballistic missiles. The goods, manufactured in France, were 
exported from the UK to Iran - some via Norway and an attempt 
to export the items via a third country without requisite 
export licenses. The investigation resulted in the successful 
prosecution of the UK proliferator who is currently awaiting 
sentence and a criminal investigation in Norway against a 
customs agent which is yet to be concluded. Importantly the 
case resulted in the recovery of 9 of the items although 5 
did in fact successfully reach Iran. An interactive session 
considered the differing export control interpretations 
between countries and licensing regimes, investigative 
options open to the investigators during the lifecycle of the 
investigation and transshipment powers. Both UK and Norway 
posed whether the case could be deemed successful given the 
fact that 5 items did get through to a country of concern. 
 
-- OEG LE members concluded that it was a success; the fact 
that a proliferation network had been identified, had been 
successfully prosecuted and shut down and nearly 70% of the 
gyrocompasses were prevented from reaching their ultimate 
destination was testament to this. Celebration and 
publication of successes were also important deterrent tools 
for governments and it was important for law enforcement to 
use these where possible. Analysis of the case did identify a 
disconnect between Intelligence and Law Enforcement channels 
- the speedy dissemination of intelligence was crucial to 
allow Law Enforcement officers sufficient time to assess 
whether time critical enforcement action was feasible. In 
this case, it was arguable that information could have been 
passed from Customs to Customs using mutual assistance 
agreements; this would have speeded up intelligence flows. 
However, an important point was the fact that an interdiction 
made by one Customs Authority (which involved initiative and 
tenacity on the part of its officers) was passed on to other 
affected customs authorities in a timely manner. This 
stimulated a short debate on licensing authorities and the 
benefits that might be derived from up-skilling their 
officials in law enforcement requirements as an aid to 
enforcement action - in particular the prompt sharing of 
information.  There was also a short debate on the issue of 
denial notices and the differing stances taken by OEG 
countries in relation to compliance visits undertaken to 
affected traders. 
 
Other issues 
 
¶22. The group briefly discussed whether or not there was a 
requirement for procurement typologies to be circulated 
within OEG countries.  This was considered problematic due to 
 
STATE 00031896  011 OF 017 
 
 
sensitive issues that were often intrinsically connected to 
investigations. 
 
¶23. An interesting presentation was conducted by the US 
Department of Energy in relation to non dual use listed 
commodities that were capable of having an application in a 
nuclear program and how the WMD handbook could be used to 
support PSI actions. 
 
¶24. The format of the law enforcement breakout differed from 
previous breakouts in that it did not include a common 
scenario but focused on a recent real life investigation that 
considered what went well, what went not so well, learning 
points and the importance of international collaboration. 
The UK questioned whether or not there was a continuing need 
for a common scenario and whether discussing real life cases 
was more beneficial. Participants were invited to provide 
feedback on the content and style of the breakout session for 
the next OEG in Paris. 
 
 
OEG Intelligence Breakout Session 
 
¶25. The intelligence Breakout Group addressed a variety of 
new challenges.  Partners were briefed on Iranian shipping by 
the United States and on developments in maritime and air 
transportation in North Korea by the United Kingdom.  The 
United Kingdom also briefed partners on new developments in 
commercial shipping. 
 
¶26. Partners were requested to consider the exchange of data 
on North Korean and Iranian shipping within existing 
international law, and to exchange data on a national basis 
in the interim. The UK agreed to put forward proposals with a 
view to this scheme being implemented by the next OEG. 
 
¶27. Australia briefed partners on national measures to assess 
risk in respect of Intangible Technology Transfer with 
particular references to visa applicants.  The United Kingdom 
provided partners with background material to be used, as 
required, in national and outreach PSI exercises.  Partners 
reviewed previous 'lessons identified', and agreed that those 
relating to the need for realistic intelligence play in 
exercises, and the importance of exchanging information in a 
timely and secure manner remained the most relevant. For the 
first time, Partners engaged in a "Red Teaming" exercise to 
identify future proliferation-related transportation trends 
over the next five years. All agreed that this was a success. 
Partners also identified a wide range of achievements by the 
intelligence breakout group, especially in relation to 
increased co-operation between the intelligence, and 
 
STATE 00031896  012 OF 017 
 
 
enforcement, communities; along with more realistic exercise 
scenarios. 
 
OEG Exercise Breakout Session 
 
¶28. Discussions in the Exercise Breakout centered around 4 
main topics: the PSI exercise schedule; the lessons 
identified; taking exercises forward and; exercise briefs and 
debriefs. 
 
Exercise Schedule: 
 
¶29. The schedule was updated.  Taking up the task from the 
main plenary discussion centered around expanding the 
exercise schedule to be a PSI Master Events List (MEL). There 
was consensus that this should be looked after by one country 
and be hosted on the PSI German website although it is 
recognized there will be a requirement for technical issues 
to be resolved. 
 
-- The MEL format should develop from the current version and 
should include OEGs, Exercises, Outreach and Industry Events. 
 Australia has offered to investigate co-coordinating the 
MEL, and will liaise with OEG states in the lead-up to the 
Washington 5th year anniversary meeting. 
 
¶30. Lessons: 
 
-- The UK introduced the lessons database noting that a lot 
of issues discussed in main OEG plenary were contained on the 
database.  The UK asked nations to consider the usefulness of 
the database including its format and discussion centered 
around breaking out Strategic, Operational Tactical lessons; 
differences between Land, Air and Maritime and; incorporation 
into exercises. 
 
-- There was also discussion about how to share lessons and 
promulgate them to other OEG products like the MNRP.  The UK 
will refresh the database on an inter-sessional basis and 
discuss how to make it more accessible to other OEG nations 
and evaluate its use in developing capacity in other nations. 
 
-- Nations were asked to continue to review the Lessons 
database and to prioritize lessons. 
 
¶31. Exercises: 
 
-- The US introduced incorporation of PSI into existing 
exercises to efficiently strengthen non-proliferation, 
national capacity and promote outreach. This effort must be 
carefully crafted so as not to interfere with larger non-PSI 
 
STATE 00031896  013 OF 017 
 
 
exercise goals or dissuade participating nations based on 
political sensitivities. 
 
-- Australia gave a presentation on the use of table top 
exercises which the group saw had great utility.  Further 
discussion highlighted the need to maintain the panoply of 
different exercises. 
 
¶32. Exercise Briefs: 
 
-- NZ gave a presentation on their forthcoming exercise MARU 
to be held in Auckland from 15-19 September 2008. Following 
on from a LIVEX, there will be a table-top exercise which 
will focus on disposition issues. It will also feature an 
outreach element. Japan and Poland debriefed their recent 
exercises Pacific Shield and Eastern Shield. 
 
¶33.  In summary the UK chair identified the following actions: 
 
-- Develop a Master Events List (MEL) (Australia). 
-- Develop the lessons database (identify top 15 lessons) 
(UK). 
-- Continue to address lessons in exercises (All). 
 
Law Enforcement/Legal Joint Breakout Session. 
 
34 Presentations were given by: 
 
-- The UK on the results from the intelligence as evidence 
questionnaire.  It was agreed that the work was useful but so 
far only eight responses had been received.  Delegates were 
urged to provide their response to the UK in time for the 
next OEG when a more meaningful analysis can be given. 
Canada said that they were awaiting the results of a 
Government Inquiry into the Air India case which could have 
an impact on their current perspective. 
 
-- New Zealand on the offenses in the SUA Protocol and the 
challenges that they present for a potential prosecution, 
especially in relation to dual use goods.  This sparked an 
interesting debate on how PSI partners would implement the 
Protocol in domestic legislation, especially considering the 
different legal systems that applied. 
 
-- The UK on a recent prosecution for a trafficking and 
brokering of arms offense for which a UK national pleaded 
guilty and was subject to a custodial sentence and 
confiscation order representing his benefit from the trade. 
The presentation highlighted the importance of information 
sharing with foreign partners even where no formal legal 
agreements were in place and the importance of inter agency 
 
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co-operation.  Without this the prosecution could not have 
taken place. 
 
5th Anniversary meeting 
 
¶35. The US gave a presentation on the forthcoming 5th year 
Anniversary meeting of PSI in Washington on May 28 and 29. 
The first day will be a substantive conference of all PSI 
states, with participation at deputy foreign minister level. 
The second day will comprise a PSI outreach workshop at 
expert-level. The first day will assess the first 5 years of 
PSI and look ahead at ways to strengthen the initiative, 
outreach being a major feature of this. The second day will 
combine efforts to support PSI activity by all endorsees as 
well as increasing support for the initiative by 
non-participants. 
 
Preview of next OEG meeting 
 
¶36. France provided further detail on their offer to host the 
next OEG meeting in Paris from 24-26 September. This OEG will 
follow on from the London OEG and the Washington 5th year 
anniversary meeting, and will coincide with France's 
presidency of the EU. 
 
Industry Outreach Workshop "Trust and Innovation" 
 
¶37. As part of the OEG meeting, an Outreach Workshop with 
industry was held. 
 
-- Poland, Norway and Denmark gave presentations on their 
recent activities in outreach to their national industries. 
Poland had held a PSI Industry Day in January 2008, which had 
included representatives from shippers, haulers and air and 
sea port authorities. The outreach covered international 
legal instruments, export control legislation, transfers of 
intangible technologies, and the PSI principles. Norway had 
developed a "Prevent Programme" industrial outreach strategy, 
which included visits to industry, and educational 
programmes, such as export control seminars. Denmark gave a 
two-fold presentation on industry outreach.  The first part 
touched on the importance of preventing proliferation at the 
earliest time possible by performing outreach to industry 
involved in production, development, research and export. 
The latter part showing an example of dialogue and 
co-operation with the transportation industry, once goods of 
proliferation concern have entered into the transportation 
industry segment. 
 
-- A representative from Lloyds Maritime Intelligence Unit 
gave a presentation on Information Flows in Shipping. 
 
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Shipping information assists maritime domain awareness and 
should be seen by business as a facilitator rather than a 
drain on resources. The global Automated Identification 
System would be a major step forward in generating this 
domain awareness. Equally, there needed to be trust between 
Government and industry to provide the confidence that 
sensitive information passed by industry would be treated 
appropriately. Suppliers should be given incentives to 
provide information, for example by granting fast-track 
clearance, or official validation. 
 
-- A representative of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) gave a presentation on developments in 
International Maritime Security. The IMO Diplomatic 
Conference in 2002 agreed to strengthen maritime safety and 
security including detecting and deterring acts that threaten 
security. Co-operation between the IMO and the International 
Labour Organization has resulted in a joint code practice on 
security in ports; equally, co-operation between the IMO and 
the World Customs Organization had brought Governments and 
business together to discuss security and safety. It was 
important that Governments now moved forward to ratify the 
2005 Protocol to the Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts at Sea, incorporate the offenses into national 
legislation, and established a national Competent Authority 
for granting Flag State consent for boarding. There was 
already a potential source of best practice on granting Flag 
State consent in the work undertaken to implement Article 17 
of the 1988 Vienna Convention. 
 
-- A representative of Hutchinson Ports (UK) LTD gave a 
presentation on Supply Chain Security. The information flows 
that support supply chain security bring not only commercial 
and national security benefits, but also bring commercial 
efficiency benefits in terms of inventory management and 
asset utilization. The International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code was an important tool for improving port 
security and in encouraging the monitoring of what was coming 
into ports. Other important data supplies could be obtained 
from radiation detection systems and container imagery; these 
sources of information would be enhanced through extended 
data integration. 
 
¶38. ANNEX:  SUMMARY OF OEG ACTION ITEMS 
 
The OEG Process - Five Years On 
 
Participants are asked to: 
 
a) work up examples of successes and benefits of PSI that 
could be released to the public, especially examples that 
 
STATE 00031896  016 OF 017 
 
 
could be used at the Washington 5th anniversary meeting. Such 
examples would be useful in outreach and in getting other 
countries to endorse PSI. It was agreed that there was no 
single metric of success: examples of success could include 
specific interdictions, or improvements to national 
capacities and capabilities; 
 
b) Organise a workshop to develop a PSI media strategy, 
including messages for think tanks, international 
organizations and academics, as well as for non-endorsees and 
the wider public. This workshop should reflect input from 
Participants' own media or communications experts; 
 
c) give consideration through the Legal Experts to whether 
there were opportunities to strengthen the existing 
international legal framework relevant to PSI actions and its 
implementation; 
 
d) review the trial classified OEG website hosted by Germany 
and make comments and recommendations. 
 
e) provide feedback and updates to the Flag State consent and 
Technical Verification capabilities matrices to Singapore. 
 
Outreach 
 
Participants are asked to: 
 
a) develop a Calendar of outreach activities for 2008 in time 
for the Washington High Level Political Meeting. This should 
be done through the website being developed by Germany; 
 
b) contribute to a small virtual Working Group established by 
the US to develop a strategy for outreach to non-OEG 
endorsees, including how OEG Participants might combine their 
efforts, and giving particular attention to the knowledge 
base amongst some PSI Participants and the need to address 
how Participants might handle and respond to requests for 
assistance in an interdiction. Such a strategy should address 
how Participants could pool their strengths to make outreach 
most effective; 
 
c) make an outreach event part of the standard structure of 
future OEG meetings; 
 
d) give further consideration to regional OEG meetings. 
 
Industry Outreach: "Trust and Innovation" 
 
Participants are asked to: 
 
 
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a) take steps to promote timely ratification of the 2005 
Protocol to the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts at Sea; 
 
b) consider how industry may be encouraged to take a positive 
view of PSI activity, including through outreach activities; 
 
c) take forward Government-Industry PSI exercises. 
 
End Chairman's Statement 
 
 
POINTS OF CONTACT 
----------------- 
 
 
¶11.  Please slug responses for OSD GSA (Beth Flores) and 
State/ISN/CPI (Carlos Guzman). USG POC for PSI Operational 
Experts Group issues is Beth Flores, OSD/GSA. USG POC for 
operational legal matters is Chip Wedan, DOD/OGC. USG POC for 
PSI policy issues is Carlos Guzman, State/ISN/CPI. 
RICE