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DE RUEHC #4257/01 0672255
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 072250Z MAR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 9935

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 024257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KGHG SENV ENRG EUN
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON U.S.-EU CLIMATE CHANGE COOPERATION 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request for posts in EU Member 
States and USEU.  Please see para 10. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: The March 13-14 meeting of the European 
Council, which will bring together European heads of state 
and government, will include a major discussion of climate 
change and energy.  The purpose of this demarche is to inform 
that discussion by underlining the importance of continued 
U.S.-EU cooperation in achieving a practical, global, and 
environmentally effective outcome in both the Major Economies 
Process and in the UN Framework Convention negotiations.  The 
Major Economies Leaders Statement in July will play a key 
role in helping ensure a successful outcome for COP-15 by 
addressing key elements of the Bali Action Plan.  Before the 
Heads of Government meeting next week, the United States 
wishes to send a clear signal to the EU and its member states 
that their calls for Annex I Parties cutting emissions by 
25-40 percent as a group will undermine our shared goal of 
broadening international participation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In order to build on the positive momentum from the 
January 30-31 Major Economies Meeting in Hawaii, it is 
important to be practical and recognize the different 
circumstances of countries in meeting the climate challenge. 
Deputy National Security Advisor Dan Price, CEQ Chairman Jim 
Connaughton, and Special Envoy to the EU Boyden Gray visited 
Paris, Berlin, and London February 24-27 to discuss 
cooperation on climate change.  The U.S. officials told 
European interlocutors that setting an impractical goal for 
the next round of UNFCCC negotiations would not only be a 
recipe for public failure, but would also raise the prospect 
of driving major developing countries such as China and India 
- whom we and Europe have a mutual interest in attracting to 
post-2012 arrangements - from participating in such 
arrangements. 
 
¶4. (U) Recent meetings underscored that many in Europe are 
not aware of the substantial new actions embodied in the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.  The United 
States now has eight mandatory programs. The mandates 
embodied in these programs represent a bipartisan consensus 
in the United States, and include: 
 
-- Renewable fuels - 36 billion gallons or roughly 15 percent 
of fuel supply by 2022 
-- Vehicle Fuel Economy - 40 percent by 2020 to 35mpg (miles 
per gallon) 
-- Lighting Efficiency - 25 to 30 percent improvement by 
2012-2014, 70 percent by 2020 
-- Appliance Efficiency - 45 new standards 
-- Federal Government Operations - 30 percent efficiency 
improvement and 20 percent renewable fuel use by 2015 
-- Accelerated Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC) Phaseout 
-- Renewable Power - 26 states 
-- Building Codes - Federal government promoting new 30 
percent model code 
 
(NOTE: Whether and how such mandates, some of which relate to 
state - rather than federal - action, could be reflected in 
an internationally binding commitment is still to be 
determined. END NOTE). 
 
¶5. (U) U.S. investments in energy technology research have 
increased from $1.7 billion in 2001 to over $4 billion per 
year and, as a result of the 2005 Energy Bill and FY08 
appropriations, there is now $38.5 billion per year available 
for federal loan guarantees to promote the deployment in the 
United States of clean energy technology.  The United States 
is joining the UK and Japan in contributing to a Clean 
Technology Fund that will help to bridge the financing gap 
towards deploying clean energy technology in developing 
countries. 
 
¶6. (U) The United States supports all major economies having 
nationally determined mid-term goals that are reflected in 
binding international commitments. 
 
-- Such goals should be supported by national plans 
sufficiently detailed to provide measurable, reportable, and 
verifiable means of achieving the goals. 
-- Allowing Parties to determine their own mid-term goals 
will further important objectives with respect to a post-2012 
outcome.  It will promote the Bali Plan of Action's emphasis 
on "nationally appropriate" actions.  In addition, it will 
make it more likely that we can attract broader participation 
and build a global, comprehensive post-2012 outcome. 
 
STATE 00024257  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Recent developments indicate that the European Union 
may, in upcoming negotiations, press other developed 
countries ("Annex 1 countries" under the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change) to take on similar absolute 
reductions to which the EU has committed; namely 20 to 30 
percent by 2020 or 2025.   For example, the EU in conclusions 
to Bali post-Kyoto negotiations pressed to highlight 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) language 
suggesting that Annex 1 countries must collectively reduce 
their emissions by 25-40% by 2020 in order to achieve the 
lowest greenhouse concentration levels assessed by the IPCC. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Most other large developed countries (e.g. 
Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States) start from a 
different baseline than the EU (due in good part to 
fortuitous structural changes in the German and United 
Kingdom economies before Kyoto was negotiated), and cannot as 
a practical matter meet the type of collective targets the EU 
appears to be calling for.  For example, achieving a 25 to 40 
percent reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels would 
require roughly a 50 percent reduction in US emissions 
compared to a business as usual scenario.  Even the most 
aggressive bills on Capitol Hill (including those supported 
by current Presidential candidates) envisage a return only to 
1990 levels by 2020, and other compromise bills envision a 
more gradual constraint.  U.S. national circumstances differ 
substantially from those of Europe in other ways as well. 
Between now and 2050, our population is expected to grow from 
300 to nearly 450 million.  The population of the EU25 (EU 
Member States excluding Bulgaria and Romania), on the other 
hand, is expected to fall from a peak of 470 million in 2025 
to about 450 million by 2050, according to Eurostat. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Many EU member states appear not to recognize that 
by insisting that other developed countries take on similar 
targets to the EU-wide commitment, the EU would be applying a 
more stringent standard to non-EU states than it is to its 
own member states.  The EU is meeting its current targets by 
means of a region-wide reallocation (the so-called EU 
"bubble") allowed under the Kyoto Protocol. The bubble is not 
a right automatically conferred on the EU under either the UN 
Framework Convention or the Bali Action Plan, but rather is a 
"flexibility mechanism" agreed by Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol.  The "bubble" has allowed EU member states to meet 
the overall 8 percent reduction target through a 
heterogeneous set of individual targets ranging from a 21 
percent reduction from 1990 levels by Germany to 27 percent 
increase by Portugal. 
 
¶10. (U) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests that Posts draw 
on the points below and engage host governments and the 
European Commission at an appropriately high level before the 
March 13-14 European Council meeting.  Posts should deliver 
the points orally. 
 
July Major Economies Leaders Statement 
-------------------------------------- 
 
-- We are pleased with the evolving cooperation on climate 
matters with EU.  The Major Economies meeting in Hawaii was 
an important step forward; our senior team, led by Deputy NSA 
Price and CEQ Chair Connaughton had productive meetings last 
week in Berlin, London, and Paris, where we underscored that 
it is crucial that the U.S. and EU work together if we are to 
achieve a post-2012 agreement that is both global and 
environmentally effective.  A strong Major Economies Leaders 
Statement in July will increase our chance of success within 
the UNFCCC by addressing some of the key elements in the Bali 
Action Plan.  We believe the most important deliverables for 
a July Leaders Statement are: 
 
-- A commitment that each major economy is prepared to 
reflect its nationally determined mid-term GHG reduction 
goal(s) in an internationally binding form. 
 
-- We are interested in achieving agreement on the concept of 
making a commitment - not the content, which should be 
negotiated after the July Leaders Statement in the UNFCCC. 
 
-- The United States is flexible on the content and timing of 
those commitments, but believes that there needs to be 
commitment for every major economy, even though the content 
of these commitments will vary. 
 
-- In addition, such commitments should be supported by 
national plans sufficiently detailed to provide measurable, 
reportable, and verifiable means of achieving the goals. 
 
-- In order to promote, rather than deter, broad 
 
STATE 00024257  003 OF 003 
 
 
participation in a post-2012 agreement, we should allow 
Parties to determine their own mid-term goals and reject 
trade or other sanctions to enforce compliance. 
 
-- Agreement (by the G8) to assist in funding dissemination 
of  clean technology needed by developing countries achieve 
their mitigation goals as expressed in the post-2012 
agreement and linked to an agreement (by all) to eliminate 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to clean energy goods and 
services. 
 
-- A shared long-term goal for reducing greenhouse gases that 
is supported by all of the major economies. 
 
-- Agreement on the importance of (and a template for) 
sectoral approaches, both national and cooperative, including 
technology roadmaps, shared standards and goals. 
 
-- Recognition of the importance of enhancing work in the UN 
and elsewhere on measurement and accounting at the facility 
or enterprise level, so we can assure that progress is being 
made and commitments honored - and that Bali's mandate that 
all mitigation be measurable, verifiable and reportable is 
met. 
 
-- Recognition of the importance of addressing deforestation 
and its key sources, such as illegal logging. 
 
Mid-term Targets 
---------------- 
 
-- Within the EU, there is considerable variability in 
expectations of member state targets by 2020, in recognition 
of different national circumstances both during the 1990s and 
since 2000.  The EU was allowed this flexibility as part of 
the Kyoto Protocol "bubble", so that different member states 
- which are themselves parties to the UNFCCC - could work 
toward different targets in light of their specific 
circumstances. 
 
-- This is a pragmatic approach, and one that the EU needs to 
bear in mind as it characterizes its expectations of the 
effort for other Parties.  The U.S. and other developed 
countries are prepared to be ambitious, but neither we nor 
any other major non-EU developed country will be in a 
position to meet anything close to a minus-20 target by 2020, 
compared to 1990 levels. This is also the case with a number 
of EU member states, which are themselves Parties to the 
UNFCCC.  Without an internationally-recognized EU-wide 
target, most EU member states could not cut their emissions 
by 20 percent without transferring billions of euros via 
international offsets. 
 
-- If the EU establishes unrealistic expectations for 
developed country mid-term targets (e.g., 25 to 40 percent 
cuts for Annex I Parties by 2020, compared to 1990 levels), 
it will tend to undermine, rather than support, an approach 
that brings the major economies together to move forward on 
this issue. 
 
-- Furthermore, we should not focus solely on one pathway for 
emissions reductions.  The IPCC Working Group III 
contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report includes 177 
scenarios, and the EU has chosen one of the most extreme. 
 
-- The U.S. is eager to work with the EU in finding a way to 
express a shared long-term goal for reducing greenhouse gases 
that is supported by all of the major economies, as well as 
developing sectoral approaches that will broaden 
international participation. 
RICE