VZCZCXYZ2664
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRH #0371/01 0651259
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051259Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7890
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000371 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018 
TAGS: KIRF KISL PGOV PINR PREL PTER SA
SUBJECT: EP CLERIC,S CALLS FOR OPPOSITION GO UNHEEDED 
(C-CT7-00989) 
 
REF: A. 06 RIYADH 003889 
     ¶B. 06 RIYADH 3720 
     ¶C. 08 RIYADH 121 
     ¶D. 08 RIYADH 42 
 
Classified By: Consul General John Kincannon for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 18, 2008, in conjunction with 
local Ashura commemorations, Qatif-based Shi'a cleric Sheikh 
Nimr al-Nimr called for the formation of a "Righteous 
Opposition Front" to combat social corruption, the "religious 
clergy," and political injustice against Shi'a citizens in 
Saudi Arabia.  Though noted for his regularly strident 
language, al-Nimr's calls to "fight and condemn those who 
prevent us from practicing our faith" were extreme by even 
his standard and turned heads throughout the Eastern 
Province.  Over a month after al-Nimr's speech, there has 
been no discernible support for the Sheikh's comments.  Post 
contacts believe this is in part due to prominent sheikh 
Hassan al-Saffar's public urging of Saudi Shi'a to ignore 
al-Nimr's instigation and continue working within the 
institutions of the current state and regime.  In addition, 
al-Nimr reportedly received a visit from Saudi Ministry of 
Interior officials after his remarks.  While most local 
observers surmise that al-Nimr is too marginal a figure to 
catalyze a significant opposition movement, some caution that 
his words are piquing the interest of young men disaffected 
by a perceived lack of progress for the Saudi Shi'a. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
CALL FOR CREATION OF A "RIGHTEOUS OPPOSITION FRONT" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2. (C) The celebration of Ashura plays an important 
socio-religious role in Shi'a communities, not only as a 
spiritual event, but additionally as an occasion to renew and 
unify Shi'a identity.  This is particularly true for the 
Shi'a population of the Eastern Province (EP), as Ashura 
provides a way to assert community identity against the 
omnipresent overlay of Sunni governing institutions in Saudi 
Arabia.  Using Hussein's martyrdom at the hands of tyrants as 
a foundation, in a January 18th (9 Muharram) speech, Qatif 
sheikh Nimr al-Nimr called for the creation of a "Righteous 
Opposition Front" that would "fight and condemn those who 
prevent us from practicing our faith."  In a nearly half-hour 
long speech, the cleric said that courage and bravery are 
essential factors to fight oppression, tyranny and 
corruption, and asked, "How long will we continue to be 
victims and targets?"  Invoking the EP Shi'a uprising of 1979 
- sparked when the SAG violently prevented Ashura 
celebrations - al-Nimr stated that those who do not stand up 
in the face of aggression are destined for the fires of hell. 
 He added that this "wise" opposition front must be led by 
learned men of religion, and that he would be the "first man 
to put his name forward..." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
EFFECT OF HIS WORDS, AL-NIMR'S PLACE IN EP HEIRARCHY 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶3. (C) Although al-Nimr's words caused a stir in the broader 
Shi'a community of the Eastern Province, they do not seem to 
have engendered any significant measure of support.  Most 
observers feel that al-Nimr's impassioned calls for 
confrontation will go unheeded for two primary reasons, his 
marginality relative to the true leaders of the EP Shi'a, and 
SAG monitoring of the situation. 
 
¶4. (C) Despite previous reporting implying a connection 
between Nimr al-Nimr and Saudi Hizbollah, post has reassessed 
his role based on new information from contacts.  Post now 
regards him as being a hard-line, independent actor, not 
directly affiliated with either the Shirazi or Hizbollahi 
movements.  While the al-Nimr name is well-known within Qatif 
community, it is Sheikh Hassan al-Nimr, a distant familial 
relation to Nimr al-Nimr, who enjoys greater recognition and 
importance in the EP hierarchy.  Hassan was one of the 
religious leaders of the Saudi Hizbollah movement (Reftel A), 
and has participated in at least one previous National 
Dialogue session with the royal court.  Nimr al-Nimr derives 
his more limited following not from a broad political or 
religious following, but rather from the village of Awamiyya, 
known jokingly in the local community as "Little Fallujah," a 
reflection of its reputation as  the roughest and most 
violence-prone village of the Qatif-area.  Nimr al-Nimr 
serves as Imam in an Awamiyya mosque, and it was in the 
Karbala Square area of the village that he delivered this 
 speech. 
 
¶5. (C) In addition to his limited constituency, Nimr 
al-Nimr's message was quickly and significantly undercut by 
Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar, the leader of the Shirazis, when 
al-Saffar publicly rebutted al-Nimr's opposition movement by 
calling for Saudi Shi'a to continue to non-violently work 
with the mechanisms of the state to achieve reform (NOTE: 
Al-Saffar and Munir al-Khabaz are widely regarded as two of 
the most influential Sheikhs in the EP.  Al-Saffar is the 
most widely followed "political" Sheikh, while al-Khabaz is 
primarily apolitical, but is perceived as having great 
potential to ascend the Shi'a religious hierarchy. 
Additionally, contacts inform post that al-Khabaz is a Sayid, 
a direct descendent of the Prophet Mohammad. END NOTE). 
Since returning from exile in the mid-90s, Al-Saffar and the 
Islamic Reform Movement, also known as the Shirazis, have 
supported working with the Saudi regime to achieve Shi'a 
political goals, putting them at odds with Nimr al-Nimr.  It 
was the Shirazis who negotiated with King Fahd in 1993 for 
the return to the Kingdom of all Saudi Shi'a exiles, and the 
last 15 years have only seen the group consolidate its 
position of power within the community. 
 
¶6. (C) As evidenced by a 2006 incident in which Nimr al-Nimr 
was detained for four days upon entering Saudi Arabia after a 
short trip to Bahrain, the SAG closely watches the firebrand 
cleric (Reftel B).  Many local observers were surprised that 
al-Nimr did not go to jail for his call to action, but 
multiple Post contacts report that soon after his Ashura 
speech al-Nimr received a visit from an official from the 
General Intelligence arm of the Ministry of Interior 
(Mabahith).  The Mabahith supposedly told al-Nimr to end his 
calls for opposition or the SAG would act against him.  There 
has been little public mention of al-Nimr or his opposition 
movement since his 9 Muharram speech. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
FEARS THAT AL-NIMR MAY REACH DISAFFECTED YOUTH 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (C) While most observers were confident that al-Nimr's 
words would not amount to much, some did express concern 
that, in addition to his core supporters in the Awamiyya 
community, al-Nimr's zealotry would entice young people 
disaffected by a perceived lack of progress in gaining 
greater rights.  Dr. Sadek al-Jubran, commenting on the small 
clashes that occurred in the Rumailah village of al-Ahsa as a 
result of SAG repression of this year's Ashura, said that men 
such as those involved in Rumailah were encouraged by 
al-Nimr's talk of opposition (Reftel C).  Al-Jubran, a 
Shirazi and one of the leaders of the Hasawi Shi'a community, 
argued that al-Nimr is not as marginalized as others believe, 
and that in the face of stagnating rights and increased 
economic pressures, people might respond to the fervor of his 
words. 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT: Al-Jubran's argument is supported by the fact 
that in July of 2007, Sheikh al-Nimr led a delegation from 
Awamiyya in a meeting with Jiluwi bin Abdulaziz bin Musaad, 
Deputy Emir of the Eastern Province.  Al-Nimr participated in 
this meeting to discuss issues of poverty and housing in 
Awamiyya, and gained media coverage throughout the Shi'a 
community.  Likewise, al-Jubran's argument about external 
pressures affecting political/religious ideology is supported 
by the slight resurgence of Sa'ad al-Faqih, the London-based 
Salafi whose anti-SAG message has been linked to two recent 
mosque demonstrations.  Some believe that al-Faqih's message 
has regained a niche inside the Kingdom thanks to economic 
problems such as inflation (Reftel D).  While it is unclear 
how much support al-Nimr might garner among disaffected Shi'a 
or what may happen if the feeling of stagnancy continues 
and/or grows, it is clear that for now the most prominent 
voices in the EP Shi'a community believe it is in their 
interest to work with the SAG, and reject calls that may lead 
to conflict. END COMMENT. 
 
(APPROVED: KINCANNON) 
FRAKER