VZCZCXRO8574
PP RUEHGR
DE RUEHSP #0139/01 0782036
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 182036Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9058
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0156
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT OF SPAIN 000139 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EB/TPP, WHA/EPSC, WHA/CAR 
GENEVA FOR USMISSION TO WTO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EINV ECIN TD
SUBJECT: DEBATING THE EU-CARIFORUM TRADE AGREEMENT 
 
¶1. SUMMARY: A dynamic debate on February 29 about the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and CARIFORUM (CARICOM 
and the Dominican Republic) at the University of the West Indies 
(UWI) highlighted concerns about the lack of civil society 
involvement in negotiations, the inadequacies of CARIFORUM's 
negotiating mechanism, and the real and perceived asymmetries of the 
agreement. Participants also voiced concern that this agreement sets 
a precedent for future trade negotiations between the Caribbean and 
the U.S. END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. At a forum entitled "The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): 
Threat or Opportunity?" on February 29 at the University of the West 
Indies' (UWI) Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic 
Studies (SALISES), panelists and audience members raised several 
concerns about the EU-CARIFORUM trade agreement.  Panelists included 
David Abdullah of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (FITUN); Professor Norman Girvan of 
the Institute of International Relations at the University of the 
West Indies (UWI); Mr. Stylianos Christopoulos, Charge d'Affaires of 
the Delegation of the European Commission in Trinidad and Tobago; 
and Ms. Diane Seukaran, Former Minister in the Ministry of Trade and 
a member of the Trinidad and Tobago EPA negotiating team. The three 
subjects dominating the discussion were CARIFORUM's negotiating 
machinery, the asymmetrical nature of both the negotiations and the 
agreement, and the implications of this agreement for future 
Caribbean trade negotiations dominated the discussion. 
 
------------------------- 
A Role for Civil Society? 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. While audience members decried the lack of public debate during 
EPA negotiations, Seukaran and Abdullah defended the Ministry of 
Trade, stating that it did take steps to engage civil society in 
discussions.  Abdullah noted that FITUN participated in a trade 
negotiation advisory committee to the Ministry of Trade, but some 
unions may have been unable to articulate their positions because of 
a lack of resources.  He added that while there is a culture of 
negotiation in T&T, the formal system for civil society 
participation is inadequate.  Seukaran was far less accepting of the 
public's criticism, questioning why the public was only now becoming 
interested in the EPA, when it had had ample opportunity to engage 
in the debate during the negotiation process. 
 
¶4. According to Abdullah, although the Caribbean Regional 
Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) did engage civil society, the CRNM did 
not always fully consider civil society input in the later stages of 
negotiations, particularly with regards to the fast approaching 
deadline for concluding the EPA.  Girvan insisted the interests of 
exporters drove the negotiating process.  He pointed out that had 
CARIFORUM not concluded the EPA, the region's exports to Europe 
would have faced GSP tariffs, trade terms that would have negatively 
affected exporters.  He accused the CRNM of being reactionary and 
lacking strategic objectives to guide the negotiating process. 
Seukaran expressed concern about the inadequate communication 
between ministries affected by the agreement and noted that the flow 
of information must be improved, not only between ministries but 
between the GOTT and the public during the implementation phase. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Questioning the Negotiating Machinery 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. Calling the CRNM a "runaway horse", Seukaran stated she was at 
times ill prepared for negotiating sessions, often receiving 
information intended to inform discussions just hours before 
attending talks in Brussels.  Moreover, Seukaran did not believe the 
Trinidad and Tobago team was well equipped to address the challenges 
of negotiating with the EU.  She remarked that countries with far 
fewer resources than T&T, such as the Dominican Republic and Costa 
Rica, were better prepared for the negotiations.  Shirley Ann Clark, 
a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative and former negotiator 
for T&T at the WTO, echoed Seukaran's concerns about the failure of 
T&T to properly prepare its negotiating teams.  As a negotiator at 
the WTO, Clark said she felt particularly handicapped by what she 
identified as T&T's inability to define its trade interests. 
Without a clear outline of local interests, she found it difficult 
to advocate for T&T's national interests. 
 
------------------------------ 
EU Exploitation or Assistance? 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. A number of audience members criticized both the negotiating 
process and the agreement, perceived as favoring the EU.  Audience 
members implied and in some cases bluntly stated that the EPA was a 
 
PORT OF SP 00000139  002 OF 003 
 
 
throwback to colonial mercantilist practices.  At the same time, 
however, contributors complained that the EU was not providing 
enough development and implementation assistance to the region in 
return for liberalization. Girvan agreed with this latter criticism 
about the inadequacy of the agreement's provisions on development 
assistance to protect the region from exploitation.  Girvan also 
pointed to certain technical barriers such as rules of origin and 
professional services requirements which put Caribbean firms at a 
disadvantage in gaining access to European markets.  Further, Girvan 
claimed the agreement's intellectual property rights and labor 
stipulations, among others, signaled that the EU's primary goal was 
to maintain the competitiveness of its firms, not support the 
economic development of the Caribbean region.  One audience member 
was far more blunt, stating that the EPA was about "world 
dominance", not development. 
 
¶7. Christopoulos argued that the trade benefits of the agreement 
were marginal for the EU.  Instead of trade, he said the EU's 
motivations center around stability, security, and peace in the 
region.  Stability, he noted, is a precondition for trade and 
foreign direct investment. 
 
¶8. While not explicitly stating that the agreement was biased 
against T&T, Seukaran stated that as a donor, the EU inherently had 
an advantage in negotiations.  However, Seukaran did acknowledge 
that the EU entered EPA negotiations in order to comply with WTO 
requirements.  Further, she argued the EU does seek to maintain its 
competitive business markets just as T&T strives to ensure a 
competitive business environment for its firms.  Unlike Girvan, 
Seukaran did not cast this goal in a negative light, instead 
pointing to its rationality.  She noted that the Caribbean also 
needs to be WTO and WTO plus compliant in order to compete in the 
"real world". Finally, she highlighted that the "colonizers" are no 
longer the country's key competitors or trading partners, pointing 
instead to Brazil, China, and the ASEAN nations as being fierce 
competitors and key markets.  Agreeing with Seukaran, Christopoulos 
noted the importance of Caribbean competitiveness with respect to 
Brazilian and Chinese companies. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
EPA and Caribbean Regional Integration 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. Girvan noted that since neither CARICOM nor CARIFORUM had the 
authority to ratify the EPA on behalf of member states, the EPA was 
in effect a series of individual agreements with the EU.  In his 
assessment, this fact undermines regional integration and pits the 
CARIFORUM states against one another, each angling to be the first 
to ratify and offer the most progressive tariff schemes.  Abdullah 
questioned why such an agreement was feasible with an external 
party, such as the EU, when similar liberalization could not be 
achieved within the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME).  In 
Christopoulos' estimation, however, the EPA will assist CSME 
development by guaranteeing all CARICOM countries the same treatment 
within CARICOM as they have granted to the EU. 
 
--------------------- 
The Future of the EPA 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. While the EPA has been initialed by CARIFORUM, it has not been 
signed by Trinidad and Tobago or any other CARIFORUM state. 
Seukaran suggested that there is still time for national debate as 
T&T reviews the agreement.  In fact, she recommended that T&T delay 
the signing of the agreement, stating that the EPA is "a full but 
incomplete agreement."  Highlighting the binding nature of the 
agreement, Seukaran suggested that it is important for T&T to review 
all 1200 pages of the document to identify element for 
renegotiation. A representative from the Trinidad and Tobago 
Manufacturing Association agreed, suggesting that T&T needs to delay 
the signing in order to negotiate adjustments to the agreement and 
allow for "policy space".  (NOTE: The EPA was supposed to be signed 
in April 2008, but CARICOM leaders pushed this date back to June 
2008 at their most recent meeting in the Bahamas. END NOTE) Abdullah 
predicted that the EPA would fall apart as the FTAA had.  Regardless 
of how the debate proceeds, there was general agreement and clear 
concerns that the EPA sets a precedent for future CARICOM trade 
negotiations with both Canada and the U.S. 
 
¶11. COMMENT:  The initialing of CARICOM's first reciprocal trade 
agreement with a developed country trading partner has unleashed 
vigorous discussion about whether CARICOM is ready for it, along 
with currents of distrust for the EU and the Caribbean Regional 
Negotiating Mechanism (CRNM).  While the GOTT did not assume a high 
profile role in the EU-CARIFORUM negotiations, Trade Ministry Keith 
Rowley is publicly defending the agreement.  All signs point to 
 
PORT OF SP 00000139  003 OF 003 
 
 
Trinidad and Tobago signing the EPA and resuming its role as an 
instigator of CARICOM trade negotiations with other partners, 
starting with Canada and Central America. 
 
AUSTIN