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DE RUEHPO #0101/01 0711617
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O 111617Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0041
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 PARAMARIBO 000101 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS A. SHANNON 
DEPART FOR WHA/CAR VMDEPIRRO AND JROSHOLT 
SOUTHCOM FOR COMMANDER ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NS
SUBJECT: (SBU) SCENESETTER AND READ-AHEAD FOR THE VISIT OF 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS A. SHANNON AND ADMIRAL JAMES G. 
STAVRIDIS TO PARAMARIBO, SURINAME FRIDAY, MARCH 28, 2008. 
 
REF: 08 PARAMARIBO 95 
 
¶1. (SBU) THE FOLLOWING SCENESETTER IS A 
SENSITIVE-BUT-UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF REFTEL. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TRIP AGENDA:  Everyone at 
Embassy Paramaribo joins me in welcoming you to Suriname. 
Although we cannot yet confirm your appointment with 
President Venetiaan, who is out of the country, our tentative 
plan for your three-hour visit would include a short 
meet/greet with Embassy staff, a working lunch/Country Team 
briefing at the Embassy, and the afore-mentioned meeting with 
President Venetiaan (perhaps with other Cabinet Ministers 
present; decision is pending with the President). 
Time-permitting, we then propose two additional, separate 
meetings for Assistant Secretary Shannon: (1) Foreign 
Minister Kraag-Keteldijk and, (2) Religious Leaders of the 
Inter-Faith Council (proposed venue: the Central Mosque). 
For Admiral Stavridis, we propose meetings with (1) Defense 
Minister Ivan Fernald and, (2) Commander of the Armed Forces 
Col. Ernst Mercuur.  If any of the previously-noted Ministers 
is not available to meet, we would pursue meetings with other 
Ministers of interest to both Assistant Secretary Shannon and 
Admiral Stavridis, specifically, Health Minister Waterberg 
(USNS Comfort, MEDRETES, Beyond the Horizon, medical 
diplomacy) and Justice and Police Minister Santokhi (counter 
narcotics, money laundering, terrorism, trafficking in 
persons, regional security).  We expect media to be present 
for at least a portion of your visit, and will seek to invite 
them for any mosque visit.  Although we have discussed the 
above proposed agenda with the Foreign Ministry, further 
arrangements remain pending the President's decision.  We 
will provide briefing materials for all confirmed 
appointments via septel.  END SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TRIP 
AGENDA; FOLLOWING TEXT PROVIDES SCENESETTER INFORMATION. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Suriname Overview and International Relations 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Suriname, formerly know as Dutch Guiana and 
independent from the Netherlands since 1975, lies on the 
northeastern coast of South America.  It is approximately the 
size of Georgia, has a population of less than half a 
million, and has traditionally been the Dutch-speaking 
"misfit" of the Western Hemisphere.  A member of the UN, OAS, 
CARICOM, NAM, and the Islamic Conference, Suriname's 
political traditions, culture, history, and immigration tries 
are neither Spanish/Portuguese (like most of South and 
Central America), nor British/French (like most of the 
Caribbean).  Although migration trends, economic assistance, 
and remittances still keep Surinamers looking to the 
Netherlands (home to an estimated 300,000 Dutch/Surinamese), 
historic resentments and ethnic and cultural differences also 
mean that Suriname does not align easily with Europe. 
Consequently, it seeks to expand its ties with China, India, 
and Indonesia as part of a foreign policy initiative to 
reduce dependency on the Dutch. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  In the region, Suriname has received sustained, 
well-publicized medical assistance from Cuba, in part funded 
by Venezuela.  This very successful program seems to be 
helping Cuba and Venezuela gain popular support among 
ordinary Surinamers.  Surinamers enjoy good relations with 
Brazil and France (French Guiana), although a territorial 
border dispute remains with French Guiana.  More serious 
border disputes complicate Suriname's relationship with 
Guyana, and remain an emotional issue for many Surinamers. 
Given the tensions surrounding the borders, in March 2007 
Post worked with the State Department Office of the 
Geographer to ensure that all official United States 
Government (USG) maps of Suriname (which invariably depict 
the borders to favor Guyana and French Guiana) include the 
following standard policy disclaimer: "Boundary 
representation is not necessarily authoritative."  In part 
due to the border dispute, an anti-Guyana bias permeates 
Surinamese society. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
U.S. -Suriname Bilateral Relations 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Except in the 1980's when then-military dictator 
Desi Bouterse's friendly relationship with Daniel Ortega and 
Fidel Castro kept Suriname on the map of U.S. foreign policy 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000101  002 OF 004 
 
 
priorities, in recent years the country has received scant 
attention from U.S. policy makers.  Nor does Suriname receive 
appreciable development assistance from the United States. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  For its part, the Government of Suriname (GOS) 
often demonstrates a lack of affinity for USG foreign policy 
priorities.  For example, Suriname supports the one-China 
policy.  It refused to issue any form of pro-democracy 
statement after Raul Castro assumed power in February, 
instead sending a congratulatory note to the new leader.  Nor 
does the GOS support the USG position on Kosovo, despite the 
Embassy's best efforts.  Although the U.S. Embassy appears to 
enjoy some level of popular support among the people of 
Suriname, official USG-GOS relations are "cordial and 
correct,' but they are not "warm."  There are, however, two 
exceptions to this generalization: our defense relationship 
with the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Suriname Defense 
Forces (SDF), and with the law enforcement community of the 
Ministry of Justice and Police.  Not coincidentally, these 
are the only two Ministries that in the past could regularly 
count on USG development assistance (modest amounts of IMET, 
FMF, and INCLE).  The Embassy also has a strong relationship 
with the cultural community and Suriname's lone University. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Through our Embassy in Paramaribo, the USG's 
short-term goals in Suriname remain four-fold: strengthening 
the police and judiciary, helping professionalize journalists 
and the military, investing in people (including the fight 
against HIV/AIDS) and the environment, and encouraging 
measures to facilitate economic growth investment.  However, 
our longer-term strategic goal is to transform our bilateral 
relationship into an overall positive partnership whereby the 
United States can count on Suriname as a friendly partner (on 
a case-by-case basis) in international forums such as the UN 
and OAS, and Suriname can count on the United States to 
recognize that this tiny country can be relevant to U.S. 
strategic interests in both the Caribbean region and the 
South American continent. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Military Coups, Desi Bouterse, and the 
December Murders of 1982 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Independent in 1975, Suriname suffered military 
coups in 1980 and 1990; civilian rule was re-established in 
¶1992.  Under the control of Desi Bouterse, who led the first 
military coup, the military government executed 15 prominent 
citizens in 1982 for their opposition to the regime.  In 
early 2005 the Government of Suriname notified Bouterse, who 
remains active in politics and is a sitting member of 
Parliament, of its intent to prosecute him and 23 other 
suspects for the murders.  Begun amidst high societal tension 
in November 2007, the slow, legalistic pace of the trial, 
inter alia, has thus far diffused societal fears that the 
trial would be disruptive.  There have been four one-day 
sessions in four months, all procedural.  Bouterse stayed 
away, and vows to continue to do so.  If, however, a guilty 
verdict appears possible (perhaps late in 2008 or in 2009), 
tensions likely will rise. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Civilian Military Relations 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U)  Since military rule ended in Suriname, there has been 
a strained relationship between the civilian government and 
the armed forces.  In 1992, during President Venetiaan's 
first of three terms, the civilian authority took bold steps 
to strip the military of its overreaching constitutional 
powers, despite strong protest from the military.  Venetiaan 
and several of his close associates had been detained by the 
military during the military regime.  During Venetiaan's last 
term, his Minister of Defense was disliked by many in the 
armed forces who perceived him as unresponsive to their 
needs.  Since being installed three years ago the current 
Minister, Ivan Fernald, has been more engaged with members of 
the armed forces.  However, to date he has failed to bring 
much-needed resources and training, nor any noticeable change 
in civilian-military relations. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Criminal Activity Pervasive, Just Below the Surface 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000101  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶10. (SBU)  Although Suriname is not an openly violent 
society, the rule of law is nevertheless under threat. 
Suriname is a major transshipment point for South American 
cocaine en route to Europe and, to a lesser degree, to the 
United States.  The government's inability to control its 
borders and the lack of law enforcement presence in the 
largely unmonitored interior allow traffickers to move drug 
shipments via sea, river, and air with little if any 
resistance.  Suriname lacks the resources to properly equip 
the marine and air wings of its national military, which are 
responsible for protecting its borders--a mission which may 
be transferred to a yet-to-be established Coast Guard. 
 
Note: There is some skepticism amongst USG experts of the 
GOS's ability to stand up a Coast Guard.  The Embassy 
recently (March 2008) shared with the MOD the May 2006 US 
Southern Command- prepared assessment of the feasibility of 
establishing a Suriname Coast Guard.  Delay in providing this 
assessment to the GOS was due in part to uncertainty whether 
there was authorization to share such a frank assessment with 
the host government.  The report identified a series of 
problems in standing up a Surinamese Coast Guard, including: 
inadequate resources and legislation, complicated 
bureaucratic requirements, drug-related corruption, relative 
geographic isolation, and weak judicial institutions.  End 
note. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Economy Stable, but not Sustainable 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The United States remains Suriname's largest 
trading partner.  Largely thanks to high commodity prices, 
the Surinamese economy has stabilized over the last six years 
after the deep economic decline and high inflation of the 
late 1990's. However, the GOS has not implemented the reforms 
necessary to liberalize its economy and realize its full 
economic potential, particularly should commodity prices 
fall.  Income from the bauxite sector, dominated by SURALCO, 
a subsidiary of U.S. based ALCOA, accounts for more than 30% 
of GDP and about 60-70% of export earnings.  Higher world 
prices for gold have led to the increased value of Suriname's 
second-most mined mineral. Lumber, fishing, and agriculture 
are other major industries.  Three international oil 
companies, Occidental, Repsol YPF, and Noble Energy, have 
formed a joint venture with the state oil company, 
Staatsolie, to prospect offshore. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Internal Politics 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (U)  With an area previously noted as roughly equal to 
the state of Georgia and a population of only 492,000, 
Suriname is one of the least densely populated countries in 
the world.  It is an ethnically diverse land with people of 
East Indian, African, Indonesian, Chinese, and European 
descent whose constant wrangling for pieces of the pie color 
Suriname's economic and political atmosphere.  On May 25, 
2005, Suriname held its fourth successive free and fair 
election since the restoration of democracy.  President 
Ronald Venetiaan's ruling New Front coalition, which 
consisted of three ethnically-based parties and one labor 
union party, lost its simple majority in the National 
Assembly but still fell short of an effective governing 
majority.  To form a working majority, the New Front joined 
with a Maroon-based coalition (Maroon is the term to describe 
the descendants of escaped slaves) which had parliamentary 
seats for the first time, and with a one-seat progressive 
party.  Slowed by a bias for strong consensus and typified by 
a spoils-system favored by the entrenched ethnic parties, the 
government's "don't upset the apple cart" politics have not 
been a public relations success.  The often cynical 
Surinamese public gives the government extraordinarily low 
marks (one March poll indicated 90% of Surinamers don't want 
President Venetiaan back in 2010).  However, the government 
seems to have convinced the public that the turmoil an early 
transition of power to the opposition might cause would be 
worse than the current perceived stagnation.  Rare street 
actions attract few participants.  Presidential elections are 
next scheduled for 2010. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Visit of Assistant Secretary Shannon and Admiral Stavridis 
will demonstrate USG commitment to Suriname, and to the region 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000101  004 OF 004 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) We expect that your visit, albeit only 
hours-long, will demonstrate to President Venetiaan and to 
his Cabinet, the National Assembly, the Surinamese Military, 
and civil society that the United States has a strong 
commitment to this country, and to the region.  Your presence 
will provide an effective counterpoint to the high-level 
attention that Suriname already receives from China, 
Venezuela (President Chavez visited in 2000), and the ongoing 
success of Cuba's "health diplomacy" initiatives in Suriname. 
We welcome your visit. 
SCHREIBER HUGHES