Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08PANAMA220, PANAMA: IN WAKE OF PRD CONVENTION, PRIMARIES BEGIN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08PANAMA220.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PANAMA220 2008-03-13 22:33 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Panama
VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #0220/01 0732233
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 132233Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1831
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000220 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: IN WAKE OF PRD CONVENTION, PRIMARIES BEGIN 
IN EARNEST 
 
REF: PANAMA 206 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS Brian R. Naranjo.  Reasons:  1.4 (b), (c), and 
(d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) In the wake of the governing Revolutionary Democratic 
Party (PRD) March 9 convention, Panama City Mayor Juan Carlos 
Navarro acted quickly to launch his campaign to win the PRD's 
presidential nomination on March 12.  The convention left 
Torrijos in control of the party, though leftist or 
"tendencia" faction members lead by Minister of Housing 
Balbina Herrera made significant gains.  Seeking to forestall 
Herrera's entry into the PRD primary race, Navarro secured 
the visible support of President Martin Torrijos, most of the 
newly elected PRD National Executive Committee (CEN) members, 
and most of the city councilmen from Panama's two largest 
municipalities, Panama City and San Miguelito.  Meanwhile, 
across town on March 12, Herrera held a thanksgiving mass for 
her victory as PRD President at which she publicly 
acknowledged that she was considering whether to run for 
Mayor of Panama, as has been her public aspiration to date, 
or instead to run for President of the Republic.  Herrera 
said she would take forty days to listen to the desires of 
the "people" before deciding.  Should Herrera decide to run 
for president, this development could help encourage 
Panamenista presidential nomination candidate Marco Ameglio, 
who has long coveted the mayor's job, to walk away from his 
presidential campaign to run for mayor.  Martinelli and 
Patriotic Union (UP) continued to look for alliance partners. 
 May is shaping up to be a big political month when Herrera 
may decide to contest the PRD presidential nomination, the 
Panamenista field may thin out, and Martinelli, MOLIRENA and 
UP may lock down alliance partners. 
 
--------------------------------- 
PRD Convention Produces Mixed CEN 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) delegates held 
their eighth ordinary congress, or convention, on March 9 at 
Panama City's National Stadium.  Nearly 97 percent of the 
4,200 delegates elected on January 12 in a nationwide PRD 
poll turned out to vote to install a new National Executive 
Committee (CEN).  The following won election to seats on the 
CEN: 
 
-- President:  Balbina Herrera -- Minister of Housing, 
publicly declared as PRD candidate for Mayor of Panama City, 
but also prospective PRD presidential nomination candidate; 
 
-- 1st VP:  Elias Castillo -- National Assembly Deputy 
 
-- 2nd VP:  Benjamin Colamarco -- Minster of Public Works and 
former leader of the Noriega-era Dignity Battalions; 
 
-- SecGen:  Martin Torrijos -- President 
 
-- 1st Sub-Secretary:  Juan Carlos Navarro -- Mayor of Panama 
City and declared PRD presidential nomination candidate; 
 
-- 2nd Sub-Secretary:  Hector Aleman -- National Assembly 
Deputy and former Minister of Government and Justice; 
 
-- 3rd Sub-Secretary:  Pedro Miguel Gonzalez -- President of 
the National Assembly and subject of a U.S. federal 
indictment in connection with the 1992 murder of a U.S. 
serviceman in Panama; 
 
-- 4th Sub-Secretary:  Belgis Castro -- Minister of 
Education; and 
 
-- 5th Sub-Secretary:  Rodrigo Diaz -- private businessman. 
 
3. (C) The CEN election results are actually somewhat more 
mixed.  Generally, Herrera's allies on the CEN are considered 
to be:  Colamarco, Aleman, Gonzalez, and Castro; Balbina and 
these four presumed allies would be able to control the nine 
person CEN.  Colamarco and Castro, however, ran and secured 
their seats while running on Torrijos' ticket.  Castro is 
probably more of a swing vote who may lean slightly toward 
Herrera.  Gonzalez is something of an outlier whose 
sympathies generally lie with Herrera's views and positions, 
 
but who tends to operate independently.  Both Castro and 
Aleman won their CEN seats by comparatively thinner margins 
than other members, and Gonzalez's victory is to a large 
extent do the extremely weak field against which he ran. 
Aleman will most likely continue to be Herrera's closest ally 
and political soul mate.  Diaz, seen as a solid Torrijos 
supporter, was also one of Herrera's most important 
financiers in her race for PRD President.  Furthermore, in 
the PRD, the secretary-general seat, not the presidency, is 
the position that holds the most power and controls the party 
apparatus.  Torrijos has not convened the CEN much over the 
past five years, preferring instead to meet with various CEN 
members on a one-on-one basis or in smaller informal groups; 
post expects that Torrijos will continue to manage the CEN in 
this fashion.  In sum, while the make-up of the CEN is 
somewhat more leftist or "tendencia," in practice it remains 
to be seen whether there will be any new direction and 
Torrijos remains in control, along perhaps by a smaller 
margin. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Navarro Launches Campaign with Torrijos at Side 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4.  (U)  Wasting no time, Panama City Mayor Juan Carlos 
Navarro formally launched on March 12 his campaign to secure 
the PRD presidential nomination at his campaign headquarters 
in the working class Panama City neighborhood of Parque 
LeFevre.  In an unmistakable signal that Navarro would be the 
PRD "establishment" candidate, President Martin Torrijos 
accompanied Navarro on the stage, remaining with Navarro on 
stage for about the first five minutes of the rally.  Amid 
the clamor and hubbub of the rally, POLCOUNS had difficulty 
to distinguishing between Torrijos and Navarro as they were 
both dressed the same, their voices were similar and their 
addresses to the crowd were nearly identical; "Coincidence?," 
Panama City newspaper commented, regarding this difficulty. 
Also, on stage with Navarro and Torrijos were fellow CEN 
members Castillo, Gonzalez, Castro and Diaz.  Noticeably 
absent were Aleman and Herrera.  According to press 
reporting, the majority of the city councilmen for Panama 
City and San Miguelito -- the largest and second largest 
municipalities in the country -- were also present. 
 
5. (U) In a combative and partisan speech, Navarro vowed to 
continue the "good work" of the Torrijos Administration.  He 
said he would "maintain the economic policies that 
"guaranteed stability" in the country and "fiscal surpluses," 
as enjoyed over the past two years.  He also promised to 
promote greater decentralization.  A lifetime 
environmentalist, Navarro received a significant amount of 
applause for his promising to protect the environment, the 
degradation of which was effecting the well-being of the 
Panamanian people.  Additionally, he promised to strengthen 
education, fight crime, and increase general law and order. 
On the whole though, the speech was long on partisanship and 
short on policy substance. 
 
6.  (C) Navarro political advisor Ivan Gonzalez acknowledged 
to POLCOUNS on March 9 on the margins of the PRD convention 
that whatever pact had previously existed between Navarro and 
Herrera to support Navarro for the presidency and Herrera for 
the mayor of Panama City was now in a shambles.  Gonzalez 
said that Navarro had decided to move up his formal campaign 
announcement to March 12, and his team was already actively 
distributing campaign literature, hats, banners and other 
paraphanelia.  POLCOUNS saw Navarro's presidential campaign 
operatives out in force at the convention advocating for 
Navarro for the PRD presidential nomination.  Navarro told 
POLCOUNS on March 9 that he was ready for a tough PRD 
primary, believed he had the best campaign in the field, and 
enjoyed the support of Torrijos.  In an aggressive 
television, radio and newspaper advertising campaign 
immediately after the convention, Navarro emphasized that now 
that the PRD's internal election process was completed it was 
time for the party to unify (ostensibly behind him) to march 
forward toward his presidential victory in May 2009.  For her 
part, Herrera launched an advertising campaign primarily in 
newspapers that also call for unity but that do not mention 
her as a candidate for the PRD presidential nomination. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Balbina:  "I am at a Cross-Roads." 
---------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Herrera, as Navarro was across town launching his 
 
campaign, hosted March 12 a thanksgiving mass at the Saint 
Michael the Archangel Church in the Panama City slum of 
Calidonia.  To the press, she commented, "I am not sure 
whether I will stand for the Presidency of the Republic or 
the Mayor of Panama (City).  I am at a cross-roads."  Saying 
that she would take forty days before making her final 
decision, Herrera told the press, "I ask that God give me the 
ability to discern, the intelligence, wisdom, the 
understanding, and the ability to analyze to enable me to 
make the best decision for the country."  Looking to the 
heavens, she added, "It cannot be my personal decision." 
Herrera indicated that she would embark on a "listening" tour 
of the country to divine the "people's" intentions.  When 
calling back to confirm her acceptance of an invitation to 
lunch with Ambassador on March 27, a gleeful Herrera told POL 
Assistant, "You see. Nobody believed me.  They thought I was 
weak."  Asked when she might launch her campaign, Herrera 
stated, "We'll see. I'm still with friends and people in the 
business to see what they think." 
 
-------------------------- 
Panamenista Race Clarifies 
-------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Meanwhile, the Panamenista race might be narrowing to 
a three-way race with the prospect that Marco Ameglio would 
drop out of the race to secure the party's presidential 
nomination.  Increasingly, speculation on the street was that 
Ameglio, who had long coveted the Mayor of Panama City and 
who was trailing badly in the race for the Panamenista 
presidential nomination, would end his presidential run and 
declare instead for the mayoral race should Herrera announce 
her presidential, not mayoral, candidacy.  Former Minister of 
Health, political advisor to Panamenista presidential 
nomination candidate Alberto Vallarino, and close friend of 
Ameglio's, told Ambassador on March 6 that Ameglio and his 
extended family had gone on an extended vacation during which 
continuing his campaign for president (and funding it with 
the family's dairy wealth) would be debated.  Vallarino and 
Panamenista presidential nomination candidate Juan Carlos 
Varela separately told POLCOUNS that they were engaged in 
conversations with Ameglio to encourage him to exit the race 
and throw his support to them.  Recent polling by CID Gallup 
(reftel) indicated that Varela was the preferred option of 
Panamenista party members by a margin of two to one. 
Striving to prove he was more "electable" though, Vallarino 
entered into an agreement with former President Guillermo 
Endara (reftel), a long-time Panamenista but now the 
president of his own party, hoping to secure the support of 
Endara supporters in the Panamenista ranks and to demonstrate 
he was capable of forming an opposition alliance. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Martinelli: Live by the Poll, Die by the Poll? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
9. (C) "Martinelli always has a poll under his arm," Varela 
told the Ambassador on March 6.  Democratic Change (CD) 
presidential candidate Ricardo Martinelli polls constantly, 
often has different companies run essentially the same poll 
in parallel, and has made his sustained presence at the top 
of the polls as his main argument to urge opposition parties 
to get behind him if they want to unify for victory and as 
his main weapon against the Panamenista-preferred inter-party 
primary as the best mechanism to unify the opposition. 
"Inevitably, Ricardo's numbers will come down.  These other 
campaigns will begin taking up more political space," 
Martinelli political advisor Demetrio "Jimmy" Papadimitriu 
told POLCOUNS on March 5, "but it's hard to get him to really 
understand that."  Following the "Pacto Chame" between 
Vallarino and Endara (reftel), Martinelli redoubled efforts 
to form an alliance with the Movement of Liberal Republican 
Nationalists (MOLIRENA). 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Ford: Seeking the Best Deal for Patriotic Union 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
10. (C) According to press reporting, Patriotic Union (UP) 
President and former 1st VP Guillermo "Billy" Ford is in the 
midst of a round of meetings with Martinelli, Varela, and 
Vallarino regarding formation of an alliance.  Party co-VP 
Anibal Galindo is working closely with Martinelli, while the 
other co-VP Jose Raul Mulino prefers Vallarino.  Ford, who 
told State's visiting Director for Central American affairs 
on January 18 that he preferred an alliance with the 
 
Panamenistas appears to be sticking by his strategy to 
negotiate the best deal for UP. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (C) Panama's May 2009 elections are shaping up to be the 
most wide open since democracy was restored in Panama in 
December 1989.  There is no obvious PRD president contender, 
though Torrijos does appear to be starting now to try to 
catalyze a PRD consensus behind Navarro, the PRD's second 
best horse in the race, according to the polls, after Herrera 
who leads by a sizable amount.  Though the PRD is perhaps in 
its least unified state in recent memory, the opposition too 
is in disarray and appears to have few prospects to advance 
significant unification over the next four months. 
Panamenista candidates must register by early May to run for 
the party's presidential nomination, by which point Ameglio 
may have dropped out.  Out of desperation of slipping under 
the political waves, MOLIRENA is looking for an alliance 
partner, and Martinelli is courting them hard to close a deal 
before the end of May.  As for the Panamenista party, 
Vallarino and Varela are locked in a what will likely prove 
to be a long and expensive campaign, and both have to face 
the political reality that in general polls they both trail 
badly behind Martinelli.  May therefore is shaping up to be 
the next important political period:  Martinelli hopes to 
nail down an alliance partner and to sustain his independent 
campaign at its current altitude in the polls; Panamenistas 
will need to register for their presidential primary; and 
Herrera's forty-day period to ponder will be drawing to a 
close. 
EATON