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Viewing cable 08NDJAMENA124, AMB BRIEFS U.S. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO DEBY ADVISOR;

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NDJAMENA124 2008-03-31 07:06 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO8651
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0124 0910706
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310706Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6122
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000124 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU CD SU
SUBJECT: AMB BRIEFS U.S. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO DEBY ADVISOR; 
ADVISOR REQUESTS INFO ON MILITARY AIRCRAFT 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 00119 
 
1. (SBU) This message is an action request.  See para. 5. 
 
2. (SBU) Implementation of the Dakar agreement has not advanced and 
Khartoum continues to instigate violence in both Chad and Sudan, 
Presidential Advisor on International Affairs Yousef Abba Saleh told 
Ambassador Nigro on March 28, 2008.  Referencing the Sudanese 
military's bombing campaign in Darfur and its efforts to undermine 
the effectiveness of the UN-AU peacekeeping force by rejecting 
certain troop contributing countries, Saleh called for determined 
international condemnation of Sudan's actions and for the 
strengthening of EUFOR and UNAMID's mandates to control cross-border 
activity.  He also blamed Khartoum for using the "Janjaweed" to 
augment Chadian rebel forces intent on overthrowing President Deby's 
Government. 
 
3. (SBU) Ambassador Nigro expressed U.S. agreement with Saleh's 
analysis and said that the USG is pursuing a three-track diplomatic 
strategy to promote peace in the region.  First, the U.S. has asked 
both Sudan and Chad to cease support for rebel groups and has put 
Khartoum on notice that the international community expects it to 
abide by the Dakar agreement and will hold it accountable if rebels 
topple the Chadian Government by force.  Second, the U.S. is working 
toward coordinated action within the UN Security Council to address 
Chad-Sudan tensions.  Third, U.S. officials in Sudan, Chad, and 
Washington have spoken directly to Chadian and Sudanese rebel 
leaders to press them to disarm and to engage in peace negotiations 
with their respective governments.  "This situation cannot be 
resolved with arms but through a political path," said Ambassador 
Nigro.  He added that the U.S. supports Chadian Ambassador Bachir's 
recent indication that Deby intends to constitute a new, more 
inclusive government and understands that Chad hopes to advance an 
"internal dialogue" with opposition elements.  Saleh expressed 
appreciation for the U.S. approach. 
 
4. (SBU) Saleh informed Ambassador Nigro that President Deby wished 
to see him within the next week.  He also reiterated Chad's interest 
in purchasing C-130s from the U.S.  Since the visit of Deputy 
Secretary Negroponte in May 2007, the U.S. has not provided an 
 
SIPDIS 
update on the possibility of this sale, noted Saleh.  Ambassador 
Nigro replied that the U.S. is examining Chad's request and that 
there is at least a two to three-year delay in delivery of C-130s. 
He reminded Saleh of General Ward's suggestion, during his July 2007 
visit to N'djamena, that Chad consider purchasing C-27s and promised 
to provide the Government with more details on these aircraft. 
 
-------------- 
Action Request 
-------------- 
 
5. (SBU) As Ambassador Nigro is leaving on official travel on the 
evening of March 29, he may meet with President Deby earlier the 
same day.  President Deby is likely to inquire on the status of the 
C-130 purchase.  Post requests: A) The Department provide 
specifications on the C-130 versus the C-27 in relation to Chad's 
legitimate need for military transport aircraft; estimates of the 
delivery dates for both aircraft; and the cost of both aircraft as 
soon as possible and B) If C-27s will not meet Chad's legitimate 
needs in lieu of C-130s, the Department assist in suggesting to the 
Chadians a suitable alternative.  End action request. 
 
NIGRO