VZCZCXRO3655
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0111/01 0851046
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251046Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6105
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 0163
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0900
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1483

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000111 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
DEPT FOR AF/C, AF/RSA, S/CRS AND PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF MARR EAID PREF UN EU SU CD
SUBJECT: NEW SRSG FOR MINURCAT/EAST CHAD GIVES AMBASSADOR 
PROGRESS REPORT, REQUESTS U.S. LIAISON OFFICER 
 
REF:  N'DJAMENA 108 
 
NDJAMENA 00000111  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action message:  See para 10. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) New MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo briefed 
ambassador 3/21 on progress since he arrived two weeks 
ago, especially signing a Status of Mission Agreement 
with the GOC, after having successfully for now resisted 
GOC demands for higher pay and "international status" for 
Chadian police and gendarmes. MINURCAT is authorized not 
only 58 police trainers, but also 50 military liaison 
officers, 102 UN security officers, and up to 145 
locally-recruited assistant security officers. Angelo 
said that he wanted to move MINURCAT to Eastern Chad as 
soon as possible, despite unresolved logistical and 
transportation obstacles.  Angelo said that he regretted 
that his mission's mandate was not broader, but that 
after getting MINURCAT up and running, and overcoming 
extreme GOC suspicion of its role, he might be able to 
look at "helping Chad in other ways." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Angelo requested that the USG consider assigning 
a military liaison officer to MINURCAT, saying that an 
American MLO would be of considerable utility to 
MINURCAT's mission.  Besides supporting the assignment of 
military liaison officers, the Department should consider 
assigning a civilian liaison officer as well, ideally an 
S/CRS officer, which would not only underline U.S. 
support but also enable the USG to learn from the 
experience of the unique EU-UN enterprise to protect 
Darfur refugees and IDPs in eastern Chad.  End summary. 
 
 
--------------- 
NEW SRSG ANGELO 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Ambassador met March 21 with new Speial 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRS) for 
MINURCAT in Eastern Chad, Victor Angelo. It was their 
second meeting. 
 
---------------------------------- 
STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT SIGNED 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Angelo briefed Ambassador on the progress of 
MINURCAT since he arrived two weeks ago.  Angelo said he 
had signed the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with 
the GOC that morning, after having resolved problems that 
had blocked an agreement and avoided concessions to the 
GOC on pay and "international status" for its police and 
gendarmes.  The mode of payment would be directly to the 
police officer or gendarme (as UN rules required) not to 
the GOC (as the GOC had wanted) but in the presence of 
GOC officials and with their countersignature on the 
voucher. GOC demands that their police and gendarmes be 
paid more than UN rules permit and that they have 
"international status" were rejected.  The name of the 
Chadian force itself -- originally to be called Chadian 
Police to Protect Humanitarians -- was being changed to 
respond to GOC objections that it also included gendarmes 
and to NGO and IO objections to use of the word 
"humanitarian."  The new name would be announced 
shortly. 
 
-------------------------- 
MINURCAT'S FORCE STRUCTURE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Angelo said that MINURCAT's eventual maximum 
force structure was more robust and complex than perhaps 
some had assumed.  He was authorized not only 58 police 
trainers, but also 50 military liaison officers, 102 UN 
security officers, and up to 145 locally-recruited 
assistant security officers.  Angelo said he intended to 
make MINURCAT as robust as possible given its ambitious 
goals and the difficult circumstances it would work in. 
 
---------- 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
NDJAMENA 00000111  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Angelo said that he wanted to move MINURCAT to 
Eastern Chad as soon as possible.  He would overcome 
logistical roadblocks - UN lack of alacrity in 
contracting for logistical services - by sending MINURCAT 
personnel forward and seek logistical services locally. 
Lack of sufficient air mobility was also a problem, given 
the vast amount of geography that MINURCAT would have to 
cover.  Angelo said he was trying to recruit Europeans as 
military liaison and security officers, to enhance 
cooperation with EUFOR. 
 
------------------ 
MINURCAT'S MANDATE 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Angelo said that he regretted that his mission's 
mandate was not broader:  He was restricted to MINURCAT 
and eastern Chad.  Angelo agreed with Ambassador's 
analysis that the international community's attempt to 
reinforce security in Chad vis-Q-vis external aggression 
was linked closely to the need to strengthen the Chadian 
state internally by increasing its legitimacy through an 
opening of its authoritarian and ethnically-based 
political system.  Angelo said that it was important 
first to get MINURCAT up and running, and second to 
overcome extreme GOC suspicion of its role in Chad.  Once 
that were accomplished, he might be able to look at 
"helping Chad in other ways." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Angelo says he wants results and seems to be 
getting some pretty impressive ones quickly. MINURCAT 
should be deploying to its eastern Chad and Northeast CAR 
operating area soon, following closely on the heels of 
its EUFOR protecting force (reftel).  We like Angelo's 
idea of one or more U.S. liaison officers for MINURCAT 
and wonder if, besides supporting the assignment of 
military liaison officers, the Department would consider 
assigning a civilian liaison officer as well, ideally an 
S/CRS officer, to such duty.  Assigning both civilian and 
military liaison officers to MINURCAT would not only 
underline U.S. support for it but enable the USG to learn 
from the experience of the complex and conjoint EU-UN 
enterprise to protect Darfur refugees, IDPs, and other 
stressed Chadian populations in eastern Chad. 
 
-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
¶10. (U) That the Department support the assignment of a 
military liaison officer to MINURCAT and consider 
assigning a civilian liaison officer as well, ideally an 
S/CRS officer. 
 
NIGRO