VZCZCXRO1080
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0108/01 0801643
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201643Z MAR 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6101
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1659
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1481
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0541
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0774

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000108 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
DEPT FOR AF/C, AF/EX, PRM AND DS 
USAID FOR OFDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: EASTERN CHAD: EUFOR OUTPACING MINURCAT, IMPROVING SECURITY 
IN CAMPS AND ABECHE 
 
NDJAMENA 00000108  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY.  Despite earlier delays, the European Mission in 
eastern Chad has now leapfrogged impressively ahead of the UN police 
training mission which provides the raison d'etre for its presence. 
Hopes are pinned on the recent arrival of UN Special Representative 
Victor Angelo to speed up MINURCAT deployment. As elsewhere in Chad, 
rumors of impending rebel movements (true or false) circulate 
rapidly among a nervous population, but the EUFOR presence near 
camps and in Abeche has already improved security for refugees and 
humanitarian workers. As the rainy season draws near, continuing 
problems in the Libya corridor have impacted refugee rations in the 
east.  End Summary. 
 
EUFOR ANNOUNCES INITIAL OPERATING CAPABILITY 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) The European Mission in Chad and Central Africa (EUFOR) 
announced initial Operating Capability on 17 March 2008.  This date 
kicks off their 12-month countdown to end of mission.  EUFOR leaders 
will conduct a mid-mission review in August 2008 to assess the 
progression of the mission and discuss the possibility of a 
"bridging" operation or follow-on force (possibly observers) after 
their mandate expires. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In meetings with the Ambassador and the DATT in Abeche on 
March 18, EUFOR leaders articulated their mission as providing a 
security umbrella for MINURCAT, IDP and refugee camps, as well as 
the "war affected" population of eastern Chad.  EUFOR leaders also 
reiterated their authority to patrol 10 Km outside the camps and the 
right of pursuit up to the Sudanese border, but not to maintain a 
permanent presence along the border.  Finally, EUFOR leaders 
expressed a desire to move quickly in supporting relocation of 
Chadian Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the Dar Sila region 
of Chad in order to reinforce their announcement of initial 
operating capability and demonstrate their resolve. 
 
¶4. (U) EUFOR deployment currently stands at 1790 with 1150 of those 
deployed troops being of French origin.  EUFOR expressed some 
concern regarding the short term deployment of the Portuguese and 
the Swedes who are due to depart in August.  Several contributing 
nations (Albania, Russia, Ukraine among those mentioned) have 
committed to a deployment but have not finalized dates or number of 
personnel and type of equipment. The lack of a multi-national 
presence in Birao, Central African Republic (CAR) was mentioned as 
an issue that needs to be addressed as this contingent is made up 
exclusively of French soldiers and is not representative of the 
coalition. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Although EUFOR had a later start than MINURCAT due to 
difficulties in mustering logistics support and troop commitments, 
EUFOR is now significantly ahead of the UN Police training mission 
in terms of readiness to perform the mission set out in UN Security 
Resolution 1778.  MINURCAT has been bogged down in negotiations with 
the Government of Chad (GOC) over Chadian police stipends.  In 
additional, MINURCAT trainers are still waiting for the names of the 
800 Chadian police and gendarmes who have been proposed by the GOC 
for training.  Once these names are provided, another month will go 
by before the first tranche of police are trained, equipped and 
ready to assume their duties protecting refugees, IDPs and 
humanitarian workers. 
 
CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (U) The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UN OCHA) has moved smartly to address the frequently articulated 
concerns of the humanitarian community vis a vis civil and military 
relationships and the importance of maintaining the strict 
neutrality of humanitarian assistance. OCHA has disseminated 
"Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies" - 
the first collection of core humanitarian instruments produced by 
the United Nations and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on 
this subject and bringing together the essential guidance materials 
in order to assist humanitarian and military professionals to handle 
civil-military issues in a manner that respects and reflects 
humanitarian concerns at the strategic, operational and tactical 
levels. OCHA will host a workshop on the guidelines in N'Djamena and 
a more extensive two-day seminar on the guidelines April 2-3 in 
Abeche.  Members of diplomatic community are encouraged to attend 
both events. 
 
SECURITY IN ABECHE 
------------------ 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000108  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶7.  The EUFOR presence is transforming Abeche - a town already 
noticeably populated by the offices and vehicles of western relief 
workers.  EUFOR and MINURCAT staff report that the town has been 
quiet and generally safe for international staff.  Despite rumors of 
rebel movements, MINURCAT still considers banditry to be the largest 
overall security threat facing people in Abeche and in eastern Chad 
as a whole.  The introduction of 24/7 EUFOR roving patrols in Abeche 
shortly will provide an additional measure of security to the town. 
As elsewhere in Chad, rumors of rebel movements (often false) 
circulate rapidly among a panicky population, creating difficulties 
for EUFOR and MINURCAT security advisors in separating fact from 
fiction as they seek to assess the security situation outside of 
Abeche. 
 
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN EASTERN CHAD 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Due to insufficient food stocks in eastern Chad, related to 
continuing problems with the Libya corridor pipeline, WFP has had to 
reduce the food ration for distribution to refugees from 2100 Kc to 
1644 Kc for the month of March. This reduction in rations will 
continue until the Libya corridor can be opened and WFP receives 
sufficient food stocks for April/May distributions. USAID/OFDA/FFP 
are working with WFP Chad and Rome to find solutions to the Libya 
corridor problems and support sufficient prepositioning of food 
stocks in eastern Chad prior to the rainy season. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) UNHCR has stated their logistics are insufficient to 
transport the newly-arrived Sudanese refugees to the two camps 
outside Guereda. Currently UNHCR has five trucks in position in the 
east; they need at least 25 fully operational in order to move the 
refugees to more secure locations in a timely manner. USAID/OFDA and 
PRM are informed of the issue and PRM is in dialogue with UNHCR to 
help find a solution to the logistics problem. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The EUFOR pace is impressive.  Their presence near camps 
and in Abeche has already improved security for refugees and 
humanitarian workers.  It is hard to overstate the logistical 
difficulties that these operations face, given that Abeche is known 
as the most landlocked destination anywhere in the world - and 
probably the one with the poorest transport infrastructure. 
 
¶11. (SBU) But the delay in MINURCAT deployment poses problems for 
EUFOR, as EUFOR's raison d'etre is to provide force protection to 
MINURCAT.  Many hope that the recent arrival of the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General, Victor Angelo, will give 
a much-needed political push to discussions with the government on 
what has become a battle of wills over compensation. 
 
NIGRO