VZCZCXYZ5530
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0638/01 0661455
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061455Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7049

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000638 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KSCA PREL PARM TSPA RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S GLONASS: LOST IN SPACE 
 
REF: (A) STATE 19459 
(B) MOSCOW 01637 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) In late 2007, First Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov trumpeted 
the launch of three new satellites that were to complete the GLONASS 
system's coverage of Russia and challenge GPS in the commercial 
navigation market.  Soon after, however, news reports revealed that 
the system had serious flaws, and that commercialization was still 
months or years away.  Ivanov was quick to point blame at Anatoly 
Perminov, Head of the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos), and 
publicly ordered that ambitious space projects be put on the back 
burner until GLONASS is operational.  Since then, Roscosmos has been 
scrambling to get GLONASS on track, but faces major impediments, 
including making its 18 satellites fully operational, and spurring 
the production of parts and equipment needed to commercialize the 
system.  End summary. 
 
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Short-Lived Celebration 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) In December 2007, Russia launched three new satellites as 
part of its Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS).  First 
Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov proclaimed that the launches 
enlarged the GLONASS satellite fleet to 18, the number required to 
provide commercial navigation services covering all of Russia.  The 
announcement appeared to fulfill his pledge to President Putin to 
have GLONASS operational and commercially available in Russia by 
¶2008.  At the time of the announcement, Ivanov predicted that the 
GLONASS system which requires 24 satellites would be available 
worldwide by 2010.  Roscosmos Head Anatoly Perminov predicted at the 
time that "...the sellers of GPS services will lose their monopoly." 
 
 
¶3. (U) The euphoric mood was short-lived, however, as Russian 
newspapers reported that only 13 of the 18 satellites in the fleet 
were actually operational.  The others had been withdrawn from orbit 
for maintenance or had not successfully joined the network.  The 13 
functioning satellites covered only 50 percent of Russia's 
territory, and even that coverage was sporadic.  Russian daily 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta commented that "what we are witnessing is not 
the success of GLONASS, but a revival of the Soviet tradition of 
over-committing, claiming to exceed targets, and then engaging in 
window dressing." 
 
¶4. (U) On January 23 Ivanov publicly criticized Perminov for 
Roscosmos' failure to have GLONASS ready, and ordered that the 
Agency's space exploration programs be put on the back burner until 
GLONASS is working.  Ivanov charged that "Working on such 
large-scale and correspondingly wasteful projects (such as missions 
to the moon or Mars) purely to satisfy our own ambitions or to 
achieve some kind of fantastic goal is something we have no right to 
do."  Perminov blamed a lack of funding for the delays, and pledged 
to shift priorities in 2008.  There has been widespread speculation 
that Perminov could be dismissed over the issue. 
 
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Roscosmos' View 
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¶5. (SBU) In a recent meeting, Roscosmos officials told us that there 
are currently 16 satellites in orbit.  Only 14 are currently 
operating, but the Agency hopes that the remaining two will be 
functional "soon."  Once that occurs, coverage within Russian 
territory should reach at least 81 percent, and global coverage 
should be at least 65 percent. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Roscosmos also told us that it is working on the 
commercialization of GLONASS, but is hampered by a number of issues. 
 First, a system operator has not been selected.  This means that 
while Roscosmos works to get sufficient satellites in place, there 
is no group in charge of developing commercial applications on the 
ground.  Second, the Federal Agency on Industry (Rosprom), which 
reports to the Ministry of Industry and Energy, was originally 
responsible for manufacturing commercial navigation equipment with 
federal funds.  However, Rosprom told Roscosmos that it would not be 
ready to produce GLONASS receiving equipment until 2010.  Perminov 
therefore ordered his own Agency's Scientific Research Institute 
(SRI), which normally produces space devices to produce the 
equipment. 
 
¶7. (SBU) SRI has designed one navigation device that uses both GPS 
and GLONASS.  Roscosmos explained to us that SRI manufactured 1000 
of these devices, which reportedly sold out immediately, and that 
they have committed to producing 1500 - 2000 of the units each 
month.  However, we have yet to see these devices on store shelves. 
Roscosmos noted that they have an agreement to sell integrated 
GPS/GLOSNASS devices through the Russian chain of electronics stores 
called "ION."  Roscosmos hesitated to predict to us when 
GLONASS-only receivers would be commercially available, but offered 
the possibility of 2011 "if all goes well." 
 
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Private Sector Adapts 
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¶8. (U) GLONASS' problems have not impacted Russian drivers and other 
users of navigation technology -- they are simply purchasing 
foreign-produced GPS devices.  Although work to digitize Russian 
maps has just begun here, maps digitized outside Russia are 
available for download on the internet.  Meanwhile, Russia's private 
sector navigation equipment producers face hurdles.  One company, 
the JJ Group, reports that a shortage of chipsets (microchips that 
decode satellite signals and calculate coordinates) is stalling its 
production of dual-band GPS/GLONASS receivers.  The company notes 
that as soon as its suppliers can provide more chipsets, they are 
ready to produce the navigators. 
 
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Comment 
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¶9. (SBU) The failure thus far to develop GLONASS into a commercially 
viable system bodes ill for Roscosmos.  It also foreshadows the 
hurdles to be faced by other "State Corporations" that the GOR has 
either created, such as Rosnanotech in an attempt to transform 
Russia's scientific agencies into economically profitable ventures. 
The GOR's attempts to serve in roles that are often filled by the 
private sector in the U.S., such as supplying capital and developing 
commercial applications, have in the case of GLONASS in any case, so 
far failed to provide the flexibility and market responsiveness 
necessary in the fast-moving world of information technology. 
 
BURNS