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DE RUEHME #0713/01 0711940
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R 111940Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0850
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USNORTHCOM
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MEXICO 000713 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM PINR MASS MX
SUBJECT: NARCO-KILLINGS UPDATE 
 
REF: A. (A) 07 MEXICO 6228 
     ¶B. (B) 07 MEXICO 6196 
     ¶C. (C) 07 MEXICO 5401 
 
¶1. (SBU) According to figures from the National Center for 
Information, Analysis and Planning in order to Fight Crime 
(CENAPI), there were over 2,400 organized crime-related 
homicides in 2007, compared to an estimated 2,120 in 2006. 
The majority of these killings continue to occur in states 
traditionally associated with narcotics trafficking, such as 
Sinaloa (385 executions in 2007), Michoacan (319), Guerrero 
(278), Chihuahua (215), and Baja California (181).  It is 
estimated that approximately 300 of these homicides were law 
enforcement officials and 27 military officials.  The death 
toll in January 2008, tracked by newspapers, was 
approximately 201. 
 
----------------------------------- 
December/January -- Violence Spikes 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) The end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008 witnessed an 
unusually high level of armed clashes between narco gunmen 
and the government forces -- army and police -- in the 
central state of Zacatecas (December 29) and, more acutely, 
in northern Tamaulipas.  In the former, seven police officers 
were injured and two were killed in an ambush staged to 
rescue three men arrested while transporting a kidnap victim. 
 The attack was attributed to Los Zetas, the notorious hit 
team of the Gulf cartel. 
 
¶3. (U) Immediately following this attack, three separate 
incidents took place in Tamaulipas. 
 
-- On December 29 the chief of police in Matamoros was killed 
by unidentified gunmen. 
-- On January 7 a group of 13 gunmen engaged a joint force of 
army troops and paramilitary members of the Federal 
Preventive Police (PFP) in Rio Bravo: 8 of the latter were 
injured, while 3 of the attackers were killed and 10 were 
arrested. Interrogation of the detainees revealed that this 
outfit was also part of Los Zetas. 
-- The next day, January 8, in Reynosa, an unknown number of 
gunmen, identified as Zetas, opened fire on a unit of the 
Federal Investigation Agency (AFI) that was pursuing them, 
killing 2 officers and wounding a third. 
 
¶4. (U) Mexico's military forces have not come out unscathed. 
After a further 1500 federal police officers (mainly military 
troops seconded to the PFP) were deployed in Michoacan, a 
clash with cartel gunmen on February 6 claimed the life of 
Army Colonel Fortino Castillo Leon, the second highest 
ranking causality of the GOM's counter-narcotics campaign. 
(Note:  The army also lost a Colonel on May 1, 2007 in the 
course of a drug fight in Guerrero.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Drug-Related Violence Spreads to Mexico City 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Through most of 2007, Mexico City had suffered little 
violence compared to the levels observed in many other parts 
of the country.  However, in December 2007, 4 people working 
at Mexico City's international airport were killed and 
decapitated, sparking fears that drug gangs were increasing 
their activities in Mexico City. The operations director of 
Jet Service was one of those decapitated, along with one of 
his staff members. All of the Jet Service personnel involved, 
including a disappeared member of the staff, checked goods 
arriving at the airport and had the right to enter cargo 
holds on aircraft.  The fact that the men's heads were cut 
off along with their fingers suggests that the killers might 
have been seeking revenge against the victims for not handing 
over drugs that had been seized by customs (on December 12) 
or informing authorities where to find the drugs. The fear of 
narco-violence spreading to Mexico City was further supported 
on December 19, when the federal Attorney General's office 
(PGR) announced the arrest of six men with heavy weapons and 
a grenade launcher in Mexico City. At least 3 of those 
arrested were policemen.  One was a member of AFI, while 2 
others were members of the Mexico City police force. 
 
¶6. (U) Moreover, in mid-January three men were arrested in 
Mexico City with shoulder-fired rockets, rifles and a 
submachine gun.  Deputy Attorney General Jose Luis Santiago 
 
MEXICO 00000713  002 OF 005 
 
 
Vasconcelos -- a point man in the country's war on drug gangs 
and the official in charge of extraditing drug bosses to the 
U.S. -- said that the men arrested were plotting to kill him. 
 He said the suspected hit men may belong to the Sinaloa 
Cartel, which dominates Mexico's Pacific Coast cocaine 
smuggling routes. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Bomb In Mexico City Blamed on Drug Dealers 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) A bomb that exploded about 100 meters from the Federal 
District police headquarters has also contributed to rising 
concern about drug related violence in Mexico City. 
Investigators concluded that the bomb was aimed at a senior 
anti-drug policeman.  Local press immediately speculated that 
the Sinaloa cartel may have had a role in the incident.  The 
Sinaloa gang wants to establish itself in Mexico City but a 
series of successful raids on drug gangs have set back their 
efforts. In retaliation, the gang purportedly targeted the 
deputy head of public security in the Mexico City government 
for assassination. 
 
¶8. (SBU) However, Mexico City's chief prosecutor Rodolfo 
Felix Cardenas, concluded that the attack was probably the 
work of drug dealers, not the cartels.  The devices were 
homemade, and the initial investigation was drawing attention 
to an area of the capital known for drug dealing. Embassy 
security analysts agree with this hypothesis and note that 
the details released by police and security camera footage of 
the bungled operation suggest the bomber was a common 
criminal/drug-dealer and not one of the cartels' many 
professional hitmen.  Nevertheless, security experts say the 
use of explosives sets a worrying precedent.   The bomber, 
who was killed when the bomb he was carrying exploded, was 
Juan Manuel Meza, known as "El Pipen."  He was identified by 
his brother who said that he had not seen him for six years. 
 
9.(SBU)  Prior to the incident, Attorney General Eduardo 
Medina Mora had already maintained that drug trafficking 
cartels were operating in Mexico City. Joel Ortega, Mexico 
City Secretary of Public Security, has also asserted that 
cartel members were living in residential areas of the city, 
blending in with the wealthy population that travels in 
luxury vehicles with security guards.  On February 29, 
security expert Jorge Chabat told poloffs that there were 
definite indications of a cartel presence, which was not 
surprising given the large domestic market.  Both embassy 
security analysts and Chabat also noted that three of 
Mexico's most wanted fugitives were arrested in Mexico City 
between August and September 2007: Juan Carlos de la Cruz 
Reyna, Sandra Avila Beltran, and Juan Diego Espinoza. 
 
------------ 
GOM Response 
------------ 
 
¶10. (U) Since our last report (reftel), federal officials 
have made a number of high-profile arrests and seizures.  The 
capture of Alfredo Beltran Leyva -- a top ranking leader in 
the Sinaloa Cartel and brother of Arturo Beltran Leyva (the 
right-hand man of the cartel's leader "El Chapo" Guzman) -- 
by Mexican army special forces on January 21 represents the 
most important arrest since Calderon took office in December 
¶2006.  The following day, utilizing forensic analysis of 
communications equipment seized at the time of Beltran's 
arrest, officers from the PFP's Special Anti-Narcotics Unit 
arrested another 11 alleged hitmen working for the Sinaloa 
Cartel in Mexico City.  The gangsters were arrested in two 
raids on houses located in two upscale neighborhoods in 
southern Mexico City.  The gangsters had dozens of high-power 
firearms and ammunition, including grenade launchers, machine 
guns, and around 40 bullet-proof vests.  Officers also found 
a laboratory that was used to manufacture synthetic drugs. 
Federal officials confirmed that those arrested are members 
of the organization controlled by Arturo Beltran Leyva. 
 
¶11. (U) The GOM's success with the Sinaloa Cartel has been 
matched by operations targeting the country's two other major 
drug gangs, the Gulf Cartel and the Arellano Felix 
organization (aka "Tijuana Cartel").  From January 2007 to 
January 22, 2008 the GOM claims to have arrested over 50 
members of the Gulf Cartel.  Separately, on January 17 in 
Tijuana, four senior figures of the Tijuana Cartel were 
captured and a "killers' training school" was discovered 
 
MEXICO 00000713  003 OF 005 
 
 
complete with an underground shooting range and an arsenal of 
weapons. 
 
¶12. (U) Other noteworthy blows against the narcocartels since 
our last report (reftel) include the following: 
 
-- On December 12, Mexican Army elements detained one of the 
top leaders of the Gulf Cartel along with three of his 
subordinates in an operation in the state of Tamaulipas. 
Marco Antonio Ramirez, aka "Tony la Palma" reportedly ran 
large-scale operations in the states of San Luis Potosi, 
Tamaulipas, Queretero, Hidalgo and Mexico. 
 
-- On January 12, 30 presumed Gulf Cartel enforcers ("Zetas") 
were arrested by federal law enforcement authorities in 
Coahuila and Campeche.  Authorities seized drugs, high 
powered weapons, communications equipment and cars .  The 
Zetas captured in these operations have been flown to Mexico 
City, where they are being held in high security PGR 
facilities. 
 
-- On January 26 Hector Izar Castro "El Teto" was arrested. 
Izar was a former director of the municipal police in Rio 
Verde, San Luis Potosi, who switched sides to become a leader 
of the Zetas. 
 
-- On February 7, in the Tamaulipas border town of Miguel 
Aleman, the Mexican military seized nearly ten tons of 
marijuana, 89 assault rifles, more than 83,000 rounds of 
ammunition, and a variety of other weapons. Also seized in 
the operation were a number of trucks, camouflage uniforms, 
and weapons training gear. Five men were arrested in 
connection with the seizure and have been taken to Mexico 
City to be charged.  The PGR says this is the most important 
weapons seizure in Mexico in 20 years. 
 
¶13. (U) On January 31, Attorney General Medina Mora reported 
that since the beginning of the Calderon Administration, 
Mexico's security forces had arrested 20,996 people suspected 
of involvement in drug trafficking.  Of these, he said more 
than 15,000 had been bound over for trial in the federal 
courts, suggesting that law enforcement authorities are 
developing sufficient evidence for prosecution in the great 
majority of cases. 
 
------------------- 
GDF's Contribution 
------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Mexico City's government (GDF) is also making an 
effort to disrupt links to organized crime within the local 
police.  In 2007, an average of 8 local policemen a month 
were jailed for committing serious crimes with the charges 
ranging from murder to armed robbery, grievous bodily harm, 
kidnapping, extortion, helping prisoners escape, blackmail, 
and sexual abuse.  In 2006, only 5 policemen were sent to 
jail.  The GDF's Deputy Secretary of Government, Juan Jose 
Garcia Ochoa believes efforts to clean up the police is one 
reason why the mayor of Mexico City, Marcelo Ebrard, enjoys 
relatively high approval ratings (up to 54 percent). 
 
¶15. (U) The GDF can also lay claim to several successful 
seizures and arrests. On February 13, local police arrested 7 
alleged criminals of the Sinaloa Cartel and transported them 
to a local Public Security Secretariat facility.  According 
to police, the two vehicles carrying the criminals were 
initially stopped because they were being driven strangely, 
with strobe lights shining inside them. Police found 
sophisticated weapons inside their vehicles, including 
special bullets known as "cop killers," grenades, 
semiautomatic rifles, and bullet proof vests. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
GOM's Counter-Narcotics Operations Press-On 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
16.(U)  Meanwhile, the GOM continues to send federal forces 
into various states.  On February 26, SEDENA officials 
announced that 1,800 additional military personnel would be 
sent to Tamaulipas at the end of February. The troops will 
augment the more than 3,000 troops already operating there 
combating organized crime as part of Operation Nuevo 
Leon-Tamaulipas. 
 
¶17. (U) In March, the GOM plans to launch "Opercion 
 
MEXICO 00000713  004 OF 005 
 
 
Limpieza." Under this measure, federal authorities and the 
Mexican Army will inspect all privately owned aircraft 
entering into Mexican airspace from Central and South 
America.  All such aircraft should land at 1 of 3 airports 
(Chetumal and Cozumel in Quintana Roo State and Tapachula, 
Chiapas State).  A similar measure is planned for maritime 
vessels with the Mexican Navy playing a major role. 
 
------------------------- 
Are the Cartels Hurting? 
------------------------- 
 
¶18. (U) On February 22, local newspaper El Universal reported 
that representatives of Mexico's drug cartels approached 
senior military officials to negotiate an end to the hunt for 
their leaders and the attacks against them.  In exchange, the 
cartels promised a reduction in criminal violence.  The 
military reportedly rejected the proposal asserting it only 
emboldens them in redoubling their efforts to combat 
organized crime. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Jorge Chabat told poloffs that Calderon's CN 
strategy had recently shifted towards attacking the revenue 
flows of the cartels, focusing more on seizures and less on 
arresting cartel leaders (or "capos").  He compared this 
strategy to that of the Fox Administration, which targeted 
capos.  He noted that Fox's strategy did not work and we only 
saw the emergence of new capos in their place.  He is 
optimistic that Calderon's strategy of attacking both capos 
and the economy of the cartels will definitely have a 
significant effect. 
 
20.(SBU) Embassy security analysts continue to believe that 
the GOM's CN operations are impacting the cartels operations, 
noting the number of seizures and arrests that have taken 
place.  As a potential unintended consequence of the GOM's CN 
ops, there is increasing evidence the cartels are looking to 
cooperate more in the form of some kind of division of labor, 
with different groups specializing either in transportation, 
production, and distribution -- akin to what we have seen in 
Colombia.  This scenario would present new challenges to the 
GOM.  Chabat believed this was possible but was cautiously 
optimistic, maintaining the cartels would be easier to 
control and less violent under this scenario. 
 
---------------------- 
CN Ops Draw Criticism 
---------------------- 
 
21.(U)  On January 23 President Calderon signed a decree, the 
Programa Sectorial de Defensa Nacional 2007-2012, which 
envisages keeping the army -- currently deployed in 10 states 
-- out on the streets for the remainder of his 
administration.  The same day the decree was signed, the head 
of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) Jose Luis 
Soberanes, called upon Mexico,s Congress to publish a 
timetable for the withdrawal of troops from the country's 
streets. 
 
¶22. (SBU) PRI Senate leader Manlio Fabio Beltrones endorsed 
Soberanes' proposal January 25 and suggested that the Senate 
set a deadline of 18 months for the withdrawal of military 
troops.  Beltrones said the army needed to be replaced by a 
special police force trained to deal with organized crime. 
Beltones recognized that the army had performed functions 
beyond the current capacity of Mexico,s police force but 
considered it unacceptable for the army to assume this role 
indefinitely.  President of the Institute for Security and 
Democracy (INSYDE), Ernesto Lopez Portillo Vargas, echoed 
similar concerns to emboffs on February 22. Portillo said the 
longer the military was involved, the greater risk they ran 
of "contamination" by the cartels. As the military's role 
deepened, so too did the prospects of its members becoming 
compromised as either informants or converts to organized 
criminal organizations. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Many leftist political leaders have also been 
critical.  On February 22, PRD leader Manuel Camacho Solis 
opined to a visiting congressional staffer and emboffs that 
the GOM's CN operations were just a "show" by Calderon to 
boost his popularity ratings.  He maintained the GOM was 
exhausting all of its good intel leads in its rush to produce 
quick results.  He argued that Calderon needs to develop a 
long-term intelligence strategy.  He predicted Calderon's 
popularity will start to wane when it no longer can deliver 
 
MEXICO 00000713  005 OF 005 
 
 
victories in the drug war.  On February 28, PRD Senator Graco 
Ramirez Garrido who sits on the National Defense Commission 
expressed similar concerns to poloffs. He believes Calderon's 
plan to use the military throughout his term is "too long" 
and described the CN ops as a "militarization of the 
country."  His solution, however, for dealing with the 
problem was to legalize drugs. 
 
¶24. (U) Intermittent claims of abuses by security forces also 
undermine the integrity of the government's efforts.  The 
National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) has launched two 
new investigations against into military operations that took 
place this year.  On January 11, Victor Alberto de Paz 
Ortega, 17 years old, was allegedly driving in a truck with 
his friend when soldiers shot and killed him in Huetamo. 
SEDENA claimed the youth tried to run over the soldiers and 
the soldiers responded by shooting.  The second investigation 
is related to an incident that occurred in February when 
Sergio Meza Varela was allegedly shot and killed by soldiers 
as he attempted to avoid a military checkpoint. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶25. (SBU) Although narco-killings continue, an ongoing string 
of high-profile arrests and seizures suggests President 
Calderon's resolve has not wavered in taking this fight to 
the cartels.  In the meantime, the GOM won adoption of 
judicial reform legislation that will give the security 
forces new tools to fight organized crime.  It is also 
pushing forward on a package of public security reforms that 
would modify the entire police structure across the country 
to emphasizing internal affairs and other ways to 
professionalize the police.  Ultimately, Calderon's objective 
is to train and empower the police to assume their rightful 
lead on all CN operations (septel). 
 
¶26. (SBU) Calderon's efforts to combat organized crime have 
also bought him public support.  On March 3 local newspaper 
Milenio reported on Calderon's approval rating at the start 
of 2008.  According to the poll, 64% of Mexicans believe 
Calderon is doing a good job.  At the same time, challenges 
remain.  In the same poll, only 42% of those interviewed say 
that they have noticed improvements in the level of drug 
consumption and distribution due to Calderon's fight against 
organized crime.  There is also evidence that some 
drug-induced violence is moving from the Southwest border to 
the heart of Mexico.  Recent arrests/seizures in Mexico City, 
the reported assassination plot against PGR Deputy Attorney 
General Santiago Vasconcelos, and the February 15th bombing 
near Mexico City Public Security offices support this 
hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
GARZA