VZCZCXRO8308
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #0274/01 0671121
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071121Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4426
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 3346

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000274 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SP
SUBJECT: SPANISH ELECTIONS:  NECK AND NECK IN THE 
HOMESTRETCH 
 
REF: MADRID 213 AND PREVIOUS 
 
MADRID 00000274  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Two days away from the March 9 Spanish 
general election, the polls continue to suggest a close race 
with Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero's Spanish Socialist Workers 
Party (PSOE) perhaps enjoying a slight lead over Mariano 
Rajoy's Popular Party (PP).  The only thing analysts seem to 
agree on is that high voter turnout favors Zapatero while low 
turnout benefits Rajoy.  No one expects the victor to take an 
absolute majority in congress, so March 9 is likely to mark 
the beginning of some serious deal-making with the smaller 
parties.  End summary. 
 
Zapatero and Rajoy - Final Debate 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Zapatero and Rajoy held their second and final 
debate March 3.  12 million Spaniards tuned in to watch a 
heated discussion in which neither candidate said much that 
was new and both devoted considerable time to events long 
past.  Rajoy again made the case that ordinary Spaniards were 
suffering in a worsening economy.  Zapatero accused Rajoy of 
having only recently discovered the economic issue, leading 
to a seemingly endless argument about whether Rajoy had or 
had not questioned Zapatero about the economy early in the 
legislature that just ended.  In a discussion of foreign 
policy, neither candidate had much to say about the future. 
Instead, Zapatero raised the Iraq war and Rajoy repeatedly 
accused him of supporting a UN resolution urging troop 
contributions to Iraq after pulling out Spanish troops.  On 
terrorism, Zapatero repeated his accusation that the PP has 
played politics, pledging he would support any opposition 
government's policy against ETA.  Rajoy's rejoinder was that 
if Zapatero's policy with ETA was to fight rather than 
negotiate, he would support him. 
 
¶3. (SBU) At times Zapatero appeared genuinely angry, 
repeatedly interrupting Rajoy.  Perhaps this was a deliberate 
attempt to stir up PSOE voters, but combined with Rajoy's 
incessant attacks regarding the economy, immigration, and 
public security it contributed to an overall negative 
atmosphere.  Snap polls after the debate (we cannot vouch for 
their trustworthiness) suggested Zapatero won the debate. 
The press split along partisan lines.  Our guess, as with the 
first debate, is that no one's mind was changed by this 
debate and undecided voters did not get much help. 
 
Polls and Turnout 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (U) As polls have consistently shown over many months, the 
final pre-election polls show the PSOE with an edge.  For 
example, a Metroscopia poll published March 2 in left-wing 
daily El Pais showed the PSOE with 42.9 percent of the vote 
and 165-169 congressional seats.  The PP showed up with 38.8 
percent and 148-154 seats (an absolute majority would be 176 
seats; in 2004 the PSOE won 164 seats and the PP 148.).  The 
poll showed the Catalan Convergence and Union Party (CIU) 
with nine seats, the Basque National Party (PNV) with seven 
seats, the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) with five to 
six seats, the United Left (IU) with four seats, and other, 
even smaller parties, with a total of six to seven seats. 
The poll showed turnout at 74-75 percent (it was 75.66 
percent in 2004).  The poll was based on 8,750 telephone 
interviews conducted February 8-27 (the first Zapatero-Rajoy 
debate was February 25).  The margin of error was plus or 
minus 1.1 percent. 
 
¶5. (U) A Sigma Dos poll published March 3 in the conservative 
daily El Mundo showed the PSOE with 43.4 percent of the vote 
and 157-171 congressional seats.  The PP showed up with 39.3 
percent and 148-161 seats.  The poll showed the CIU with 9-11 
seats, PNV with 7 seats, ERC with five or six seats, the IU 
with four seats, and the smaller parties with a total of 
three to eight seats.  The poll showed turnout at 76-78 
percent.  The poll was based on 11,000 telephone interviews 
conducted between February 20 and March 1.  The margin of 
error was plus or minus 1.2 percent. 
 
¶6. (U) March 3 was the last day polls could be published in 
Spain, but a Barcelona left-leaning daily evaded the 
prohibition by releasing a poll in their March 5 Andorra 
edition.  The poll was conducted by the Group of Social and 
Public Opinion Studies (Gabinet d'Estudis Socials i Opinio 
Publica or GESOP) and showed the PSOE with 41.5 percent to 
the PP's 39.0 percent.  A datum likely to alarm (and perhaps 
motivate) the PSOE was the prediction of only 68 percent 
voter turnout.  The poll was based on 600 telephone 
 
MADRID 00000274  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
interviews conducted March 4.  The margin of error was plus 
or minus 4 percent. 
 
¶7. (SBU) We also have unpublished poll conducted by ASEP 
(Juan Diez Nicolas, a member of Spain's pre-PP conservative 
party but well-regarded for the technical rigor of his 
polling).  Diez does not predict an outcome (he once told us 
that given Spain's provincial voting scheme, one would need 
roughly 30,000 interviews to make worthwhile predictions, and 
since he eschews telephone interviews as inherently 
unreliable, the cost would be prohibitively high). 
Nevertheless, he mentions a 1.6 percent PSOE advantage and 
argues that the outcome will be close (no more than three 
point if the PSOE wins or no more than two points if the PP 
wins -- the PSOE won by 4.9 percent in 2004).  He predicted 
turnout at 68-72 percent, noting that at 72 percent or above, 
a PSOE victory became more likely, while the reverse was true 
at 68 percent or less.  The poll was based on 1,201 
face-to-face home interviews conducted February 11-17.  The 
margin of error is unknown.  The poll can be found at 
www.jdsurvey.net. 
 
¶8. (U) As we have noted previously, the conventional wisdom 
here is that low turnout favors the PP.  In 2004, the Iraq 
war and the Madrid train bombings three days before the 
elections sent 75.66 percent of voters to the polls, and the 
PSOE won a surprise victory.  The percentages of voter 
turnout (and victors) in other general elections:  79.97 in 
1982 (PSOE absolute majority); 70.49 in 1986 (PSOE absolute 
majority); 69.93 in 1989 (PSOE); 76.44 in 1993 (PSOE); 77.38 
in 1996 (PP, the anomalous result was attributed to PSOE 
corruption scandals); and 68.71 in 2000 (PP absolute 
majority). 
 
Absentee Voters and Recounts 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) The polls will close here at 8:00 pm and the first 
results should start coming out shortly thereafter. By 
midnight, and perhaps as early as 10:00 pm local, we should 
know who won.  However, if the margins are razor thin, the 
absentee (including overseas) vote could become a factor. 
There are approximately 1.2 million voters overseas.  The 
largest numbers are in Argentina, France, and Venezuela. 
Like absentee voters in Spain, they could request an absentee 
ballot (the deadline for doing so was February 28).  Overseas 
voters also had the option of going to a Spanish embassy or 
consulate to vote (March 2 was the deadline).  The deadline 
for posting absentee ballots was March 6 (or March 8 for 
overseas voters who chose to mail their ballots).  Absentee 
ballots are counted in the province in which the voter is 
listed in the census.  In 2004 the absentee vote favored the 
PP by nearly 20 percent (but it predated the terrorist 
attacks in Madrid three days before the election).  Requests 
for absentee ballots have been heavy this year (770,000) 
compared to 2004 (559,730).  This might suggest higher voter 
turnout across the board, but remember that the 2004 absentee 
ballot requests were made before the train bombings raised 
voter interest.  As a footnote, we know of at least one 
controversy in recent years regarding overseas voting.  The 
PP alleges that in 2005 it failed to capture Galicia because 
Venezuela's Hugo Chavez held up a Spanish diplomatic pouch 
containing -- according to the PP -- a large number of PP 
ballots. 
 
¶10. (U) If the results in a given race a very close, there 
might be a call for a recount.  However, the Spanish system 
of voting is uniform and simple.  Voters choose the ballot of 
the party for which they wish to vote and seal it in an 
envelope.  They then identify themselves to the poll workers 
and are allowed to place the envelope in a ballot box.  When 
the polls close, the four poll workers (selected randomly 
from the census - similar to jury duty in the U.S.) open the 
envelopes and count the ballots.  If an envelope contains 
more than one ballot or if the voter has made any marks on 
the ballot, that vote is void.  After counting and certifying 
the results (under the watchful eyes of any party observers 
present), the election materials are taken by courier to the 
electoral commission offices, where the results are entered 
in a computer. 
 
¶11. (U) Regardless of any glitches with absentee ballots or 
recounts, the election results are supposed to be finalized 
and the official count published as early as March 12 but no 
later than March 15.  Then follows the roughly month-long 
process of forming a government described in reftels. 
 
Comment 
 
MADRID 00000274  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) We expect a close race.  We have no reason to doubt 
the conventional wisdom about turnout.  A party needs 176 
congressional seats to have an absolute majority and no one 
here is predicting either party will achieve that.  With 
fewer seats, the winner will have to court the small parties, 
which gives the advantage to the PSOE.  There are two other 
potential twists to keep in mind.  One, if the winner comes 
out with more seats than votes (which has never happened), he 
will be in an embarrassing position, although both candidates 
have recently backed away from saying they would not try to 
form a government in that circumstance.  Two, because of the 
difficulty the PP could have in forming a coalition (see 
reftels), it could win but find itself unable to form a 
government (which has also never happened).  We do not 
predict either outcome, but the possibilities are there. 
AGUIRRE